Andrews v. State

• Decision Date: 01 June 1920
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 363
• Citation: 85 So. 840,17 Ala.App. 456
• Parties: ANDREWS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

85 So. 840

17 Ala.App. 456

ANDREWS v. STATE.

1 Div. 363

Court of Appeals of Alabama

June 1, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Baldwin County; A.E. Gamble, Judge.

Sim Andrews was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Webb McAlpine & Grove, of Mobile, for appellant.

J.Q Smith, Atty. Gen., for the State.

SAMFORD J.

Charges 1, 2, 16, 21, 29, 34, 36, Q, and R, are all charges attempting to define "reasonable doubt" and "burden of proof." The court had already, in its oral charge, clearly defined the law of "reasonable doubt" and "burden of proof," and at the request of the defendant gave in writing 30 charges on this same subject, many of which might have been well refused but, in any event, the propositions of law embraced in the above charges were fully covered in the written charges given at the request of the defendant and the general charge of the court. The multiplication of charges defining a reasonable doubt would tend rather to confuse than to elucidate.

Charges A, B, C, and D assert the proposition that, if the defendant was insane at the time he committed the act and the jury are so reasonably satisfied, they must find the defendant not guilty on his plea of not guilty. These charges are in direct conflict with Code 1907, §§ 7176, 7177, and were properly refused.

In addition to what we have said with regard to charges Q and R, these charges begin by hypothesizing a condition in the minds of the jury, without requiring a consideration of the whole evidence. As stated, the charges tend to confuse, and therefore were properly refused.

The defendant seriously contends that the court erred in asking each juror, upon his qualification, this question:

"Would you hang in a case where the evidence satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of a mob that went into the county jail and killed a prisoner lawfully confined therein, if the evidence further satisfied you, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant in so doing was guilty of murder in the first degree?"

The defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and therefore it affirmatively appears he was not injured by the question, even if it was error, which we do not hold. On the contrary, we think it was discretionary with the court. Walker v. State, 153 Ala. 31, 45 So. 640.

It seems from the evidence that after the defendant had been arrested on a charge of murder, and while he was still in custody, those in authority endeavored by inducement and promises of immunity to get him to confess his guilt and to tell the whole truth as to the crime and who participated in it. This was at Bay Minette, the place where the crime was committed. The defendant made no statement at that time, but after being taken to Birmingham, and after the Assistant Attorney General having charge of the prosecution had said to defendant:

"I made you a proposition to the effect that if you would tell about this thing before we left Bay Minette, that I would stand between you and trouble. Well, now, I don't want to take any unfair advantage of you. That proposition is off. I had a reason then, but it is withdrawn. Everything you say, this gentleman is taking down, word for word. These other fellows have told the whole story. He is going to write it up, and they are going to sign it, and it will be used against you in court, both before the grand jury and petit jury. I don't offer you any inducement whatever to make any statement. *** Now, you can make a statement if you want to and trust to your own luck as to what good it will do you. I am not going to threaten you; I am not going to offer you any inducement at all. If you want to make a statement, you can do it; or you can keep your mouth shut."

--the defendant...