Andrews v. State

Decision Date14 November 2002
Docket NumberNo. 101,101
Citation372 Md. 1,811 A.2d 282
PartiesKurt Nichols ANDREWS v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Geraldine K. Sweeney, Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Mary Ann Ince, Assistant Attorney General (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J. and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.

BELL, C.J.

The petitioner, Kurt Nichols Andrews, was arrested and tried, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, for the death of his infant daughter, Kristin Andrews,1 which, it was alleged, was caused by "Shaken Baby Syndrome." Shaken Baby Syndrome is characterized by violent acceleration and deceleration forces being applied to an infant, whose head is disproportionately heavy, whose neck muscles are weak, and whose brain is unmyelinated and soft, making it more susceptible to trauma. The petitioner was found not guilty of second degree depraved heart murder, involuntary manslaughter, and child abuse. He was convicted, however, of reckless endangerment, for which he was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment. After unsuccessfully appealing his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, the petitioner filed a petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, which we granted. Andrews v. State, 362 Md. 34, 762 A.2d 968 (2000). In this Court, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred by allowing a demonstration, using a doll that did not have the same characteristics as the infant child alleged to have been shaken, to be conducted before the jury for the purpose of showing the amount of force necessary to cause an injury associated with Shaken Baby Syndrome, and by permitting the expert witness, called by the respondent, the State of Maryland, to testify on the basis of that demonstration. We agree. Accordingly, we shall reverse.

I.

As acknowledged by the State, the facts of the case sub judice are largely undisputed. Kristin Andrews was born prematurely, at a gestational age of 23½ weeks,2 weighing only one pound and eight ounces, in Mercy Hospital on May 6, 1997. As a result, she was plagued with severe health complications, including intraventricular brain hemorrhage, sustained at birth, patent ductus arteriosus (a hole in the heart), and Respiratory Distress Syndrome. Kristin required eight blood transfusions as a result of anemia of prematurity. In addition, Kristin suffered from periodic bouts of apnea, a cessation of breathing for 20 seconds or more, and bradycardia, a slowing of the heart rate to less than 100 beats per minute. Kristin was also treated for an e-coli infection and monitored for retinopathy of prematurity, a condition in which blood vessels to the eye develop abnormally, resulting in the eye becoming engorged, possibly leading to detachment of the retina. She was unable to self-feed and required an arterial line to the umbilicus for formula, antibiotics and fluids.

Kristin remained hospitalized for a period of 89 days after birth, requiring during that period, numerous medications and medical equipment. Due to the Respiratory Distress Syndrome caused by the premature development of her lungs, she required an artificial surfactant3 to prevent lung collapse; medication to stimulate the brain center to breathe; a diuretic to prevent pulmonary edema; a powerful steroid to decrease inflammation of the lungs; and supplemental oxygen to assist her breathing. Her first 28 days of life were spent in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The remainder of Kristin's hospital stay was spent in the Stepdown Unit, which was one level higher than a traditional newborn nursery. Throughout her hospitalization, Kristin was under constant monitoring as a result of apnea and bradycardia attacks. Some of those attacks required medical intervention.

The petitioner and Debbie Young, Kristin's mother and the petitioner's fiance, visited their daughter daily while she was hospitalized. Testimony adduced at trial indicated that both parents bonded strongly with Kristin and that, the petitioner, Ms. Young, Ms. Young's seven-year old son and Kristin appeared to be a caring and loving family.

Kristin was discharged from the hospital on August 2, 1997, about the same time she would have been born at full-term. Although she was allowed to leave the hospital, she continued to have health problems associated with her premature birth: Kristin was diagnosed as having bronchial pulmonary dysplasia, damage to the lungs associated with Respiratory Distress Syndrome in premature infants. Thus, Kristin was sent home with a 24-hour a day monitor and instructions for the continued administration of medication designed to stimulate breathing. Both of her parents were instructed in the use of the monitor and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) of infants. The record indicates that the leads to the monitor sometimes became detached, which would trigger an alarm. In addition, the monitor would sound an alarm when the memory was full indicating that the monitor required servicing. The alarms resulting from a loose lead or a full memory are different from the alarm sounded when triggered by an apnea event. Nevertheless, whenever an alarm sounded, the petitioner or whoever was caring for her would have to check on Kristin to determine whether the alert from the monitor was a false alarm or a true alarm.

