Andrews v. Ring

• Decision Date: 12 September 2003
• Docket Number: Record No. 022434.,Record No. 022243
• Citation: 266 Va. 311,585 S.E.2d 780
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Ruth S. ANDREWS v. William Dale RING and Jimmy Don Bolt, William Cox, v. William Dale Ring and Jimmy Don Bolt.

585 S.E.2d 780

266 Va. 311

Ruth S. ANDREWS v. William Dale RING and Jimmy Don Bolt, William Cox, v. William Dale Ring and Jimmy Don Bolt.

Record Nos. 022243, 022434.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

September 12, 2003.

Monica Taylor Monday (S.D. Roberts Moore, Roanoke; Jimmy F. Robinson, Jr., Richmond; Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, on brief), for appellant (Record No. 022243).

S. Vernon Priddy, III, Richmond; Melvin E. Williams (James E. Cornwell, Jr., Chesterfield; Michael R. Bedsaul, Radford; Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Roanoke; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, Fredericksburg; Guynn & Memmer, on briefs), for appellees (Record No. 022243).

Monica Taylor Monday (S.D. Roberts Moore, Roanoke; Charles H. Smith, III, Alexandria, Richmond; Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, Roanoke, on brief), for appellant (Record No. 022434).

S. Vernon Priddy, III, Richmond; Melvin E. Williams (James E. Cornwell, Jr., Chesterfield; Michael R. Bedsaul, Radford; Jim H. Guynn, Jr., Roanoke; Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, Fredericksburg; Guynn & Memmer, on briefs), for appellees (Record No. 022434).

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

In this consolidated appeal involving two separate suits alleging malicious prosecution and statutory conspiracy to cause injury to "reputation, trade, business or profession" against the Commonwealth's Attorney of Grayson County and the Building Inspector of Grayson County, we consider whether the trial court erred by granting defendants' motions for summary judgment. Because the trial court granted summary judgment pursuant to Rule 3:18, our review of the facts is limited to pleadings, orders, and admissions of the parties.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

During all times relevant to this case, Ruth S. Andrews ("Andrews") was the Chairperson of the Grayson County School Board; William Cox ("Cox") was the Director of School Maintenance for Grayson County; Jimmy Don Bolt ("Bolt") was the Commonwealth's Attorney of Grayson County; and William Dale Ring ("Ring") was the Building Inspector of Grayson County.

On August 1, 2000, upon direction of Cox and on behalf of the Grayson County School Board, David G. Cornett, an employee of the Grayson County School Maintenance Department, applied for and received a building permit to install an above-ground storage tank on the premises of Grayson County High School. On August 7, 2000, employees in the Maintenance Department, personally supervised and directed by Cox, poured a concrete pad designed to support the proposed above-ground storage tank. At Cox's direction, the site upon which the concrete pad was poured had been excavated July 31, 2000, the day prior to issuance of the building permit. On August 28, 2000, Cox and Ring discussed the project, and Ring informed Cox that his office needed a letter from the project's architect "stating that the concrete pad was adequate to support the weight of the proposed storage tank." On September 6, 2000, Cox delivered a letter from William W. Huber, the project architect, to Ring, which "confirmed that a structural engineer evaluated the slab thickness needed to support the ... tank and determined that the ... pad was structurally adequate for supporting the proposed tank."

On September 8, 2000, at the direction of Bolt, Ring appeared before a magistrate for Grayson County, and filed a criminal complaint against Andrews, Cox, and Dr. Alvin C. Proffit¹ ("Dr. Proffit"), the Superintendent of Grayson County Schools, alleging that they "Mailed to obtain a Building Permit before beginning work on a 10,000 Gallon Storage tank[]" and "[c]onceal[ed] work prior to the required inspection by pouring concrete slab." On September 11, 2000, Andrews, Cox, and Dr. Proffit were served with warrants requiring them to appear before the General District Court of Grayson County for arraignment and trial. However, on the date set for trial, October 3, 2000, Bolt moved the court to nolle prosequi the charges against all three defendants. Bolt and Ring claim that the decision to nolle prosequi the charges was the result of settlement negotiations. Andrews and Cox deny that any agreement to settle the criminal charges was reached.

