Andrews v. Ala. Dep't of Corr.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2016
• Docket Number: CR–14–1467.
• Citation: 212 So.3d 287 (Mem)
• Parties: Eugene ANDREWS v. ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

212 So.3d 287 (Mem)

Eugene ANDREWS

v.ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

CR–14–1467.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 3, 2016.

Eugene Andrews, pro se.

Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Anne A. Hill, gen. counsel, and Bart G. Harmon, asst. atty. gen., Alabama Department of Corrections, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM.

WINDOM, P.J., and KELLUM and JOINER, JJ., concur.

BURKE, J., concurs in the result.

WELCH, J., dissents, with opinion.

WELCH, Judge, dissenting.

In an unpublished memorandum, the majority affirms the circuit court's dismissal of Eugene Andrews's petition for a writ of certiorari. I respectfully dissent.

On September 11, 2014, Andrews filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Montgomery Circuit Court. In his petition, Andrews, who was convicted of manslaughter, argued that he was improperly classified as a restricted offender and that the classification system implemented by the DOC was administered maliciously. Specifically, Andrews argued that because he was convicted of manslaughter he did not qualify for classification as a restricted offender under an Alabama Department of Correction ("DOC") rule that classified an inmate who committed an execution-style murder as a restricted offender.¹

On December 30, 2014, the DOC moved to dismiss the petition or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment, arguing that Andrews was not entitled to due process because he had asserted no protected liberty interest and that an inmate does not have a constitutional right to a particular custody classification. The DOC further argued that Andrews was properly classified. In support of its motion, the DOC attached a copy of Andrews's institutional record that included, among other things, a report provided by the Houston County District Attorney's office setting forth the details of Andrews's offense. On December 31, 2014, the circuit court dismissed the petition.

On January 20, 2015, Andrews filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the court's judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P. In this motion, he argued that he was denied due process because he did not receive the State's response to his petition, that the circuit court erred in not providing notice that the State's response had been filed, and that he "was never provided with 10–day–requirement notice after the filing of the defendant's motion" as required by Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P. (C. 62.) The circuit court denied Andrews's motion on April 13, 2014. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Andrews reasserts his claim that the DOC improperly classified him as a "restricted offender." Andrews also reasserts the claims he raised in his Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion.

A circuit court's review of the acts of an administrative agency, such as the DOC, is very limited:

" ‘On petition for writ of certiorari the circuit court is, as is the appellate court, limited in its review of quasi-judicial acts of administrative officers and boards. The limited function of that review is to determine whether the act in question was supported by any substantial evidence, or whether findings and conclusions are contrary to uncontradicted evidence, or whether there was an improper application of the findings viewed in a legal sense. Sanders v. Broadwater, 402 So.2d 1035 (Ala.Civ.App.1981). Judicial review of administrative acts and decisions is limited in scope, and ordinarily the courts will only pass on the question of whether the administrative agency has acted within its constitutional or statutory powers, whether its order or determination is supported by substantial evidence, and whether its action is reasonable and not arbitrary. Little Caesar's, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 386 So.2d 224 (Ala.Civ.App.1979).

" ‘A court may not set aside an order of a fact-finding administrative body, acting within the field of its designated powers, unless the order is illegal, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. Little Caesar's, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., supra; Alabama Electric Cooperative v. Alabama Power Co., 278 Ala. 123, 176 So.2d 483 (1965) ; 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, 202 et seq. (1951). "Substantial evidence" means legal evidence. Little Caesar's, Inc. v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., supra; Eagle Motor Lines, Inc. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, 343 So.2d 767 (Ala.1977). The order of an administrative board is not to be vacated because of receipt of evidence not admissible under general rules of evidence, so long as there is sufficient legal evidence to sustain the order. However, such illegal evidence will not be considered by the reviewing court in determining if there was substantial evidence to support the order of the Board. Edmondson v. Tuscaloosa County, 265 So.2d 154 (Ala.Civ.App.1972).’

" Ellard v. State, 474 So.2d 743, 750 (Ala.Crim.App.1984), aff'd, 474 So.2d 758 (Ala.1985)."

Austin v. Alabama Dep't of Corr., 975 So.2d 398, 403 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (reference to additional cases omitted).

Andrews's claim regarding classification relates to due process. The Due Process Clause affords procedural protections against the deprivation of constitutionally protected liberty interests. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 162 L.Ed.2d 174 (2005) ; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ; Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998). This Court has long held that inmates of Alabama's prison system do not have a liberty interest with respect to a particular custody or security classification. See Handley v. State, 549 So.2d 630, 631 (Ala.Crim.App.1989) ("[C]ustody classifications in prison do not amount to matters in which the inmate has a constitutional right."); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). Moreover, " ‘the classification scheme adopted by the Alabama prison system to determine the custody status of prisoners "is not arbitrary and capricious, but reasonable and appropriate." ’ " Hill v. State, 594 So.2d 246, 248 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437, 1441 (11th Cir.1991), quoting in turn, Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir.1986) ). This Court has recognized, "the classification system used by the Alabama prison system ... becomes constitutionally offensive only if ‘the regulation is administered maliciously or in bad faith.’ " Hill v. State, 594 So.2d at 248 (quoting Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850, 852 (11th Cir.1986) ). Further, the Constitution proscribes only the use of admittedly false information, see Monroe, 932 F.2d at 1441, not mere assertions that erroneous information may exist in the prisoner's file. Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1982).

The issue before this Court is whether the DOC, in classifying Andrews as a restricted offender, administered its own regulation arbitrarily or in bad faith by applying item 6—execution-style murder—to Andrews who had been convicted of manslaughter. I believe that it did.

The DOC's Classification Manual states that "[t]he following category of inmates will require review for the ‘R’ suffix ... 6—Execution Style Murder." Section 5.4.3.1.1. (C. 41.) In the same section of the manual, the DOC refers to various offenses and convictions that require review for restricted status, the "R" suffix. The question is whether the "execution-style murder" provision includes inmates like Andrew—who were convicted of manslaughter—for the purpose of being classified as a restricted offender.

The DOC contends in its response at trial and on appeal that Andrews was properly classified because, it says, the evidence indicated that Andrews killed his wife by placing the gun used to kill her in close contact with her head before he pulled the trigger, leaving a muzzle burn on her skin. According to the DOC,...