Andrew G. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 01 October 2020
• Docket Number: 3:19-CV-0942 (ML)
• Parties: ANDREW G., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

ANDREW G., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

3:19-CV-0942 (ML)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

October 1, 2020

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

LACHMAN & GORTON

Counsel for Plaintiff

1500 E. Main Street

Endicott, New York 13761

PETER A. GORTON, ESQ.

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.

Counsel for Defendant

J.F.K. Federal Building, Room 625

15 New Sudbury Street

Boston, Massachusetts 02203

AMY C. BLAND, ESQ.

MIROSLAV LOVRIC, United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Andrew G. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or "Commissioner") denying his application for Social Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI"). (Dkt. No. 1.) This case has proceeded in accordance with General Order 18 of this Court which sets forth the procedures to be followed when appealing a denial of Social Security benefits. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings and Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 12.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted and this case is remanded to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") for a de novo review.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff filed an application for SSDI, alleging that he became disabled on September 15, 2016, due to post traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), depression, anxiety, hypervigilance, carpal tunnel syndrome, and tendon damage in his right wrist. (Administrative Transcript ("T.") 166-167, 210.) His application was denied initially on December 21, 2017. (T. 71-76.) Plaintiff requested a hearing which was held on July 11, 2018, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Elizabeth W. Koennecke. (T. 27-46.) The ALJ also held a supplemental hearing on March 27, 2019, at which vocational expert ("VE") Josiah Pearson testified. (T. 47-55.) The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on April 2, 2019. (T. 10-26.) This became the Commissioner's final decision when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on June 7, 2019. (T. 1-6.)

II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW

A. Scope of Review

In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Featherly v. Astrue, 793 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citations omitted); Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987)). A reviewing court may not affirm the ALJ's decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986.

A court's factual review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to the determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2015); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). To facilitate the Court's review, an ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying her findings with sufficient specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the decision. Roat v. Barnhart, 717 F. Supp. 2d 241, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (Kahn, J.); see also Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). "Substantial evidence has been defined as 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). It must be "more than a mere scintilla" of evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Featherly, 793 F. Supp. 2d at 630; Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

"To determine on appeal whether an ALJ's findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from its weight." Williams, 859 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings they must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's positions and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [ALJ's]." Rosado, 805 F. Supp. at 153. In other words, a reviewing court cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ's decision. Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

B. Standard for Benefits¹

To be considered disabled, a plaintiff-claimant seeking benefits must establish that he or she is "unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2015). In addition, the plaintiff-claimant's

physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

Acting pursuant to its statutory rulemaking authority (42 U.S.C. § 405(a)), the Social Security Administration ("SSA") promulgated regulations establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4) (2015). Under that five-step sequential evaluation process, the decision-maker determines:

(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a "residual functional capacity" assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform given the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.

McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). "If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further." Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).

III. FACTS

As of the date of the first administrative hearing in July 2018, Plaintiff was 36 years old. (T. 44.) Plaintiff was a high school graduate, having attended regular education classes. (T. 959.) Following high school, he served four years in the United States Marines, including two combat tours in Afghanistan. (T. 31, 2199.) Following his discharge from the military, Plaintiff worked at a grocery store, a caterer, and a vending machine company. (T. 33, 235-236, 373.) Most recently, he had worked as a commercial cleaner for a janitorial services company. (T. 34-35, 236.) He was unmarried and shared a house with a roommate. (T. 959.)

While serving in Afghanistan in November 2011, Plaintiff was thrown from a personnel transport vehicle after it struck an improvised explosive device ("IED"). (T. 1594.) He lost consciousness and may have suffered a concussion. (T. 348, 373, 1594.) The next day, Plaintiff was in another transport vehicle that was struck by an IED. (T. 1594.) He did not lose consciousness but reported feeling confused for about fifteen minutes after the explosion and suffering from a headache for the rest of the day. (Id.)

Since 2015, Plaintiff has received in-patient and out-patient mental health services for depression, anxiety, PTSD, and alcohol use disorder at various Office of Veterans Affairs ("VA") medical facilities. (T. 1596.) His symptoms included re-experiencing traumatic events from his military service, lack of interest, feeling distant or isolated from other people, difficulty sleeping, and irritability. (T. 349, 370, 690.) At various times, Plaintiff was considered a high suicide risk. (T. 289, 695, 1227.) His treatment included multiple stays in a 28-day in-patient alcohol rehabilitation facility, and a three-month hospitalization for mental health issues.² (T. 43-44, 331, 959.) He had also undergone treatment for severe alcohol withdrawal symptoms, including seizures and hallucinations. (T. 320, 327, 1021.)

The record includes Plaintiff's lengthy treatment history. Rather than summarizing the records at the outset, I will refer to the pertinent records during my discussion of Plaintiff's arguments.

IV. THE ALJ'S DECISION

As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through September 30, 2020. (T. 15.) After finding that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") after the alleged onset date of September 15, 2016, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "mental impairments as variously characterized" were a severe impairment. (T. 15-16.) The ALJ noted that different physicians had diagnosed Plaintiff as suffering from PTSD, depressive-related disorder, and drug and alcohol abuse but that the relevant inquiry for her decision was the functional impact of Plaintiff's mental impairments, rather than the specific diagnosis. (T. 16.)

At step three of the evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments either singly or in combination did not meet or medically equal the severity of a listed impairment. (T. 16-18.) At step four, the ALJ...