Andrea N. v. Saul
Decision Date | 09 March 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 3:18-CV-1186 (CFH),3:18-CV-1186 (CFH) |
Parties | ANDREA N., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
PETER A. GORTON, ESQ.
PETER W. JEWETT, ESQ.
Plaintiff Andrea N.2 brings this action pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner")denying her application for supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. See Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.").3 Plaintiff moves for a finding of disability or remand for further administrative proceedings, and the Commissioner cross moves for a judgment on the pleadings. See Dkt. Nos. 9, 10. Plaintiff filed a reply. See Dkt. No. 11-1. For the following reasons, the determination of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Plaintiff was born in 1981, and obtained a G.E.D. See T. 38, 59. Plaintiff lives with her two children. See id. at 38. Plaintiff last worked in 2009 as a waitress at Denny's until she was "laid off." Id. at 34. On November 19, 2014, plaintiff protectively filed a Title XVI application for SSI benefits, alleging a disability onset date of October 1, 2013. See id. at 159. Her application was initially denied on January 20, 2015. See id. at 73. Plaintiff requested a hearing, and a hearing was held on June 13, 2017 before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Shawn Bozarth. See id. at 30. On July 31, 2017, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See id. at 23. On July 30, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final determination of the Commissioner. See id. at 1. Plaintiff commenced this action on October 2, 2018. See Compl.
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not determine de novo whether an individual is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner's determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla," meaning that in the record one can find "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal citations omitted)). The substantial evidence standard is Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm'r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations marks omitted). Where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards, the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably supported by substantial evidence. See Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986). However, if the correct legal standards were applied and the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence, such finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citation omitted).
"Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). Disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). A medically-determinable impairment is an affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon age, education, and work experience. See id. § 423(d)(2)(A). Such an impairment must be supported by "medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." Id. § 423(d)(3). Additionally, the severity of the impairment is "based on objective medical facts, diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience." Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (spacing added). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps. See DeChirico v. Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467). If the inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere. Id. (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467). "In addition, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his findings with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision." Barringer v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 358 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 17. At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. See id. at 21. At step five, considering plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. See id. at 22. Thus, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since October 14, 2014. See id. at 23.
Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ's RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence because it fails to account for plaintiff's limitations regarding work-pace and attendance. See Dkt. No. 9 at 14. Plaintiff next argues that the ALJimproperly applied the treating physician rule, failed to adequately weigh the medical opinion evidence, and failed to set forth sufficient analysis of her findings. See id. at 17-23. Specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to give controlling weight to the medical opinions of her treating physicians with respect to her limitations concerning work-pace and attendance. See id. Finally, plaintiff argues that the step five determination is not supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 23-24. Conversely,...
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