Andrea v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1957
• Citation: Andrea v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 131 A.2d 642, 144 Conn. 340 (Conn. 1957)
• Parties: Linda ANDREA et al. v. The NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN and HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 642

131 A.2d 642

144 Conn. 340

Linda ANDREA et al. v.The NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN and HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 24, 1957.

Edwin H. Hall, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas P. Hackett, New Haven, for appellant(defendant).

Anthony L. DiLorenzo, Hartford, with whom was Salvador A. Fasi, Hartford, for appellees(plaintiffs).

Before BALDWIN, WYNNE, DALY, KING and MURPHY, JJ.

KING, Associate Justice.

The named plaintiff, hereinafter called the plaintiff, was a passenger on the defendant's train.She had a verdict of $1500 for personal injuries sustained by her as the result of a fall which occurred, between 10 and 11 o'clock in the evening, as she was descending the steps of a railway coach at the Hartford station.Her husband was awarded $500 for her medical expenses.The defendant has appealed from the judgment on the verdict, and the sole error assigned is the court's denial of a motion to set aside the verdict.

The trial court filed no memorandum of decision explaining its denial of the motion, thus leaving this court without any information as to the underlying reasoning.The action of the trial court in refusing to set aside the verdict is, nevertheless, entitled to great weight.McWilliams v. American Fidelity Co., 140 Conn. 572, 575, 102 A.2d 345.

The defendant's brief discloses that its precise claim is a rather narrow one.This claim is that the plaintiff testified that the sole proximate cause of her fall was the wet and slippery condition of the steps of the coach; that the specification of negligence in that regard was taken from the jury by the court because there was no evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of the wet and slippery condition; and that it necessarily follows that the plaintiffs' verdict must have been without support in the evidence.Whether this claim is sound depends upon the specifications of negligence which were submitted to the jury and the evidence presented at the trial.

The plaintiffs seemed to concede the accuracy of the defendant's statement as to the specification of negligence withdrawn from the jury, and for the purposes of this appeal it will be assumed to be correct.In the interest of proper practice, however, it should be pointed out that such a statement should be formally incorporated into the record, either by stipulation of the parties or in a brief finding by the court.Tenney v. Baird Machine Co., 85 Conn. 333, 335, 82 A. 639;Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc.(2d Ed.) § 185, p. 227.This rule applies with especial force in this case because of the court's failure to file any memorandum of decision in explanation of its refusal to set aside the verdict.

It is also assumed, in the absence of an assignment of error addressed to the charge, that the instructions on applicable principles of law were correctly stated and were followed by the jury.Zenik v. O'Brien, 137 Conn. 592, 597, 79 A.2d 769.

In the complaint it was alleged, in brief, that the defendant was negligent in that (a) the coach steps were unlighted and dangerous; (b) the steps were wet and slippery, and the defendant failed to provide a porter or other safeguard for passengers alighting from the coach when it had actual or constructive notice that the steps were wet, slippery, unlighted and dangerous; (c) the distance from the bottom step to the station platform was inordinately high and deceptive, and the defendant failed to provide a stepping platform by which the plaintiff could have stepped from the bottom step to the station platform; and (d)the defendant caused the plaintiff to alight in a dark and unlighted portion of the station in complete contrast to the well-lighted coach from which she was alighting.

The removal of the specification of negligence as to the wet and slippery condition of the steps did not, of course, withdraw from the jury any of the other specifications of negligence.These included the balance of subdivision (b), which in effect charges negligence in a failure to provide a porter or other safeguard for passengers when the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the steps were unlighted and dangerous.While the jury were not at liberty to find that the steps were dangerous because of their wet and slippery condition, the plaintiff could still offer evidence as to any other condition which she claimed made them dangerous.

As far as appears, the defendant had control of the methods of exit from its train and could permit the use of only such exit steps as its personnel could man.Instead of this, it permitted passengers, including the plaintiff, to make use of exit steps where it had no one to assist them.Such permission could be found to constitute an invitation to use these steps.Elwood v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 77 Conn. 145, 149, 58 A. 751.

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