Andrew S. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 16 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | 5:19-CV-0570 (LEK) |
| Parties | ANDREW S., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
This Social Security appeal is before the Court following a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") ceasing Plaintiff Andrew James Snyder's Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") as of December 20, 2011. Both parties have filed briefs. Dkt. Nos. 12 ("Plaintiff's Brief"); 19 ("Defendant's Brief"); 22 ("Plaintiff's Reply"). On appeal, the parties agree that the Court should not affirm the determination of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). The only issue on appeal is whether the Court should remand the case to the ALJ for further proceedings, or remand for the narrow purpose of calculating benefits. For the reasons that follow, the Court elects the latter option.
The applicable substantive regulatory criteria and burdens of proof differ between the initial grant of DIB and the cessation of DIB. Because both sets of rules are relevant in thiscase, the Court details both below.
For purposes of an initial application, there is a five-step evaluation process for determining whether an individual is "disabled" as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. As described recently by another court in this District:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a "listed" impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Nesiba O. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-931, 2019 WL 464882, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2019) (report-recommendation); see also McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982). "If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further." Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003). At this initial stage, "[t]he ultimate 'burden is on the claimant to prove that he is disabled.'" Smith v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6018, 2013 WL 1681146, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (quoting Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000)).
After a person has been found to be entitled to DIB, her entitlement is to be periodically reviewed. See 42 U.S.C. § 421(i). If there is substantial evidence that "there has been anymedical improvement in the individual's impairment or combination of impairments" that relates to his or her ability to work, such that "the individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful activity," the individual is no longer entitled to benefits. Id. § 423(f)(1). In the context of administrative determinations of medical improvement, "Congress intended the Secretary to compare an applicant's condition at the time of review with his or her condition at the time benefits were initially granted." DeLeon v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 734 F.2d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1984). A determination that there has been a decrease in severity "must be based on improvement in the symptoms, signs, and/or laboratory findings associated with [the individual's] impairment(s)." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1).
This inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with the following eight-step analysis:
(1) If the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity ("SGA"), she is no longer disabled; (2) If the claimant is not engaging in SGA and has an impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals the severity of an impairment listed in appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpart P, disability will continue; (3) If the claimant does not have such a combination of impairments, the Commissioner must determine ; (4) If there is medical improvement, the Commissioner must determine if that medical improvement is related to the ability to work; (5) If there is no medical improvement, or the established medical improvement is unrelated to the ability to work, then disability will continue. If an exception applies, or there is medical improvement related the ability to do work, the Commissioner goes to step six; (6) The Commissioner must determine whether the claimant's impairments in combination are severe. If they are not, the claimant is no longer disabled; (7) If the claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner must assess the claimant's residual functional capacity and then determine if they are able to do work they have done in the past. If the claimant can do work they have done in the past, the claimant is no longer disabled; (8) If the claimant cannot do any work they have done in the past, the Commissioner mustdetermine whether there is any other work the claimant can do given the claimant's [Residual Functional Capacity], age, education, and work experience. If no such work exists, the claimant's disability will continue. If such work does exist, the claimant's disability will end.
Torres v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-625, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112691, at *7-8 (W.D.N.Y. Jul. 5, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)). "The burden rests with the Commissioner at every step to show, by substantial evidence, that a medical improvement has occurred." See Galente v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-9981, 2018 WL 852113, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018) (citing Baker v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV-1715, WL 1280306, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014)); see also McColl v. Saul, No. 18-CV-4376, 2019 WL 4727449, at *15 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) ().
This case has a complex, decade-long procedural history that includes four ALJ decisions, one remand by this court, and two remands by the Social Security Appeals Council. The Court recounts this history below.
Snyder is a former member of the Marine Corps who suffered a back injury while on a training mission. Dkt. No. 11 ("Record") at 708.2 He last worked for his family business in May 2010 as a part-time service technician and officer worker. Id. at 31. He maintains that he had to stop working due to absences and an inability to perform his duties. Id. at 31-32. Snyderapplied for DIB on September 23, 2010, alleging disability beginning in May 2010 based on a variety of physical and psychiatric conditions, including herniated/bulging discs, spinal stinosis, degenerative disc disease, plantar fasciitis, and depression. Id. at 112.
On December 12, 2011, ALJ Marie Greener issued a decision finding Snyder not disabled at any time since his alleged disability onset date. Id. at 10-20 ("2011 ALJ Decision"). Among other findings, ALJ Greener determined at step two of the five-step sequential disability evaluation process that Snyder did not have any severe mental impairment. Id. at 12-14. ALJ Green found that Snyder had severe physical impairments for purposes of step two, namely "lumbar condition" and "plantar fasciitis," but found at step four that he nevertheless had "residual functional capacity" (RFC) to perform his past work. Id. at 14-19.3
On July 8, 2014, the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States Magistrate Judge, reversedthe 2011 ALJ Decision and remanded for further proceedings, primarily based on a determination that the ALJ's finding that Snyder lacked a severe mental impairment was not supported by substantial evidence. See Snyder v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-585, Dkt. No. 13 at 4-8 ("2014 MJ Order"), report and recommendation adopted by No. 13-CV-575, Dkt. No. 15 (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 8, 2014). Specifically, Judge Hines found that ALJ Greener had ignored the opinions of two mental health professionals regarding the functional effects of Snyder's depression, both of which tended to support Snyder's position. Id. at 8. Instead, ALJ Greener had improperly based her conclusion entirely on her own contrary psychiatric diagnosis, without citing any medical evidence in the record. See id. at 4; R. at 13. Moreover, Judge Hines found, because these overlooked medical opinions likely were relevant to RFC analysis, the ALJ's failure to consider them was not harmless error. 2014 MJ Order at 9-11.4
Judge Hines reversed the 2011 ALJ Decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the 2014 MJ Order.
On remand, ALJ Greener determined that Snyder was disabled beginning on his alleged disability onset date and through the date of the 2011 decision, but that he experienced medical improvement justifying the cessation of DIB one week after the 2011 decision, on December 20, 2011. R. at 775-93 ("2015 ALJ Decision").
ALJ Greener noted in her step two analysis that Snyder had the following...
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