Andrews v. Williams WPC-I, LLC
| Decision Date | 13 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:19-CV-02200,4:19-CV-02200 |
| Parties | KEITH ANDREWS, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAMS WPC-I, LLC and ALAN ARMSTRONG (individually), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Brann)
On August 6, 2020, Plaintiff Keith Andrews ("Andrews") filed a five-count second amended complaint ("SAC") against Defendants Williams WPC-I, LLC ("Williams") and Alan Armstrong ("Armstrong"), the CEO of Williams1 (together, the "Defendants"). The SAC brings claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"). Andrews seeks to bring claims on behalf of himself and on behalf of a class or collective group of plaintiffs.
The Court ruled on Andrews' first amended complaint ("FAC") on July 16, 2020. In that ruling, the Court dismissed all of Andrews' claims except for thoseunder Counts 1 and 2 for Andrews' individual claims. Plaintiff was given leave to amend only the "Counts that were not dismissed with prejudice or that otherwise remain[ed]."2 Plaintiff ignored this Court's determination and attempted to replead certain claims and requests that had previously been dismissed with prejudice. The Court will address those specific issues in greater detail, to once again attempt to make clear to Plaintiff that he should not have included them in the SAC.
The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denies it in part. Because Plaintiff has had several opportunities to plead his case, leave to further amend the complaint is denied. The case shall proceed solely on Counts 1 and 2.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court dismisses a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." A motion to dismiss "tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading"3 and "streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding."4 "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of adispositive issue of law."5 This is true of any claim, "without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one."6
Following the Roberts Court's "civil procedure revival,"7 the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly8 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal9 tightened the standard that district courts must apply to 12(b)(6) motions.10 These cases "retired" the lenient "no-set-of-facts test" set forth in Conley v. Gibson and replaced it with a more exacting "plausibility" standard.11
Accordingly, after Twombly and Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'"12 "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."13 "Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."14 Moreover, "[a]sking for plausible grounds . . . calls for enough factsto raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [wrongdoing]."15
The plausibility determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense."16 No matter the context, however, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'"17
When disposing of a motion to dismiss, the Court "accept[s] as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all inferences from the facts alleged in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff]."18 However, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."19 "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."20
As a matter of procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed that:
Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps. First, it must tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state aclaim. Second, it should identify allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Finally, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, [the] court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.21
A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case does not need to establish a prima facie case in his or her complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified this point recently, stating: "a complaint need not establish a prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss."22
"Generally, consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is limited to consideration of the complaint itself."23 Typically, to consider materials outside the complaint, a motion to dismiss must be converted to a motion for summary judgment.24 However, "[c]onsideration of materials outside the complaint is not entirely foreclosed on a 12(b)(6) motion."25 It is permissible to consider full text of documents partially quoted in complaint.26 It is also permissible to consider documents relied upon by plaintiff in drafting the complaint and integral to the complaint.27 "However, before materials outside the record may become the basis for a dismissal, several conditions must be met."28 "For example, even if adocument is 'integral' to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document."29 It must also be clear that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.30 In this matter, I find that these conditions have been met, and will consequently consider the attachments.
The facts alleged in the SAC, which I must accept as true for the purposes of this motion, are as follows. Because the facts pled have not changed substantially, the Court's recitation of the allegations is largely the same as it was in its prior Memorandum Opinion.
In or around October 2012, Keith Andrews became employed by Access Midstream.31 Access Midstream was then acquired by Williams in or around 2016.32 Andrews was employed by Williams as a Senior Operations Technician.33 When Williams acquired Access Midstream, current employees, including Andrews, retained their seniority level dating back to their original hire date with Access Midstream.34 Andrews, therefore, had seven years of seniority with Williams.35
In or around July 2019, Williams issued a voluntary separation agreement to all of its employees who would be fifty-five years of age or older on December 31, 2019.36 Defendants provided a spreadsheet of employees who were offered the voluntary severance package, in which the employees were identified solely by their positions and ages.37 Andrews, currently sixty-two years old, falls within the class of employees to whom Williams offered the voluntary separation agreement.38
The voluntary severance package component of the separation agreement offered the following:39
The voluntary severance package went on to state that severances would be granted on a first come, first served basis, and that there was no guarantee that all employees who elected to take the severance package would be compensated.40
The compensation in the voluntary severance package exceeded the severance that Williams would offer employees who did not elect to take the severance package and then were ultimately terminated due to an involuntary reduction in force.41
Similarly situated younger Williams employees did not feel pressure to leave their jobs pursuant to the voluntary severance agreement and were not similarly threatened with losing their jobs.42 All workers over fifty-five years of age were pressured by Williams to take the voluntary severance package or were consistently threatened with additional layoffs that would result in less severance (if any) being offered.43 Andrews did not elect to take the voluntary severance package.44
One question in a July 16, 2019 Frequently Asked Questions document, proffered by Williams, states: "What if I don't sign my separation agreement?"45 The corresponding answer states: 46
On or around August 20, 2019, Alan Armstrong, the Chief Executive Officer of Williams, held a conference where he stated that approximately 350 employees similarly situated to Andrews...
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