Andreson v. Progressive Marathon Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 336351,No. 334157,334157 |
| Citation | 322 Mich.App. 76,910 N.W.2d 691 |
| Parties | Debra K. ANDRESON and David Edward Andreson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PROGRESSIVE MARATHON INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant, and Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant. Debra K. Andreson and David Edward Andreson, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company, Defendant, and Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Nolan, Thomsen & Villas, PC (by Lawrence P. Nolan and Gary G. Villas ) for Debra and David Andreson.
Secrest Wardle (by Drew W. Broaddus ) for Progressive Michigan Insurance Company.
Before: Beckering, P.J., and O'Brien and Cameron, JJ.
In Docket No. 334157, defendant1 appeals as of right the trial court's order awarding plaintiff Debra Andreson $1,324,112.68 following a jury trial.2 In Docket No. 336351, defendant appeals as of right the trial court's order awarding attorney fees and taxable costs to plaintiffs. We ordered these appeals to be consolidated.3 We reverse in part and remand for entry of a judgment in favor of Debra and against defendant in the amount of $200,000. In all other respects, we affirm.
On October 11, 2013, plaintiffs were stopped in their vehicle at a red light when their vehicle was struck from behind by a different vehicle being driven at a high rate of speed. Both plaintiffs suffered injuries as a result of the collision, and it was uncontested that plaintiffs were not at fault. Plaintiffs were insured by defendant at the time of the accident, and their insurance policy included a provision for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits in the amount of $250,000 per individual, capped at a total of $500,000 per accident. The UIM contract provision required plaintiffs to pursue recovery from the at-fault driver and obtain payment of the maximum policy limits from the at-fault driver's insurance carrier before they could collect UIM coverage from defendant. The contract provision also required plaintiffs to obtain defendant's permission before reaching a settlement with the at-fault driver or the at-fault driver's insurance carrier.
Defendant initially declined to grant plaintiffs permission to settle with the at-fault driver's insurance carrier. On February 18, 2015, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against defendant in an attempt to obtain that permission and to obtain UIM benefits due them from defendant. Eventually, defendant granted plaintiffs permission to settle. The parties agree that plaintiffs obtained a settlement of $100,000 from the at-fault driver's insurance carrier—the maximum limit of the driver’s policy. The settlement allocated $50,000 to each plaintiff.
After the settlement, plaintiffs sought payment from defendant for the difference between the maximum amount of plaintiffs’ UIM coverage and the settlement amount obtained from the at-fault driver’s insurance carrier. Defendant refused to pay UIM benefits to plaintiffs, arguing that plaintiffs' injuries failed to qualify as threshold injuries. With respect to Debra, defendant alleged that her lower-back injuries arose from a preexisting condition and were not causally related to the October 11, 2013 accident. The case proceeded to trial. The central issues at trial were (1) whether plaintiffs suffered serious impairments of body function as a result of the at-fault driver's negligence and (2) whether Debra's lower-back injuries were causally related to the automobile accident. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the jury from being told about the UIM limits in plaintiff’s policy. The trial court granted defendant's motion, ruling that "[a]ny evidence of the UIM policy limits, if relevant, would be more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403."
Testimony at trial indicated that Debra suffered various physical injuries as a result of the automobile accident. Her neurosurgeon, Dr. Christopher Abood, testified that he had served as Debra's treating physician since October 2008 when she first came to him complaining of lower-back pain. Dr. Abood indicated that although Debra was experiencing pain at that time (five years before the automobile accident), the pain was manageable and was not preventing her from working or living her normal life. Dr. Abood did not see Debra for the five-year period between October 2008 and August 2013. During that time, Debra received a series of facet injections from a different doctor to whom Dr. Abood had referred her for treatment.4 Debra returned to see Dr. Abood on August 22, 2013, indicating that she had fallen on her back in April 2013 and experienced a significant increase in pain and heaviness in both legs that severely limited her ability to walk any distance. Dr. Abood diagnosed the pain as coming from a narrowing of the spinal canal.
Dr. Abood next saw Debra on November 11, 2013, one month after the accident at issue. At that time, she was experiencing severe pain in her back and legs. Dr. Abood testified that, in his medical opinion, the increased lower-back pain was not related to her earlier fall. According to Dr. Abood, Debra's "spinal condition was severely aggravated by the automobile accident, causing severe worsening of her back and leg symptoms and pain." Dr. Abood recommended that Debra have back surgery, which he performed on December 11, 2013.
