Andrews v. Collins

• Citation: 810 F. Supp. 759
• Decision Date: 01 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 6:92-CV-509.,6:92-CV-509.
• Parties: Maurice ANDREWS, Petitioner, v. James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

810 F. Supp. 759

Maurice ANDREWS, Petitioner, v. James A. COLLINS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, Respondent.

No. 6:92-CV-509.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Tyler Division.

December 1, 1992.

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David Charles Holmes, Honigman, Miller, Schwartz & Cohn, Thomas H. Wilson and Margaret C. Ling, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, TX, for petitioner.

Stephanie A. Stelmach, Asst. Atty. Gen., Criminal Law Enforcement Div., Austin, TX, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HALL, District Judge.

Petitioner, Maurice Andrews, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death pursuant to the judgment of the 252nd Judicial Court of Jefferson County, Texas, entered on October 21, 1982. Mr. Andrews seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and petitions this Court to review the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence. On August 17, 1992, this Court granted Mr. Andrews a stay of execution for an indefinite time in order for the Court to thoroughly review the more than 2,000 pages of testimony, pleadings and motions filed by Petitioner less than two weeks prior to his scheduled date of execution. Respondent filed a Response and Motion for Summary Judgment on September 24, 1992. Mr. Andrews requested and was granted an extension of time in which to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. Andrews timely filed his Response. In addition, Mr. Andrews filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority on November 17, 1992.

After having carefully examined the pleadings, briefs and state court record, the Court concludes that the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is without merit and will be denied. Furthermore, the Court will grant Respondent's motion for summary judgment and will vacate the stay of execution previously granted.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Andrews was convicted by a jury of the capital murder of Joe Angel Granado during the course of the robbery of Granado's Jewelry Store in Beaumont, Texas on April 8, 1982. An employee of the store, Arturo Melindez, was also murdered. After the jury affirmatively answered the special issues submitted to it pursuant to Article 37.071, Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. (Vernon 1981)¹, the trial judge assessed the punishment at death. The facts of the crime are recounted in the opinion of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and sentence on direct appeal on September 23, 1987. Andrews v. State, 744 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.Crim. App.1987). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 3, 1988. Andrews v. Texas, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 182, 102 L.Ed.2d 151 (1988). The Supreme Court denied Mr. Andrews' petition for rehearing on November 28, 1988. Andrews v. Texas, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 518, 102 L.Ed.2d 552 (1988).

After his direct appeal proved futile and his petitions for writ of certiorari and rehearing to the United States Supreme Court were denied, Mr. Andrews filed an application for writ of habeas corpus raising thirty-seven claims in the state district court on November 28, 1988. The state district court denied the petition and motion for stay of execution on December 5, 1988. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing on December 6, 1988. Ex parte Andrews, No. 19,564 (Tex.Crim.App., Dec. 6, 1988) (unpublished order). The trial court then conducted a two-day evidentiary hearing on six of Mr. Andrews' claims. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law and denied relief. Ex parte Andrews, No. 19,564, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (May 17, 1989). On June 24, 1992, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief and lifted the stay of execution on the basis of the trial court's findings and conclusions. Ex parte Andrews, No. 19,564 (Tex.Crim.App., June 24, 1992) (unpublished order). The state district court then scheduled Mr. Andrews' execution for August 26, 1992. State v. Andrews, Trial Court No. 41403, Execution Order (252nd Dist. Ct., Jefferson Co., July 1, 1992).

On August 10, 1992, Mr. Andrews filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the judgment of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Mr. Andrews' state habeas petition. Andrews v. Texas, No. 92-5456 (U.S. petition for cert. filed Aug. 10, 1992). On October 13, 1992, the Supreme Court again denied Mr. Andrews' petition for a writ of certiorari. Andrews v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 335, 121 L.Ed.2d 253 (1992).

