Andrews v. Lombardi

• Decision Date: 18 March 2014
• Docket Number: C.A. No. KC-2013-1128
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Parties: MANUEL ANDREWS, JR., et al. v. JAMES J. LOMBARDI, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, Rhode Island

MANUEL ANDREWS, JR., et al. v. JAMES J. LOMBARDI, in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, Rhode Island

C.A. No. KC-2013-1128

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS KENT, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

FILED: March 18, 2014

DECISION

TAFT-CARTER, J. Before this Court is the Motion for Order of Proof at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing and at Trial (Motion for Order of Proof) of Defendant James J. Lombardi (Defendant), in his capacity as Treasurer of the City of Providence, Rhode Island. Plaintiffs Manuel Andrews, Jr., et al (Plaintiffs) have objected. Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 8-2-13, 8-2-14, and 9-30-1 et seq.

IFACTS AND TRAVEL

Providence police officers and firefighters have long engaged in mandatory and binding collective bargaining with the City of Providence (City) pursuant to either the Municipal Police Arbitration Act, G.L. 1956 § 28-9.2-1 et seq. or the Firefighters Arbitration Act, § 28-9.1-1 et seq. Various collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the City have resulted. A particular benefit afforded under the CBAs was health insurance for the lifetime of the Providence police officer or firefighter and the lifetime of his or her spouse.

On June 30, 2011, Governor Chafee signed House Bill 2011 - 5894, substitute A, which became P.L. 2011, ch. 151, art. 12, § 2 (Medicare Enrollment Statute). The MedicareEnrollment Statute, effective as of July 1, 2011, permitted municipalities to require retirees to "enroll in Medicare as soon as he or she is eligible."

On July 19, 2011, the Providence City Council enacted ch. 2011-32, ordinance number 422, amending art. VI, § 17 of the Providence Code of Ordinances (Medicare Ordinance). The Medicare Ordinance required Medicare-eligible retirees to enroll in Medicare as of their sixty-fifth birthday to receive health benefits.

On October 12, 2011, the Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association filed C.A. No. 2011-5853 challenging the constitutionality of the Medicare Ordinance. The Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association sought a preliminary injunction barring the City from implementing the Medicare Ordinance. On January 30, 2012, this Court granted the preliminary injunction.

On May 14, 2012, after several months of discovery, this Court ordered the Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association and City into mediation. The Police Union (Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police), representing active Providence police officers, and the Firefighters Union (Local 799 of the IAFF, AFL-CIO) representing active Providence firefighters, also participated in the mediation. Through the mediation, the participating parties reached a tentative settlement agreement.

On June 26, 2012, members of the Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association approved the tentative settlement agreement (Settlement Agreement). On August 6, 2012, the Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association filed C.A. No. 2012-3590 and moved for class certification. On September 28, 2012, this Court recognized members of the Providence Retired Police and Firefighters Association as a certified class (Certified Class).Plaintiffs are "opt-out" members of the Certified Class who retained their right to take separate action against the City.

On October 22, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the underlying action challenging the constitutionality of the Medicare Ordinance on various grounds, including a Contract Clause violation. Plaintiffs' Complaint specifically seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from "terminating or suspending the Health Care Benefits to which [they] are entitled under the terms of the CBAs."

On January 7, 2014, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Order of Proof prior to the preliminary injunction hearing with respect to Plaintiffs' underlying Contract Clause claim. On January 15, 2014, Plaintiffs objected to Defendant's Motion for Order of Proof. On January 17, 2014, this Court heard the parties' arguments on the Motion for Order of Proof.

IIANALYSIS

Defendant's instant motion raises issues related to the burden of proof and law of presumptions. Defendant asks this Court to exercise its "sound discretion" under R.I. R. Evid. 611 to set the order of proof for Plaintiffs' Contract Clause claim. See R.I. R. Evid. 611, Advisory Committee Notes; see also Padula v. Machado, 416 A.2d 1184 (R.I. 1980) (regarding a trial judge's "sound discretion" to set the order of proof); State v. Mathias, 423 A.2d 484 (R.I. 1980) (pertaining to a trial judge effectuating an "orderly and expeditious" handling of a trial). Defendant specifically contends that Plaintiffs cannot prevail at either the preliminary injunction stage or trial without proving each element of the claim beyond a reasonable doubt.

