Andrews v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 28 October 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 82-255,82-255 |
Citation | 124 N.H. 148,467 A.2d 254 |
Parties | Kenneth W. ANDREWS et al. v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Upton, Sanders & Smith, Concord (Frederic K. Upton, Concord, on brief and orally), for plaintiffs.
Devine, Millimet, Stahl & Branch P.A., Manchester (Andrew D. Dunn, Manchester, on brief and orally), for defendant.
The defendant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, appeals from adverse rulings by the Superior Court (Cann, J.) concerning the interpretation to be given provisions in one of its automobile liability policies and the applicability of declaratory judgment procedures to situations involving first-party claims, i.e., claims between the insured and the insurer not involving liability to a third party. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The plaintiffs, Kenneth W. and Rachel Andrews, filed a petition for declaratory judgment (RSA 491:22) seeking a judicial interpretation of the uninsured motorist endorsement in Mr. Andrews' insurance policy. The parties stipulated to the following facts. On November 23, 1979, Mrs. Andrews was operating an automobile covered by the policy issued by the defendant. Mr. Andrews and the couple's two minor children were passengers. The automobile was involved in a collision on a public highway in Rochester with a vehicle which was later determined to be an uninsured motor vehicle as defined by Mr. Andrews' policy. Both plaintiffs and their two children suffered bodily injuries as a result of the collision. The plaintiff Rachel Andrews made a claim exceeding $100,000 against the insurer under the uninsured motorist endorsement for damages on account of her bodily injuries. Mr. Andrews and each of the children also made individual claims against the defendant under the policy's uninsured motorist coverage for injuries which each of them sustained.
The claims by Mr. Andrews and the two children are not in issue but are relevant to this appeal to the extent that they indicate that more than one person sustained bodily injuries in this single occurrence.
The issues presented to the trial court and which now are the basis of the defendant's appeal are:
1. Whether the claim of the plaintiff Rachel Andrews under the uninsured motorist coverage of the automobile liability policy on account of her bodily injuries, where more than one person has sustained damages in the same occurrence, is limited only by the aggregate per "occurrence" limit of $300,000, and is not subject to the "one person" limit of $100,000.
2. Whether RSA 491:22-a relating to the burden of proof in a petition for declaratory judgment to determine coverage of a liability insurance policy, and RSA 491:22-b relating to costs and attorneys' fees in such a declaratory judgment action, are applicable to a petition involving first-party claims.
We consider first the procedural issue. The defendant contends that an insured's first-party claim against his insurer cannot be asserted in an action for declaratory judgment, RSA 491:22, and that it therefore follows that the provisions of RSA 491:22-a (Supp.1979), relating to the burden of proof, and RSA 491:22-b (Supp.1979), relating to costs and attorney's fees are inapplicable to such claims. We disagree.
We believe that the language of RSA 491:22 is clearly broad enough to encompass the type of claim raised here. RSA 491:22 states:
(Emphasis added).
The defendant argues, however, that the six-month filing limitation for third-party claims contained within RSA 491:22 supports its contention that only that type of insurance claim can be asserted in a declaratory judgment action. We conclude, as did the trial court, that merely because the legislature deemed a six-month limitation desirable in cases involving third-party insurance claims does not mean it also intended to limit the applicability of the statute to such claims.
We acknowledge the general proposition that the availability of adequate relief through other proceedings bars the maintenance of a declaratory judgment action. E.g., Beaudoin v. State, 113 N.H. 559, 561, 311 A.2d 310, 312 (1973). However, "[a]lthough it may be true that plaintiff's rights could be enforced in an action at law this does not necessarily preclude their determination by a petition for declaratory judgment." Hermer v. Dover, 105 N.H. 108, 110, 192 A.2d 624, 625 (1963) (emphasis added).
We have previously considered first-party insurance claims which have been brought as declaratory judgment actions under RSA 491:22. See, e.g., Grimes v. Concord Gen'l Mut. Ins. Co., 120 N.H. 718, 422 A.2d 1312 (1980); Shea v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 120 N.H. 106, 411 A.2d 1118 (1980). Recognizing that a declaratory judgment action is "a broad remedy which should be liberally construed so as to effectuate the evident statutory purpose of making a controversy over a legal or equitable right justiciable at an earlier stage of the controversy than it would be if the matter were pursued in an action at law or in equity," Beaudoin v. State, 113 N.H. at 562, 311 A.2d at 313, we hold that a petition for declaratory relief is a proper means for determining first-party insurance coverage claims.
Nor does Hampton Indoor Tennis Center, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 122 N.H. 790, 451 A.2d 172 (1982), dictate a different result. In Hampton, we upheld the trial court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment action which had been brought simultaneously with an action at law, because "it was merely duplicative of the action at law." Hampton Indoor Tennis Ctr., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 N.H. at 793, 451 A.2d at 173. We did not hold in that case that a declaratory judgment action was an inappropriate procedural vehicle even if it had been brought alone, and we do not embrace that view now.
Since the plaintiffs' claims can be resolved by means of a petition for declaratory judgment, it follows that the provisions in the statute which allocate the burden of proof, court costs and attorneys' fees in a petition for declaratory judgment action are applicable. RSA 491:22-a (Supp.1979); RSA 491:22-b (Supp.1979).
We next address the issue involving the interpretation to be given language in the insurance policy relating to uninsured motorist coverage. The provisions at issue state:
The declarations attached to the policy indicated that the limits of the defendant's liability were $100,000 for...
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