Andreozzi v. D'Antuono

• Decision Date: 07 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1851-A,1851-A
• Citation: 113 R.I. 155,319 A.2d 16
• Parties: Joseph V. ANDREOZZI v. Frank D'ANTUONO d/b/a Ideal Market. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 16

319 A.2d 16

113 R.I. 155

Joseph V. ANDREOZZI v. Frank D'ANTUONO d/b/a Ideal Market.

No. 1851-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 7, 1974.

[113 R.I. 160] D. A. St. Angelo, Providence, for petitioner.

Vincent J. Baccari, Providence, for respondent.

OPINION

PAOLINO, Justice.

This is an original petition for compensation benefits in which the petitioner alleges he sustained a compensable injury on or about February 15, 1971 while employed by the respondent. The trial commissioner dismissed the petition. The case is before us on the petitioner's appeal from the decree of the full commission affirming the decree entered by the trial commissioner.

At the hearing before the trial commissioner, petitioner testified that he injured his back and right leg on Monday, February 15, 1971 while employed by respondent as a grocery clerk, and that his injury required medical attention and resulted in his becoming incapacitated for work. It is undisputed that petitioner was employed by respondent in February 1971. It also appears from the medical evidence that petitioner did in fact sustain an injury to his back and right leg.

The respondent denied that petitioner was injured while working for him. He testified that petitioner did not report to work on the day petitioner claimed he was injured. However, on cross-examination respondent testified that he paid medical bills to two doctors who had treated petitioner for the injuries allegedly sustained while petitioner was working for respondent. These medical bills were for medical services furnished some two months after petitioner sustained the injury to his lower back.

The trial commissioner found that petitioner had failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his injuries arose out of his employment with respondent. Without expressly considering respondent's testimony with respect to his payment of the medical bills, he denied and dismissed the petition.

One of the grounds relied on by petitioner in his reasons of appeal is that the decree entered by the trial commissioner is against the law because, under G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-35-9, ¹ payment of the medical bills by respondent was an admission of liability.

The full commission held that the mere payment of medical bills by respondent did not amount to a payment of compensation under § 28-35-9 and was not therefore an admission of liability under the Act. It then affirmed the trial commissioner's finding that petitioner had failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his injuries arose out of his employment with respondent.

The narrow question raised by this appeal is whether the payment of medical bills by respondent without execution of a memorandum of agreement is the payment of 'compensation' within the meaning of § 28-35-9 and thus an admission that petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The answer to this question is 'Yes' and therefore we reverse.

Section 28-35-9 in pertinent part provides that if

'* * * an employer or insurer makes payment of compensation to an employee without executing a memorandum of agreement such payment shall constitute an admission that the employee is entitled to compensation under the provisions * * *' of the Act.

The determination of this question depends completely upon the meaning of the word 'compensation' as used in § 28-35-9. The question of whether or not payment of medical services is compensation had been before this court in recent years in two cases. In Brothers v. Cassedy, Inc., 101 R.I. 307, 222 A.2d 363 (1966), the question was discussed but not decided.

Later, in Thompson v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 105 R.I. 214, 251 A.2d 403 (1969), we were presented with the same issue raised here, but in a different context. There the issue was whether the payment of medical bills could be considered as a payment of compensation under § 28-35-45, which provided that the commission could review any agreement or decree within ten years after the cessation of compensation payments. If the medical payments were compensation within the meaning of § 28-35-45, then the employee's action would not be barred by the ten-year limitation. In Thompson the employer had accepted liability for the payment of compensation benefits and had entered into a written agreement with the employee under the Act. In that case we held that

'* * * the general assembly, cognizant of the remedial purposes of the workmen's compensation act, employed the word 'compensation' as the same is used in § 28-35-45 to include payments for medical services and charges as well as hospitalization and medicines.' ² Id. at 224-225, 251 A.2d at 409.

We come now to the question raised in this appeal. We must decide what the General Assembly meant by the word 'compensation' in § 28-35-9. We believe that the reasoning of the court in Thompson, supra, is equally applicable here. The words used in a statute must be given their ordinary and customary meaning unless a contrary intention clearly appears on the face of the statute. As we said in Podborski v. William H. Haskell Mfg. Co., 109 R.I. 1, 8, 279 A.2d 914, 918 (1971):

'* * * except in the case of equivocal and ambiguous language, the words of a statute cannot be interpreted or extended but must be applied literally. * * * The Legislature's meaning and intention must...