Andrist v. Union Pac. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1887
• Parties: ANDRIST v. UNION PAC. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

30 F. 345

ANDRIST v. UNION PAC. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, D. Colorado.

February 24, 1887

Stallcup & Shafroth, for plaintiff.

Teller & Orahood, for defendant.

BREWER J.

This was an action for personal injuries. plaintiff had a verdict for $3,500, and defendant asks a new trial. The facts are these: plaintiff, who is a native of Switzerland, came to this country in March, 1884. In May of that year he started to go as passenger on one of the trains of defendant from Kansas City to Ogden. He rode in an emigrant car. He was not familiar with railroad traveling, and could scarcely speak or understand a word of the English language. The train arrived in Denver about half-past 11 o'clock on the eleventh of May. It remained at Denver all night. For convenience of inspection and washing of cars it was taken up to the yards of defendant, and left there. The plaintiff remained in the car all night. In the morning the employes of the defendant began washing the outside of the car, throwing a stream upon it through the hose. The water spattered through the windows, and, to escape being wet, all the passengers went outside. After a short time, and while the plaintiff was standing about 70 or 80 feet from the car without any warning or signal, the train commenced moving. As soon as he saw the train moving, plaintiff hurried to get onto the car on which he had been riding. The train was then moving slowly, and in a westerly direction. When he reached the train he was at the east platform of his car. A brakeman was standing on the steps, and not moving. plaintiff stepped onto the west platform of the next car. He was intending to go from this platform into the car in which he had been riding, but, when he got to the passage-way between the two platforms, the brakeman had passed from the steps to the center of the platform, and just filled the passage-way. Nothing was said by or to the brakeman. After a few moments the brakeman stepped one side, and plaintiff started to step from the one platform to the other. At that moment the cars parted, and plaintiff fell between them, and was run over and injured. At the time of the parting the train was moving with considerable speed. The cause of the parting was this: The train coming from Kansas City was composed of cars, some of which were going from Denver in one direction, and some in another; and, as was the custom, the employes were simply then making up the two trains. The entire train was backed with some force and speed towards the depot, and, when sufficient speed had been attained, the engine was reversed, and, the cars having been uncoupled at the proper place, the cars in advance moved on to the depot, while the remainder were switched onto another track. The speed which this train had attained at the time of the parting was about 12 miles an hour.

Now, it is claimed by the defendant-- First, that the company was guilty of no negligence causing the injury; second, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence; third, that the court erred in the instructions; and, fourth, that, in the exercise of its discretion, the court should grant a new trial by reason of the absence of an important witness.

I think it may be taken beyond doubt that when a train stops, as this did, over night, a passenger has a right to get out from the car, and take the fresh air, providing he keeps within a reasonable distance of the train, and that it is negligence to start the train, under these circumstances, without giving some reasonable notice or warning to enable the passengers to take their places in the car before it starts. Indeed, I understand counsel for the company to concede this. But the contention is that this negligence was not the cause, but simply the occasion, of the injury; the cause being the parting of the train, and that such parting of the train, being the ordinary and usual way of making up trains, was not negligence.

They have made quite an elaborate and ingenious argument distinguishing between that which is but the occasion and that which is the cause of the injury, and have cited many authorities in which that matter has been fully discussed. Their reasoning is not at all satisfactory to me. It compels in the case at bar a refinement and analysis of the relation of causes to effect which seems to me illy in accord with practical affairs and the limits of just responsibility. Where...