Andrew J. Ostrowski & Pa. Civil Rights Network v. Killion
| Decision Date | 10 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case Number: 14-1727 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
| Parties | ANDREW J. OSTROWSKI AND PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL RIGHTS NETWORK, Plaintiffs, v. PAUL KILLION, ROBERT FULTON, SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA, SUPREME COURT DISCIPLINARY BOARD, ROBERT SNOOK, BRIAN CALI, CAPITAL POLICE OFFICER SLOAN, AND JOHN/JANE DOES, Defendants. |
Pro se Plaintiffs Andrew J. Ostrowski and Pennsylvania Civil Rights Network brings this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against the following Defendants: Chief Counsel for the Disciplinary Board Paul Killion; Staff Attorney for the Disciplinary Board Robert Fulton; Hearing Chairman for the Disciplinary Board Brian Cali; Tipstaff/Bailiff Deon Turner; Tipstaff/Bailiff Robert Snook; "Capitol Police Officer Sloan;" Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; Supreme Court Disciplinary Board; John/Jane Does; and "other unnamed defendants." (Doc. No. 1).
According to Ostrowski, Defendants violated his constitutional rights by intimidating him and removing him from the courtroom during the disciplinary hearings of attorney Don Bailey. Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. (Docs. No. 11, 12, 14, 16). Having reviewed the parties' briefs together with all relevant materials and legal authorities, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss. The Court's reasoning follows:
I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS A PRO SE ACTION
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all well-pleaded material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See id.; NL Indus. Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). However, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ().
"A document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(internal citations omitted). Cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(f) ().
II. BACKGROUND
On August 12, 2011, Ostrowski—a suspended Pennsylvania attorney1—testified during a disciplinary hearing being held for attorney Don Bailey. (Doc. No. 1, at para. 5, 6). Ostrowski alleges that Robert Fulton, Staff Attorney for the Disciplinary Board, and Brian Cali, Hearing Chairman for the Disciplinary Board prevented Ostrowski from fully and effectively testifying byrepeatedly and "rudely" cutting him off. (Id. at para 16).2 Ostrowski further contends that Bailiff Robert Snook "stared and sneered" at Ostrowski. (Id. at para 18).3
After the August 2011 hearing, Ostrowski submitted a disciplinary complaint against Chief Counsel for the Disciplinary Board Paul Killion and Fulton "for their activities in connection with those proceedings, and [ ] expressed himself personally to all of the Middle District Judges about the Bailey disciplinary proceedings." (Doc. No. 1 at para. 26). Ostrowski also posted comments on the Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law Network regarding Bailey's disciplinary proceedings. (Id.). Ostrowski asserts that these activities angered several of the defendants and caused them to start "gunning" for him. ).
On June 20, 2012, a second disciplinary hearing was held regarding Bailey; Ostrowski attended the hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at para 30). According to Ostrowski, Bailiff Deon Turner "focused significantly on" Ostrowski during this hearing and "made one or two remarks or gestures" toward him. ).
Ostrowski attended Bailey's third hearing on September 5, 2012. According to Ostrowski, during the hearing Turner "leer[ed]" at him. (Id.). Ostrowski gave Turner an "exaggerated glare in response, attempting to non-verbally communicate his displeasure with being stared at[,] and intimidated[,] with repeated silly glares." (Id. at para 36). Immediately after Ostrowski gave Turner this look, Turner and Capital Police Officer Sloan placed "one or both" hands on Ostrowski and escorted him out of the courtroom. (Doc. No. 1 at para. 37). Neither Turner nor Sloan explained to Ostrowski why he was removed. Ostrowski believes that Turner and Sloan wereinstructed by Killion, Fulton, Cali, and several unnamed individuals to remove him from the hearing. He asserts that these defendants conspired against him in retaliation for the complaints he lodged.
On September 4, 2014, Ostrowski filed the present Complaint, which sets out the following counts under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983:
Count One alleges that "all Defendants, including as yet unnamed John and/or Jane Does, and covering the entire course of conduct involving the Bailey disciplinary proceedings, the Ostrowski proceedings, before those proceedings were filed, while they were being planned, and through the present, effected and continue to effect, a violation of Plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights along with similar rights of many, many others, mostly past and present clients of Don Bailey and the Plaintiff, all of whom are suffering ongoing violations of their rights and imminent future violations of their rights." (Doc. No. 1 at para 46).
Count Two alleges that Turner, Sloan, Killion, Cali, and Fulton effected an unlawful seizure on September 5, 2012, in violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. ).
Count Three alleges that Article 5, Section 10(c) of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is unconstitutional because it vests the legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court, which Ostrowski asserts is a violation of the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers scheme. (Id. at para 52).
Count Four seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Supreme Court Disciplinary Board, Killion, Fulton, and Cali on the grounds that the "courseof conduct alleged as aforesaid constitutes a past and ongoing violation of the rights of the Plaintiffs and many others." (Id. at 54).
III. PRELIMINARY RULINGS
According to Ostrowski, pro se Plaintiff Pennsylvania Civil Rights Law Network (the "Network") is an "organization" designed to prevent corruption. Doc. No. 1 at 5. "It has been the law for the better part of two centuries . . . that a [legal entity] may appear in the federal courts only through licensed counsel." See Doughtery v. Snyder, 469 F.App'x 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. 2012). Since the Network is not represented by counsel, the Court will dismiss it from this action.
Ostrowski has named Jane and John Does Defendants to this action. A plaintiff may name a fictitious defendant to an action, provided his allegations state a potential cause of action and he has demonstrated that he may be able to determine the defendant's identity during discovery. Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 31-32 (3d Cir.1985). Ostrowski has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that he will be able to identify unnamed individuals against whom he can state a claim. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Jane and John Doe Defendants.
IV. ALL CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES ARE DISMISSED
It is hornbook law that the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Board, and each individual defendant acting in his official capacity are immune from suit for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Ostrowski has seemingly conceded this point. Doc. No. 19 at 5 (). More importantly, there can be no question that the relevant case law supports Defendants' position.
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to all state entities from suits for monetary damages in federal court.4 See Chilcott v. Erie Co. Domestic Relations, 283 F. App'x 8, 10 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Regents of the University of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429-30 (1997). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is an entity of the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania and, therefore, is deemed a state entity for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes. Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir.2000). Similarly, the Disciplinary Board—an agency of the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System—is a state entity. See, e.g., Mattas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 576 F.Supp. 1178, 1182 (W.D.Pa.1983); Haagensen v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 651 F. Supp. 2d 422, 432 (W.D. Pa. 2009) aff'd sub nom. Haagensen v. Supreme Court of Penn., 390 F. App'x 94 (3d Cir. 2010). Finally, it is well-established that immunity bars a suit for monetary damages against a state official acting in his official capacity. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Accordingly, all claims for monetary damages except those raised against individual defendants acting in their individual capacity are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
42 U.S.C. Section 1983 authorizes suits for...
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