Andrews v. BNSF Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 04 January 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:16–CV–00424–SMR–RAW
• Citation: 284 F.Supp.3d 910
• Parties: Gayle R. ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

284 F.Supp.3d 910

Gayle R. ANDREWS, Plaintiff,

v.BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Defendant.

Case No. 4:16–CV–00424–SMR–RAW

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed January 4, 2018

Kent A. Gummert, Lederer Weston Craig PLC, West Des Moines, IA, William Kvas, Pro Hac Vice, Hunegs, Leneave & Kvas, P.A., Wayzata, MN, Jayson D. Nelson, Pro Hac Vice, Hunegs Leneave & Kvas (NE), Omaha, NE, for Plaintiff.

Michael W. Thrall, Mitchell R. Kunert, Nyemaster Goode PC, Des Moines, IA, Nichole S. Bogen, Pro Hac Vice, Tyler Spahn, Pro Hac Vice, Sattler and Bogen LLP, Lincoln, NE, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

STEPHANIE M. ROSE, JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant BNSF Railway Company's ("BNSF") Motion for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 15]. In this action, Plaintiff Gayle Andrews seeks recovery against BNSF, her former employer, under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. , and the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("FSAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 20301 et seq. , for injuries she allegedly sustained during her employment. BNSF moves for summary judgment on both of Andrews's claims. Although BNSF requested oral argument, the Court finds this matter can be appropriately resolved without it. See LR 7(c). The matter is fully submitted and ready for decision. As explained below, BNSF's motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated. Andrews worked for BNSF as a conductor based out of Galesburg, Illinois. On October 15, 2014, Andrews was working as an "over-the-road" conductor on the route from Galesburg to Creston, Iowa. When working this route, she typically traveled from Galesburg to Creston, spent the night in Creston, and returned to Galesburg the next day. On this date in particular, Andrews received a duty call to take a loaded coal train to "ISU Station" near Helpin, Iowa. Andrews reported to the Creston depot during the afternoon, and the crew received their trip paperwork and a safety briefing. The train they were to take to ISU Station was parked at New York Avenue. The crew went to New York Avenue, conducted another safety briefing, and Andrews went to the coal cars to release the hand brakes.

Railroad freight cars have two kinds of braking systems: air brakes and hand brakes. Air brakes and hand brakes both function through a brake cylinder and piston. With air brakes, the piston extends from the brake cylinder as air pressure is reduced, and a series of brake rods and levers eventually forces the brake shoes against the railcar's wheels. Applying the air brakes pushes the piston out of the brake cylinder. Hand brakes are similar in nature to parking brakes on automobiles. Applying the hand brake pulls the piston out by tightening the brake chain. The brake chain is tightened by turning the wheel of the hand brake clockwise. To release the hand brake, an employee can either use the quick release lever or turn the wheel counterclockwise until the brake releases. Some hand brakes do not have a quick release lever and can only be released by turning the wheel. The parties dispute whether quick release levers are standard on all hand brakes. However, it is undisputed that a quick release lever cannot be replaced separately. Instead the whole hand brake mechanism must be replaced if a new quick release lever is necessary. To use the quick release lever, an employee rotates the lever to the "off" position until the brake releases. The quick release lever releases the brakes without turning the wheel. Even if it is used, a quick release lever may not fully release the hand brake, necessitating one or two turns of the wheel to release the brake completely. If the quick release lever releases the hand brake, the wheel spins freely.

Andrews received training on the operation of hand brakes. BNSF's Train, Yard, and Engine Safety Rules provide instructions on setting and releasing hand brakes. The rules state that if a quick release lever does not release the hand brake, the employee should use the wheel to release the brake by turning the wheel with steady pressure. If the wheel does not easily release the hand brake, the employee should have air applied to the car or seek assistance. The rules additionally instruct that when an employee is operating a hand brake, the employee should stand on the left side of the hand brake with her left foot on the ladder of the car and her right foot on the brake platform. The employee is required to grasp the ladder with her left hand and operate the hand brake wheel with her right hand. The General Code of Operating Rules instructs employees to be alert and attentive while working and to be careful to prevent injury to themselves and others. Andrews was familiar with how to set and release hand brakes; she had set and released hand brakes previously. BNSF states Andrews was adequately trained in these procedures, which Andrews disputes.