At the close of proofs, the trial court found a jury-submissible question of fact regarding whether Debra's injuries met the threshold.5 The jury ultimately found that they did and awarded her $1,374,112.68 in damages.
After trial, plaintiffs' counsel filed a proposed judgment for $1,324,112.68 for Debra, which reflected the jury's special verdict minus $50,000 to reflect the setoff from the earlier settlement. On May 19, 2016, defendant filed an objection to the entry of judgment with respect to Debra, arguing that the judgment in her favor should be limited to $200,000 because her recovery was capped by the $250,000 UIM policy limit minus the $50,000 setoff. Following a hearing, the trial court determined that it was required to enter a judgment consistent with MCR 2.515(B), which provides that "[a]fter a special verdict is returned, the court shall enter judgment in accordance with the jury's findings." Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Debra for $1,324,112.68, which reflected the jury's award minus the $50,000 settlement offset.6 Defendant moved for remittitur, arguing that the jury's verdict had to be reduced because it was more than the UIM policy limits. The trial court denied defendant's motion.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion for remittitur. We agree. Appellate review of a grant or denial of remittitur is limited to the determination of whether an abuse of discretion occurred. Majewski v. Nowicki , 364 Mich. 698, 700, 111 N.W.2d 887 (1961). A trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses an outcome outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.
Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co , 476 Mich. 372, 388, 719 N.W.2d 809 (2006).
"Broadly defined, remittitur is the procedural process by which a verdict of the jury is diminished by subtraction." Pippen v. Denison Div. of Abex Corp. , 66 Mich.App. 664, 674, 239 N.W.2d 704 (1976) (emphasis omitted). "As long as the amount awarded is within the range of the evidence, and within the limits of what reasonable minds might deem just compensation for such imponderable items as personal injuries sustained and pain and suffering, the verdict rendered should not be set aside." Id . at 675, 239 N.W.2d 704 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for remittitur because the verdict awarded by the jury was in excess of the UIM policy limits. Neither uninsured motorist (UM) coverage nor UIM coverage is required by Michigan law, and therefore "the terms of coverage are controlled by the language of the contract itself, not by statute."
Dawson v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 293 Mich.App. 563, 568, 810 N.W.2d 106 (2011). As our Supreme Court has explained, "Uninsured motorist coverage is optional—it is not compulsory coverage mandated by the no-fault act," and consequently, "the rights and limitations of such coverage are purely contractual...." Rory v. Continental Ins Co , 473 Mich. 457, 465-466, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). "It is not the province of the judiciary to rewrite contracts to conform to the court's liking, but instead to enforce contracts as written and agreed to by the parties." Dawson , 293 Mich.App. at 569, 810 N.W.2d 106.
Prior to trial, the trial court stated that plaintiffs were pursuing a "Breach of Contract claim against Defendant for the refusal to pay UIM protection benefits without explanation." According to the terms of the parties' contract, defendant was only liable for $250,000 for each plaintiff, up to a total of $500,000. All parties agree on appeal that plaintiffs' earlier settlement of $100,000 with the at-fault driver’s...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Le Gassick v. Univ. of Mich. Regents, 344971
...portion of the Court's opinion is arguably obiter dicta, we adopt this reasoning as our own. See Andreson v. Progressive Marathon Ins. Co. , 322 Mich. App. 76, 86 n. 7, 910 N.W.2d 691 (2017).6 In light of our holding, we do not address plaintiff's contention that he has standing pursuant to......
-
Griffey v. Dep't of Corr.
... ... " ... Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm BureauMut Ins Co of ... Mich , 333 Mich.App. 457, 477; 960 N.W.2d 186 (2020) ... subtraction." Andreson v Progressive Marathon Ins ... Co , 322 Mich.App. 76, 84; 910 N.W.2d ... ...
-
Kraus v. Link
... ... reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Andreson v ... Progressive Marathon Ins Co , 322 Mich.App. 76, 87; 910 ... ...
-
Pellegrino v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
... ... new trial for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v ... Progressive Marathon Ins Co, 322 Mich.App. 76, 91; 910 ... N.W.2d 691 (2017). "An abuse of discretion ... ...