Andrews v. Missoula Cnty.
| Decision Date | 22 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | CV 11-29-M-DWM |
| Parties | ROBERT SHANE ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. MISSOULA COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Montana, Michael McMeekin, Sheriff of Missoula County, and John Does I through X Missoula County Detention Facility Employees and Officers, Missoula County Attorney Fred VanValkenburg, and John Does XI through XV, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
The defendants move for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff, Robert Andrews, claims that he was mistreated while he was detained at the Missoula County Detention Facility. He alleges negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and use of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also claims that Missoula County Attorney Fred Van Valkenburg improperly requested that he be detained at the Detention Facility, rather than the Montana State Hospital in Warm Springs.
Van Valkenburg moves for summary judgment, individually, on the basis ofabsolute prosecutorial immunity. The remaining defendants, as well as Van Valkenburg, move for summary judgment on all claims. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of all the defendants.
BACKGROUND
Andrews was arrested on February 11, 2008, at approximately 1:30 a.m. by the Missoula City Police Department on a city warrant. He was on probation at the time, following a guilty plea for felony burglary, two counts of criminal trespass, and obstructing a police officer. The warrant was issued for various probation violations, including possession of 12-gauge shotgun shells and marijuana use.
When city officers arrested Andrews, he yelled obscenities at them, became uncooperative, and kicked objects around the room. And, when he was placed in the patrol car, he struck "his forehead against the Plexiglass cage so hard that [the officer] thought [Andrews] would break it." Another officer reported, "We were unable to control [Andrews] due to his violent flailing . . . ."
Once at the jail, Andrews initially refused to exit the patrol car. He eventually exited the patrol car, though, and was placed in a spit hood and restraint chair. The time was approximately 1:40 a.m. Andrews had no visible injuries.
The detention officers continued to check on Andrews every 10 minutes. After more than three hours in the chair, Andrews was still fighting the restraints.He later calmed down and was taken out of the restraints at 6:00 a.m.
As shown in a surveillance video, Andrews became disruptive and violent at about 8:20 p.m. the next day. Several detention officers filed incident reports recounting what had happened. Andrews had wrapped a cup in a towel and was swinging it at his cell light, attempting to break the light. The officers noticed that Andrews had broken the cup and that he was bleeding. The officers repeatedly told him to approach the food hatch so that he could be handcuffed. As surveillance video also shows, the officers told Andrews several times that he would be Tased if he did not comply. He refused, continued to yell obscenities at the officers, continued to act violent, and the officers eventually Tased him. After being Tased, Andrews was placed in a restraint chair at 8:30 p.m. He was removed from the chair at 9:54 p.m.
Andrews was then committed to the Montana State Hospital in order to determine whether he was fit to stand trial. While he was at the State Hospital, he assaulted a staff member badly enough that the staff member had to be transported by helicopter from Warm Springs to Missoula. On June 3, 2008, the state court found that Andrews was unfit to proceed, and it committed him to the State Hospital for 90 days.
Despite the court's order, the State Hospital sent Andrews back to theDetention Facility not long after the court issued its order and well before the 90-day period had expired. Importantly, though, there is no evidence that Fred Van Valkenburg, the Missoula County Attorney, told or advised the State Hospital to send Andrews back. Instead, the State Hospital appears to have sent Andrews back on its own accord.
At a hearing to address the matter, Van Valkenburg advised the court that the State Hospital sent Andrews back to the Detention Facility because he was too violent. He also asked the Court to keep Andrews at the Detention Facility. The court, though, concluded that Andrews could not remain at the Detention Facility because the court had found him unfit to proceed. As a result, the court ordered that Andrews be sent back to the State Hospital.
A little over a month later, on July 31, 2008, the court ordered Andrews to be transported from the State Hospital to the Detention Facility because he had been restored to a condition that made him fit to proceed. The court sentenced him to three years imprisonment in the Montana Department of Corrections on September 22, 2008.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ifany, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The party opposing the summary judgment may not rest on conclusory allegations, but must set forth facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Hutchinson v. United States, 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988).
ANALYSIS
There are two motions for summary judgment. In the first, Van Valkenburg moves for summary judgment on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. In the second, all the defendants move for summary judgment on the merits of Andrews' claims and on other bases. The Court grants both motions.
Van Valkenburg filed an individual motion for summary judgment, arguing that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court agrees and grants summary judgment in favor of Van Valkenburg.
Prosecutors enjoy "'absolute prosecutorial immunity'" for "'actions that are connected with the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings . . . .'" Lacey v. Maricopa Co., 649 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494 (1991)). The immunity extends to actions taken while performingthe "traditional functions of an advocate." Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Stated differently, state prosecutors are absolutely immune for acts that are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," such as "initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State's case." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31.
When determining whether a prosecutor is protected by prosecutorial immunity, the court employs a "functional analysis, looking not at the office or title of the actor but at the act performed." Lacey, 649 F.3d at 1129 (citation omitted); see Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342-43 (2009). "[T]he actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the question is whether the prosecutor was functioning in the role of an advocate—that is, conducting activities intimately associated with the judicial process or, rather, functioning in the role of an administrator or investigator. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. At a minimum, a prosecutor's courtroom conduct "clear[ly] . . . falls on the advocacy side of the line." Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1261 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274); see also Waggy v. Spokane Co. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir. 2010).
Here, Van Valkenburg is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity because the acts complained of are "intimately associated with the judicial process." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31. In his complaint, Andrews alleges that Van Valkenburg improperly recommended that Andrews be detained at the Detention Facility, rather than the State Hospital. Andrews does not claim that Van Valkenburg improperly investigated Andrews' detention—or, more specifically, advised the State Hospital to send Andrews back to the Detention Facility. Instead, he contends that Van Valkenburg improperly presented argument and evidence to the Court. Those actions are, by definition, advocacy-oriented actions that are "intimately associated with the judicial process." Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31; see Mink, 482 F.3d at 1261 ; Waggy, 594 F.3d at 711. As a result, Van Valkenburg is absolutely immune from Andrews' claims.
The outcome might have been different if Van Valkenburg had told the State Hospital to transport Andrews back to the Detention Facility, in violation of the state court's order. Had he done so, he might have been acting beyond his prosecutorial authority. But Andrews has not come forward with any evidence whatsoever to support that argument. Instead, as Andrews appears to concede, VanValkenburg simply explained to the Court why the State Hospital had sent Andrews back to the Detention Facility and why he thought Andrews should stay there.
Moreover, in his response brief, Andrews offers nothing more than conclusory allegations. He has not come forward with any specific facts or evidence to refute prosecutorial immunity.
Since Van Valkenburg is immune from Andrews' claims, the Court grants summary judgment in his favor.
The remaining defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on a variety of bases. First, they argue they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims because the undisputed facts disprove Andrews' allegations of excessive force, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Seco...
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