In the interim period between Mr. Andrews' filing his certiorari petition with the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court's subsequent denial, Mr. Andrews filed his first federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief with this Court on August 14, 1992, less than two weeks before his scheduled execution date. Mr. Andrews' petition raised twenty-seven claims, all of which had been presented to the state district court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. As previously stated, this Court granted Mr. Andrews an indefinite stay of execution so that the Court could thoroughly review the multitude of documents accompanying the petition.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

As indicated by the procedural history of this case, Mr. Andrews' claims have been reviewed on several occasions by the state district court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Andrews now asks this Court to once again review his numerous claims for relief which are as follows:

1. The presence of juror Curtis Joseph Tomplait, a relative of the victim, denied Mr. Andrews due process, a fundamentally fair trial, trial by jury representative of the community and capable of bringing contemporary standards of decency to bear, and a reliable determination that death is the appropriate punishment.

2. At the time of his trial, Mr. Andrews suffered from severe psychiatric and drug-related impairments that rendered him incompetent to stand trial.

3. The Texas capital punishment procedure generally, and the jury instructions in this case specifically, precluded the jury from considering mitigating evidence as the basis for a sentence less than death.

4. The Texas capital punishment procedure precludes the jury from considering mitigating evidence as the basis for a sentence less than death; thus, the procedure discourages the discovery of and penalizes the use of mitigating evidence.

5. Trial counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence at trial denied Mr. Andrews the effective assistance of counsel.

6. The prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse black jurors violated the Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

7. The prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse jurors who expressed qualms about the death penalty denied Mr. Andrews due process, a fundamentally fair trial, trial by jury representative of the community and capable of bringing contemporary standards of decency to bear, and a reliable determination that death is the appropriate punishment.

8. The disqualification for cause of prospective jurors who opposed the death penalty and of prospective jurors who were otherwise disqualified for cause removed a disproportionate number of black prospective jurors from the jury panel.

9. The trial court's rulings on challenges for cause by Mr. Andrews and the prosecution deprived Mr. Andrews of due process, a fundamentally fair trial, trial by jury representative of the community and capable of bringing contemporary standards of decency to bear, and a reliable determination that death is the appropriate punishment.

10. The publicity surrounding the crime, its investigation, the arrest of Mr. Andrews and his alleged accomplices, the pretrial proceedings, and the trial itself was so pervasive that it rendered the trial in Jefferson County, Texas, fundamentally unfair and deprived Mr. Andrews of a reliable determination of guilt and punishment.

11. The trial court incorrectly defined the prosecution's burden of proof.

12. The prosecution repeatedly commented about Mr. Andrews' failure to testify.

13. The prosecution's closing arguments included numerous improper statements that constituted prosecutorial misconduct.

14. The jury failed to expressly determine that Mr. Andrews killed, attempted to kill, intended that lethal force be used, or was a major participant in the crime who acted with reckless indifference to human life.

15. Dispositive terms in the Texas capital sentencing statute are ambiguous and were incorrectly defined by the prosecution.

16. The trial court committed numerous evidentiary errors.

17. The admission of illegally seized evidence deprived Mr. Andrews of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

18. The testimony of Lena Granado, the victim's widow, was irrelevant and constituted fundamental error under state law.

19. The prosecution failed to disclose material evidence to the defense.

20. Evidence of unadjudicated prior offenses allegedly committed by Mr. Andrews was improperly introduced at the punishment stage.

21. The admission of evidence at the punishment stage concerning prior non-violent offenses allegedly committed by Mr. Andrews was fundamental error under state law and violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

22. The admission of prior convictions for crimes committed when Mr. Andrews was seventeen years old was fundamental error under state law and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

23. The trial court improperly refused to submit the lesser included offenses of murder, robbery, and theft to the jury.

24. Mr. Andrews was denied access to an impartial psychiatrist.

25. Mr. Andrews is mentally retarded; therefore, the imposition of the death penalty in this case violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

26. Mr. Andrews did not receive the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

27. Mr. Andrews did not receive the effective assistance

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