Andrews v. Stallings

Decision Date14 February 1995
Docket NumberNo. 15238,15238
Citation892 P.2d 611,1995 NMCA 15,119 N.M. 478
PartiesRonald E. ANDREWS and Jill Andrews, husband and wife, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., a New Mexico corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Charles STALLINGS, a/k/a Chuck Stallings, and Frankie Jarrell, each individually and as employees of The Ruidoso News, and Raljon Publishing, Inc., d/b/a The Ruidoso News, a New Mexico corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtCourt of Appeals of New Mexico
OPINION

BLACK, Judge.

Ronald Andrews ("Andrews"), Jill Andrews, and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc. ("the Corporation") filed suit against Raljon Publishing, Inc., owner of the Ruidoso News, Frankie Jarrell ("Jarrell"), editor and general manager of the Ruidoso News, and Charles Stallings ("Stallings"), a reporter for that newspaper. Plaintiffs sued for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and prima facie tort. Plaintiffs' claims are based upon a series of articles, editorials, and statements that they allege presented false accounts of public proceedings and drew unfair inferences from Andrews' actions as both a member of the Ruidoso Village Council ("the Village Council") and promoter of the Golden Aspen Motorcycle Rally ("the Motorcycle Rally"). After entertaining both briefs and oral argument, the district court dismissed the complaint. We affirm.

I. DEFAMATION

Plaintiffs allege that beginning the second year Andrews was on the Village Council, Defendants, "with reckless disregard and malice, published false, unfair and inaccurate accounts of public proceedings, more particularly with respect to the meetings of the Ruidoso Village Council, which accounts have contained repeated claims or innuendo of malfeasance of office on the part of plaintiff, Ronald E. Andrews, all with the intent to injure the good standing of said plaintiff." Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants "negligently, recklessly, and maliciously published defamatory statements relating to plaintiffs Jill Andrews and Golden Aspen Rally, Inc., which statements were understood to be defamatory, but which were false." Defendants' allegedly defamatory statements deal generally with the authors' opinions regarding the operation of the Village of Ruidoso and the use of Andrews' elected governmental position to promote the Motorcycle Rally.

Initially, we consider the common law tort of defamation and the limitations placed upon that tort by the First Amendment, U.S. Constitution Amendment I. At common law, a statement is considered defamatory "if it has a tendency to render the party about whom it is published contemptible or ridiculous in public estimation, or expose him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder virtuous men from associating with him." Bookout v. Griffin, 97 N.M. 336, 339, 639 P.2d 1190, 1193 (1982). "A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1976) [hereinafter Restatement]; cf. Marchiondo v. Brown, 98 N.M. 394, 404, 649 P.2d 462, 472 (1982) (difference between fact and opinion depends on whether ordinary person would understand words as expression of speaker's or writer's opinion, or as statement of existing fact).

In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The Sullivan decision constitutionalized the common law tort of defamation. "It set a single standard for libel suits by public officials against the press in every court in the nation." Robert D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems 7 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter Sack & Baron].

Sullivan and its progeny are based on the premise that "[i]t is vital to our form of government that press and citizens alike be free to discuss and, if they see fit, impugn the motives of public officials." Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1305 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). Indeed, the right to criticize public officials "lies near the core of the First Amendment." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 1541, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Thus, at least since Sullivan, fiery political dialogue, rhetoric, and public debate have been protected under the First Amendment. See Mendoza v. Gallup Indep. Co., 107 N.M. 721, 725, 764 P.2d 492, 496 (Ct.App.1988). Therefore, the courts have been "particularly assiduous in using protections given opinion by common and constitutional law as tools to shelter strong, even outrageous, political speech." Sack & Baron, supra, at 226.

"The actual malice requirement was thought to be necessary, because if the makers of some inevitably false statements about public officials (that is, statements made without actual malice) were not insulated from defamation liability, then there would be substantial danger that the first amendment rights of speakers would be unduly chilled." Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 91, 96 (1987). The failure to dismiss an unwarranted libel suit might necessitate long and expensive trial proceedings that would have an undue chilling effect on public discourse. See Time, Inc. v. McLaney, 406 F.2d 565, 566 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922, 89 S.Ct. 1776, 23 L.Ed.2d 239 (1969); Myers v. Plan Takoma, Inc., 472 A.2d 44, 50 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (on issues of public importance where even nonmeritorious claim may stifle robust debate, motion to dismiss is appropriate exercise for the court); see also State v. Powell, 114 N.M. 395, 398, 839 P.2d 139, 142 (Ct.App.1992) (recognizing chilling effect of criminal libel statute). Therefore, "every defamation action governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan contemplates a threshold, constitutional inquiry by the court concerning whether the publication at issue is reasonably capable of bearing a false, defamatory meaning." C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 Iowa L.Rev. 237, 281 (1993) [hereinafter Dienes & Levine]; see, e.g., Chapin v. Greve, 787 F.Supp. 557, 562 (E.D.Va.1992) (mem. op.) (threshold inquiry is whether article is defamatory), aff'd sub nom. Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir.1993); cf. Marchiondo, 98 N.M. at 400, 649 P.2d at 468 (courts must determine in the first instance whether alleged statement was constitutionally protected expression). Based on this standard, the trial court should determine, at the earliest possible stage, whether the plaintiff can establish that statements regarding a public figure are (1) false; (2) defamatory; and (3) evidence of actual malice. See Dienes & Levine, supra, at 281-83.

The Sullivan standard applies to Andrews as an elected official. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67, 85 S.Ct. 209, 212, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Where public figures are involved in issues of public concern, the Constitution contemplates a bias in favor of free speech. This bias sometimes works to the detriment of the right of public figures to obtain compensation for damage to their reputations. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977).

It is within this legal framework that we measure Plaintiffs' allegations.

A. February 14, 1991

Plaintiffs identify an article regarding the departure of the city manager, Charles Norwood, as the opening salvo in Defendants' "pattern of malicious, reckless and bad faith conduct, in both investigation and reporting with the purpose and effect of defaming the good characters and reputations of plaintiffs." The article rhetorically raises ten questions as to why Norwood might have resigned. Plaintiffs specifically target question seven, "Did you, Mr. Norwood, get tired of the village's appearance of impropriety by having the same people serve on several boards where money switches hands." However, because defamatory statements must be "concerning the plaintiff[,]" SCRA 1986, 13-1002(B)(3) (Repl.1991), none of the Plaintiffs has a legal basis to complain about the question regarding the "village's appearance of impropriety."

In Sullivan, the jury found that readers of a New York Times advertisement could fairly infer that the accusations of misconduct made against the police actually defamed Sullivan as Commissioner of Public Affairs. The United States Supreme Court rejected this finding of the Alabama jury and the state appellate courts that affirmed it, saying:

There is no legal alchemy by which a State may thus create the cause of action that would otherwise be denied for a publication which, as respondent himself said of the advertisement, "reflects not only on me but on the other Commissioners and the community." Raising as it does the possibility that a good-faith critic of government will be penalized for his criticism, the proposition relied on by the Alabama courts strikes at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free expression. We hold that such a proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental...

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