"[T]he criteria a hearing justice should consider in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction are well settled." Fund for Cmty. Progress v. United Way of Se. NewEngland, 695 A.2d 517, 521 (R.I. 1997). When determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the hearing justice must determine

"'whether the moving party (1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will suffer irreparable harm without the requested injunctive relief, (3) has the balance of the equities, including the possible hardships to each party and to the public interest, tip in its favor, and (4) has shown that the issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status quo.'" Vasquez v. Sportsman's Inn, Inc., 57 A.3d 313, 318 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Iggy's Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I. 1999)); seealsoFund for Cmty. Progress, 695 A.2d at 521.

Substantive issues, however, are not resolved at the level of a preliminary injunction. See Iggy's Doughboys, 729 A.2d at 705. A "reasonable likelihood of succe[ss] on the merits" does not therefore mean a "certainty of success." See Fund for Cmty. Progress, 695 A.2d at 521. Instead, our Supreme Court requires "only that the moving party make out a prima facie case" for the underlying claim. Id. "Prima facie evidence is [considered the] amount of evidence that, if unrebutted, is sufficient to satisfy the burden of proof on a particular issue." Paramount Office Supply Co. v. D.A. MacIsaac, Inc., 524 A.2d 1099, 1101 (R.I. 1987).

With respect to a Contract Clause claim, the United States Supreme Court in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), has formulated "a three-part analysis for harmonizing the command of the [Contract] Clause with the 'necessarily reserved' sovereign power of the states to provide for the welfare of their citizens." Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 (4th Cir. 1993). Our Supreme Court in R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. Corp. v. Brown, 659 A.2d 95, 106 (R.I. 1995), has since adopted the three-pronged test fixed by the United States Supreme Court. Trial courts are therefore directed to inquire:

"First, has the state law in fact substantially impaired a contractual relationship? Second, if the law constitutes a substantialimpairment, can the state show a legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, 'such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem'? Third, is the legitimate public purpose sufficient to justify the impairment of the contractual rights?" Id. at 106 (citations omitted).

Additionally—as a starting point for any challenged legislation—courts at both the federal and state level presume legislative enactments to be "valid and constitutional." Mackie v. State, 936 A.2d 588, 595 (R.I. 2007); see e.g., Dowd v. Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 681 (R.I. 1995); Kass v. Ret. Bd. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. of R.I., 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I. 1989); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157 (1919) ("There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people . . . and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds."); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) ("[A Legislature is presumed] to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution."). Thus, "[w]hen reviewing a challenge to a statute's constitutionality, [a court must exercise] the 'greatest possible caution.'" Mackie, 936 A.2d at 595 (quoting Cherenzia v. Lynch, 847 A.2d 818, 822 (R.I. 2004)). "Unless the party challenging the statute's constitutionality can 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act violates a specific provision of the constitution or the United States Constitution, [a court shall] not hold the act unconstitutional.'" Id. (citing City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44-45 (R.I. 1995)); see also Dowd, 655 A.2d at 681 ("[T]he party challenging the constitutional validity of a statute carries the burden of persuading the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation violates an identifiable aspect of the constitution.").

At the forthcoming preliminary injunction hearing, it is well established that Plaintiffs hold the burden of persuasion for each factor of a preliminary injunction analysis. See Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318 (requiring the moving party to demonstrate (1) "a reasonable likelihood ofsuccess on the merits," (2) "irreparable harm," (3) a favorable "balance of the equities," and (4) preservation of the "status quo"); see also Iggy's Doughboys, 729 A.2d at 705; Fund for Cmty. Progress, 695 A.2d at 521. Yet, this Court's weighing of the first factor of a "reasonable likelihood of success on the merits" necessitates that it consider the burden of proof for the underlying Contract Clause claim. See Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318; see also Fund for Cmty. Progress, 695 A.2d at 521 (providing that "the moving party [must] make out a prima facie case" for a "reasonable likelihood of success on the merits"). Defendant thus asks this Court to articulate the burden of proof for a Contract Clause claim, while also arguing that the test's burdens—production and...