Andrews v. New Britain Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 29 July 1931
• Citation: 155 A. 838,113 Conn. 467
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ANDREWS v. NEW BRITAIN NAT. BANK et al.

155 A. 838

113 Conn. 467

ANDREWS v. NEW BRITAIN NAT. BANK et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 29, 1931

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Earnest C. Simpson Judge.

Action by Alden Andrews against the New Britain National Bank executor, and others, claiming a decree that plaintiff is the owner of certain real estate and other relief. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Obligation of grantee to build house upon lot in accordance with agreement under which quitclaim deed was executed did not give rise to trust.

Mortimer H. Camp and Margaret P. Camp. both of New Britain for appellants.

John T. Robinson and John C. Parsons, both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HAINES, HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

MALTBIE, C.J.

The facts necessary to present the questions of law involved in this case may be stated rather briefly. There is no need to consider in detail the appellants' motion to correct which largely concerns immaterial matters. Such material corrections as should be made are incorporated in the following statement: On May 14, 1912, the plaintiff owned a 2 1/2 acre lot in New Britain on which was situated his home. It had formed a portion of a large tract of land owned by his father, and the lot was subject to a life use in favor of the latter. The plaintiff's two brothers and his sister also had a 50-foot right of way across a portion of it to adjoining lands owned by them. The plaintiff had a very intimate friend, William J. Long. Long was 48 years old, and the plaintiff a year or two older. Long had a wife 52 years of age and no children. Prior to May 14, 1912, the plaintiff and Long discussed the matter of Long's moving from his residence in the city and coming to live near the former's home. Long, to quote the finding, " made the suggestion to Andrews that he be allowed to build a house on a portion of the plaintiff's home lot, and stated that if he be allowed to do so he would build a house thereon which would be an addition to the neighborhood and that upon the death of Long and his wife the land and the house intact would revert to the plaintiff or if the plaintiff were then deceased to his wife of heirs." The defendants seek to have stricken out the words, " or if the plaintiff were then deceased, to his wife or heirs," but they are reasonably supported by the evidence. The plaintiff agreed to this proposal, but no writing containing its terms was ever made. On May 14, 1912, the plaintiff, his father, his brothers and sister, executed and delivered to Long a quit claim deed of a portion of the lot, containing the usual provisions of such a deed. The plaintiff's father joined in the deed in order to release his life use, and the plaintiff's brothers and sister, to release their interests in the right of way. No money was paid for this conveyance. The lot was then worth about $450. Long took possession of the property, filled in the lot, and erected a brick bungalow; the whole costing about $4,300. Thereafter Long acted as would an owner of the premises; he made a mortgage in which he warranted that he was well seized of the premises as a good indefeasible estate in fee simple, and he paid the taxes on the property and insurance premiums on the house. He stated, however, to various people at various times that the house and lot were the property of the plaintiff. Long's wife died in 1929, and he died in 1930. At the time of his death, the house and lot were worth about $9,000, and at the time of trial about $8,500. Long left a considerable estate and a will, in which no mention was made of the premises in question, but in which he made certain bequests and gave the residue of his property to the defendant bank as trustee for the benefit of his wife during her life and at her death to be distributed among various persons and charitable organizations; and, in this distribution, all the beneficiaries named were given corporate stock or sums in cash except as to the residue which was given to four charitable organizations. The present action is brought by the plaintiff against the bank as executor and these charitable organizations, seeking to impress a trust upon the lot in question, a decree vesting title in the premises in the plaintiff and requiring the defendants to convey their interests to him, an injunction against their making any claim to the premises, and any other appropriate equitable relief. From a judgment for the plaintiff the defendant bank and two of the charitable organizations have appealed, a stipulation by the other charitable organizations having been filed in which it is agreed that the decision in this appeal shall be conclusive upon their rights.

Briefs of counsel quite largely discuss the question at issue from the standpoint of the sufficiency of the facts to give rise to an enforceable trust for the benefit of the plaintiff. But we see in them no trust relationship whatsoever. The quitclaim deed stated a valuable consideration, and this is sufficient to rebut any claim of trust resulting at the time the deed was made. Belden v. Seymour, 8 Conn. 304, 312, 21 Am.Dec. 661; Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383; Murray v. Klinzing, 64 Conn. 78, 85, 29 A. 244. In Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Devine, 97 Conn. 193, 196, 116 A. 239, 240, 21 A.L.R. 134, we said: " The modern rule, permitting the actual consideration to be inquired into notwithstanding the presence of a seal, cannot be carried so far as to permit proof of an entire absence of consideration for the purpose of nullifying the effect of the deed as a legal act; that is, of denying its legal effect as a conveyance of the specified title to the described premises." If we do inquire into the consideration upon which the deed was given, we find that not merely did Long change his place of residence in reliance upon it, but he agreed to and did expend more than $4,000 in preparing the land and erecting a house, so that in no sense could the deed be said to have been given without consideration. There was, then, no resulting trust growing out of a lack of consideration for the deed.

A trust has been defined as follows: " A trust is where there are rights, titles, and interests in property distinct from the legal ownership. In such cases, the legal title, in the eye of the law, carries with it, to the holder, absolute dominion, but behind it lie beneficial rights and interests in the same property belonging to another. These rights, to the extent to which they exist, are a charge upon the property, and constitute an equity which a court of equity will protect and enforce, whenever its aid for that purpose is properly invoked." Plum Trees Lime Co. v Keeler, 92 Conn. 1, 10, 101 A. 509, 512, Ann.Cas. 1918E, 831. By the terms of the agreement no duty was imposed upon Long except that growing out of his promise to build a house upon the lot conveyed to him. This would create nothing more than an obligation in the plaintiff's favor, which would not in any sense give rise to a trust. Hyland v. Crofut, 87 Conn. 49, 54, 86 A. 753. No duty was imposed by the agreement upon Long to convey or devise the land to the plaintiff or any one else. Had the agreement been reduced to writing, it would have merely been one under which the lot was to be conveyed to Long for his life and that of his wife, with a reversion to the plaintiff or his representatives. In other words, it would have created a life estate in the premises measured by Long's life and that of his wife, if she survived him. A life tenant is not a trustee. To be sure, as regards certain obligations resting upon him either by virtue of his limited estate or the terms of the instrument creating it, it has been said that equity will treat him as a quasi trustee. Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio St. 446, 461, 38 N.E. 61; 2 Perry, Trusts (7th Ed.) § 540. But he does not hold the legal title as trustee. The...