On October 15, 2014, Andrews began walking from the engine back along the rail cars. The grade at the New York Avenue location requires the use of twenty to thirty hand brakes to park a train, depending on the tonnage of the train.

Andrews had worked at the New York Avenue location before. She released several brakes and then reached a car with a "short-handle" quick release lever. She does not remember the car number or any other identifiers. In the personal injury report Andrews submitted to BNSF, she included a car list for the train and indicated the car was within the train's first twenty cars. Andrews testified that COLX 4564 may have been the car, since it was the only one she could identify with a short handle quick release lever. Once Andrews reached the car, she looked at the hand brake to check that it was applied. She does not remember the wheel being bent or broken. Likewise, the chain was not bunched or kinked. Andrews did not see anything wrong with the hand brake.

Andrews mounted the ladder on the back of the car to release the hand brake. She first tried to use the quick release lever. She testified that the quick release lever did not release the brake. She made at least one more attempt to release the brake using the quick release lever before beginning to turn the wheel. Andrews put both of her hands on the wheel "and when [she] pulled down, it let go, and it just let go. That's when [she] fell to [her] knees and everything." [ECF No. 15–3 at 27]. When Andrews fell to her knees, "something happened, and [her] insides went ...." Id. at 29–30. The wheel released the hand brake. The parties dispute whether Andrews correctly followed BNSF's training and rules governing the release of hand brakes. Andrews did not report a problem with the car or the hand brake.

Andrews reported her injury to BNSF the next day. Three carmen inspected the twenty cars of the train two days later, on October 18, 2014, dividing up the inspections between them. In doing so, they inspected, set, and released the hand brakes of the cars, by using both the quick release lever and the wheel. They also set and released the brakes with and without the train's air brakes being set. All of the hand brakes, including the wheels and quick release levers, were in working order.

Andrews subsequently filed this action against BNSF, alleging two counts. [ECF No. 1]. Count One alleges Andrews's injuries were a result of BNSF's negligence in violation of the FELA. Count Two alleges BNSF violated the FSAA and such violation resulted in Andrews's injuries. After the close of discovery, BNSF moved for summary judgment on both of Andrews's claims. [ECF No. 15].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Paulino v. Chartis Claims, Inc. , 774 F.3d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 2014) ; accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case." Doe v. Hagar , 765 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Amini v. City of Minneapolis , 643 F.3d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 2011) ). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating there are no genuine issues of material fact. Gibson v. Geithner , 776 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 2015). Courts must view "the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giv[e] that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record." Pedersen v. Bio–Med. Applications of Minn. , 775 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 744 F.3d 539, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. FELA Claim

The FELA allows railroad employees to seek damages for injuries "resulting in whole or in part from the negligence" of the railroad. 45 U.S.C. § 51. "The FELA imposes upon employers a continuous duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work." Cowden v. BNSF Ry. Co. , 690 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Francisco v. Burlington N. R.R. Co. , 204 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2000) ). Although the FELA is "liberally construed" to further its remedial purposes, it is not a workers' compensation statute and it does not make an employer an insurer of employees' safety. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall , 512 U.S. 532, 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994) ; Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. , 361 U.S. 138, 140, 80 S.Ct. 242, 4 L.Ed.2d 198 (1959). Because a FELA claim is predicated on negligence on the part of the railroad–employer, a plaintiff must prove the traditional, common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. See Consol. Rail Corp. , 512 U.S. at 543–44, 114 S.Ct. 2396. However, "a relaxed standard of causation applies" in FELA cases. Id. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396 ; see Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. , 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). "[T]he test of a jury case is simply...