On September 4, 2001, Andrews and Cox filed separate motions for judgment in the Circuit Court of Grayson County against Ring and Bolt alleging malicious prosecution and conspiracy to injure reputation, trade, business, and profession pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-499 and 18.2-500. Ring and Bolt filed responsive pleadings which included several demurrers and special pleas of immunity. On November 29, 2001, the parties appeared before the trial court to present argument on the demurrers and special pleas filed by Ring and Bolt. By order dated January 11, 2002, the trial court overruled Ring's and Bolt's special pleas of immunity without prejudice and overruled each demurrer. The trial court ordered Ring and Bolt to file grounds of defense.

On April 8, 2002, Ring and Bolt filed separate motions for summary judgment. On April 30, 2002, the trial court heard argument from the parties on the motions for summary judgment. With regard to the malicious prosecution allegation, the trial court held that there was sufficient probable cause justifying the issuance of the warrants. Additionally, the trial court held that Andrews and Cox could not recover damages for injury to their personal reputations under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500. The trial court granted both motions for summary judgment. In its final order in each case, the trial court stated that "Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED for the reasons and on the grounds stated on the record at the hearing of Defendants' motions and for the reasons and on the grounds stated in the Defendants' memoranda in support thereof." Andrews and Cox appeal the adverse judgments of the trial court.

II. Analysis

Summary judgment upon all or any part of a claim may be granted to a party entitled to such judgment when no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 3:18; Renner v. Stafford, 245 Va. 351, 353, 429 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1993). A grant of summary judgment must be based upon undisputed facts established by pleadings, admissions in pleadings, and admissions made in answers to requests for admissions.² Additionally, the trial court must consider inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, unless the inferences are strained, forced or contrary to reason. Carson v. Le-Blanc, 245 Va. 135, 139-40, 427 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1993).

Andrews and Cox present identical assignments of error. They assert that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Bolt and Ring on the statutory conspiracy count and on the malicious prosecution count of their respective motions for judgment, and they further assert that summary judgment should not have been granted before discovery was concluded.

A. Statutory Conspiracy under Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500

Andrews and Cox each allege that "Ring and Bolt acted in concert to willfully and maliciously injure [them] in [their] business, trade, and reputation" and seek damages from Bolt and Ring under the statutory conspiracy provisions of Code §§ 18.2-499 and 500. A violation of Code § 18.2-499 is punished as a Class 1 misdemeanor. Additionally, Code § 18.2-500 provides a civil remedy for a violation of Code § 18.2-499. Bolt and Ring argue that the scope of the conspiracy statute is limited to injury to business interests and does not extend to injury to personal reputation even in the context of employment.

The conspiracy statute was once codified as part of the antitrust laws of the Commonwealth. See Code § 59-21.1 (Cum. Supp.1962) (superseded). In 1964, the General Assembly removed the conspiracy provisions from the antitrust statutes and placed them in the criminal code with much greater sanctions. See Code § 18.1-74.1:1 (superseded) (Chapter 623, 1964 Acts of Assembly). We conclude that the origin of Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500 establishes that they apply to business and property interests, not to personal or employment interests.

Traditional statutory construction requires the same conclusion. Code § 18.2-499 proscribes conspiracy to "willfully, and maliciously injure] another in his reputation, trade, business or profession." The maxim of noscitur a sociis provides that the meaning of doubtful words in a statute may be determined by reference to their association with related words and phrases. When general words and specific words are grouped together, the general words are limited and qualified by the specific words and will be construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects identified by the specific words. Commonwealth v. United Airlines, Inc., 219 Va. 374, 389, 248 S.E.2d 124, 132-33 (1978). Here the word "reputation" is at issue. Within the statute, its association with "trade, business or profession" requires the exclusion of personal reputation and interest in employment from the scope of the statute's coverage. We note that federal courts in Virginia have reached similar holdings. See Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259 (4th Cir.1985),

Nationwide Fire Ins. Co. v. Jones, 577 F.Supp. 968, 970 (W.D.Va.1984).

The undisputed facts subject to proper consideration by the trial court upon motions for summary judgment on this issue clearly establish that Andrews and Cox seek damages for injury to personal reputation and employment interests. As a matter of law, an action under the Code §§ 18.2-499 and -500 may not embrace such claims. With causes of action based upon statutory conspiracy removed from consideration, we must now consider claims of malicious prosecution.

B. Immunity of the Prosecutor

Bolt, the Commonwealth's Attorney of Grayson County, maintains that, upon the record of these cases, he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The absolute immunity of...