Kristin also required on-going medical evaluation. In one such followup examination, Kristin's doctor noted that she exhibited abnormally rigid muscle tone which suggested a brain injury that may become more apparent as Kristin developed.

As a consequence of Kristin's need for heightened medical care and attention that her parents had been trained to provide, the petitioner and Ms. Young agreed that, because Ms. Young, a nursing assistant, earned a higher salary than petitioner, she would keep her job and the petitioner would quit his employment and care for their daughter full time. As a result, the petitioner acted as Kristin's primary caretaker from the moment she was discharged from the hospital until her death. The record indicates that the petitioner took Kristin to all of her followup examinations with her doctors. During this time, Kristin's weight increased to eleven and-a-half pounds, which was characterized as excellent weight gain. Kristin's last recorded apnea event took place on September 5, 1997.

In October of 1997, Ms. Young was offered a position as a medical assistant with Kaiser Permanente. Although the position was located in Towson, Maryland and the family resided in Baltimore County, acceptance of the job was dependent on Ms. Young traveling to Rockville, Maryland for a three-day training seminar. Ms. Young being unfamiliar with the Rockville area, the petitioner and Ms. Young agreed that the petitioner would drive Ms. Young to the training seminar. Due to financial difficulties, however, to avoid wasting gas making the return trip to Baltimore and back to Rockville to pick Ms. Young up at the conclusion of the training and concerned that no one would be available to pick up Ms. Young's seven-year old son after school, the couple also decided that the entire family would accompany Ms. Young to Rockville and would remain there the entire day while Ms. Young attended the training seminar.

The family left for Rockville at about 6:00 a.m. on October 27, 1997 and arrived at the Kaiser Permanente garage at approximately 8:00 a.m. The leads from Kristin's monitor detached several times that morning, causing the monitor to sound an alarm. The petitioner remained in the car with the two children. During a break in the training session, between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Ms. Young returned to the car to check in on the family. She testified that all was well during this visit which lasted approximately fifteen minutes. Ms. Young returned to the car shortly after noon, when she received her lunch break. She testified that, once again, the entire family appeared fine and that no one seemed frustrated by the wait.

The petitioner fed Kristin a bottle and burped her at approximately 2:45 p.m. At the conclusion of the feeding, according to accounts given by the petitioner to medical personnel, Kristin began choking and stopped breathing. Testimony at trial also indicated that the petitioner informed the medical personnel that he had unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate Kristin by performing CPR and shaking her gently. A passerby in the garage, flagged by petitioner, was able to place a call from the garage office to 911 at 2:54 p.m.

The log on Kristin's monitor indicated that between 11:05 a.m. and 2:59 p.m. the monitor had registered 20 "loose lead" alarms and 16 "full memory" alarms.4 The last loose lead alarm occurred at approximately 2:47 p.m. and lasted until the monitor was turned off at 2:59 p.m. Emergency medical technician, Captain Michael Prete, arrived at the scene at approximately 2:59 p.m. Captain Prete noticed that Kristin was lying on the back seat of the vehicle, unconscious, not breathing with some blueness around her lips, indicating a lack of oxygen in the body. Captain Prete unsuccessfully attempted to arouse Kristin by tapping her on the feet. He then covered her nose and mouth with his mouth and blew two breaths of air into Kristin's lungs. At this point, Captain Prete noticed a rise and fall in Kristin's chest and that she began to vomit a milky substance. Unable to detect a pulse, Captain Prete then began CPR and proceeded to transfer her by ambulance to Shady Grove Adventist Hospital. During the ambulance ride, Prete noted that he was able to stimulate a spontaneous pulse in Kristin, however, she never breathed on her own and required the assistance of an "ambu-bag" which contained 100 percent oxygen. Although, Kristin vomited a couple more times in the ambulance, the emergency...

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