Andrews v. Chase
Decision Date | 25 September 1935 |
Docket Number | 5504 |
Citation | 89 Utah 51,49 P.2d 938 |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Parties | ANDREWS v. CHASE et al |
Opinion on rehearing, 89 Utah 73, 57 P.2d 702.
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; James W. McKinney, Judge.
Action by Hal Andrews against Ogden C. Chase and others. From a judgment dismissing the action, the plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED AND REMANDED, with directions.
Allen T. Sanford and E. A. Rogers, both of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Van Cott, Riter & Farnsworth, Cheney, Jensen & Marr, and Ray McCarty, all of Salt Lake City, for respondents.
In the court below defendants' demurrers to plaintiff's amended complaint were sustained. Plaintiff refused to further amend his complaint, whereupon defendants moved to dismiss the action. The motion was granted and the action dismissed. Plaintiff appeals. He assigns as errors the order sustaining the demurrers and the order dismissing the action. It is in substance alleged in the complaint: That defendant companies are, and at all times alleged in the complaint were, Utah Corporations; that plaintiff is, and at all times alleged in the complaint was, a statistician, analyst, and adviser of the value of stocks, bonds, and various kinds of securities and as such engaged in business at Salt Lake City, Utah; that at the times complained of plaintiff had a list of numerous clients to whom he was, and for two years had been, sending weekly letters advising them of his opinion and analysis of mining stocks and other securities; that during the month of April, 1932, defendant Ogden C. Chase was a director, secretary and treasurer, and defendant S. F. Hunt was a director and the president, of defendant corporation Rio Tinto Copper Company. Paragraph 4 of the amended complaint contains the allegations which form the basis for the questions which divide the parties. We quote it in full:
"That on or about the 1st day of April, 1931, the said defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company, was desirous of giving some of its shares of treasury stock to such members of the public as would receive it, upon the understanding that the Rio Tinto Copper Company would for the purpose of carrying on development of said property levy one two-cent assessment and three one-cent assessments, or as many thereof as might be necessary to finance the development of its mining property and with the understanding that the persons receiving said stock were not obligated to pay such assessments, or any of them, and on or about said date the said Rio Tinto Copper Company and the said Ogden C. Chase and said S. F. Hunt, knowing that the said plaintiff had a large number of clients residing outside of Utah who reposed confidence in the judgment of the plaintiff and who relied upon the advice of the plaintiff with reference to the value of mining stocks and other securities, entered into an agreement with the said plaintiff wherein and whereby the said defendants, Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C. Chase and S. F. Hunt, agreed to and with the plaintiff that if the plaintiff would assist the said Rio Tinto Copper Company in placing its treasury stock with his clients residing outside of Utah upon the aforesaid basis, the said defendants, Rio Tinto Copper Company, Ogden C. Chase, and S. F. Hunt, would transfer, convey, and deliver to the plaintiff 20,000 shares of the Class A capital stock of the said Rio Tinto Copper Company after the aforesaid assessments or as many thereof as might be necessary, had been levied and paid; that the said Rio Tinto Copper Company levied one two-cent assessment and three one-cent assessments, assessment No. 4 having been levied on or about the 17th day of March, 1932, and the collection of said assessment having been consummated on or about the 17th day of May, 1932; that pursuant to said agreement the plaintiff immediately commenced upon said work, circularized his said clients frequently and wrote personal letters to about one hundred twenty-five of his clients, such circulars and letters all having been delivered outside of Utah, recommending the acquisition of the said stock of the said Rio Tinto Copper Company upon the aforesaid basis, and as a result of the efforts of the plaintiff approximately 145,000 shares of stock were accepted by plaintiff's customers; that the plaintiff duly performed all things in said contract upon his part to be performed."
It is further alleged in the complaint that in October, 1932, defendant Mountain City Copper Company acquired all of the assets and property of the defendant Rio Tinto Copper Company, and in consideration therefor agreed to exchange its stock share for share to the stockholders of the Rio Tinto Copper Company and to assume all contracts and liabilities of the Rio Tinto Copper Company; that plaintiff has made demand of defendants that they issue to him the 20,000 shares of stock which they agreed to convey to him, but defendants have failed and refused, and continue to refuse, to deliver the stock. Plaintiff prays judgment that defendants deliver the stock, or, if delivery thereof cannot be had, that he be awarded judgment for the value thereof.
One of the principal questions of law upon which the parties divide is whether or not the alleged agreement relied upon by the plaintiff is or is not void. Defendants contend that the alleged agreement was and is unenforceable and void because inhibited by the provisions of Laws of Utah 1925, c. 87, p. 171, which act is sometimes referred to as the Securities Act, and is commonly known as "the Blue Sky Law." Plaintiff contends that the agreement pleaded in his complaint did not involve a sale, and therefore was not within the provisions of the act.
In the main, the present law touching the matter in hand is the same as it was at the time plaintiff alleges that he entered into the agreement sued upon. Rev. St. Utah 1933, title 82, chap. 1, p. 981 (82-1-1 et seq.). We quote from chapter 87, Laws of Utah 1925, such provisions of the act as we deem bear upon this controversy:
"All securities required by this Act to be registered before being sold in this State, and not entitled to registration by notification shall be registered only by qualification in the manner provided by this section." Section 7.
"No dealer or salesman shall engage in business in this State as such dealer or salesman or sell any securities including securities exempted in Section 3 of this Act, except in transactions exempt under Section 4, of this Act unless he has been registered as a dealer or salesman in the office of the commission pursuant to the provisions of this section." Section 10.
"Any person, issuer, dealer, agent or salesman, who, not being at the time exempt or registered pursuant to the provisions of this Act, in any manner or by any means shall issue, sell assign, transfer or offer to or negotiate for the issuance, sale or assignment, or transfer, of any securities said securities not being exempt or registered at the time of such issuance sale assignment or transfer, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than $ 100.00 or more than $ 10,000.00, or by imprisonment in the (State prison for a term of not more than ten years, or by both such fine and imprisonment." Section...
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...is necessary to give validity to a contract is the place where the contract is made."); see also Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 69, 49 P.2d 938, 947 (Utah 1935) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (explaining that because the last act necessary to complete the contract occurred in Utah, it was a Utah c......
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...proceedings commenced before the effective date of the Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(2) (1988).3 CGC cites Andrews v. Chase, 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938 (1935), as support for the proposition that a "gift" of securities is not a "sale" for purposes of § 61-1-7. We do not agree with this a......
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Andrews v. Chase
...of UtahMay 15, 1936 Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; James W. McKinney, Judge. For former opinion, see 89 Utah 51, 49 P.2d 938. Petition for rehearing Allen T. Sanford and E. A. Rogers, both of Salt Lake City, for appellant. Van Cott, Riter & Farnsworth, Cheney,......