Andross v. Town of West Hartford, 17742.

Decision Date29 January 2008
Docket NumberNo. 17742.,17742.
PartiesPamela J. ANDROSS et al. v. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD et al.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Leon M. Rosenblatt, West Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Joseph A. O'Brien, corporation counsel, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Brian R. Smith, with whom was Karen A.L. Perry, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant Ginsburg Development CT, LLC).

Robin Messier Pearson, Farmington, for the appellees (defendant Mark Investments, LLC, et al.).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE and ZARELLA, Js.

KATZ, J.

The plaintiffs, certain residents of the Elmwood section of the town of West Hartford (town), appeal from the judgment of the trial court granting the motions of the defendants, the town, four town officials and three private development firms, to dismiss the action for lack of standing and, hence, subject matter jurisdiction.1 The plaintiffs had sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the conveyance of public park land to a private developer, to prevent the commercial development of this land and another parcel in Elmwood and to obtain the town's compliance with a traditional neighborhood design ordinance (neighborhood ordinance) enacted for the benefit of Elmwood residents. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly applied an aggrievement analysis that has no application outside of administrative appeals, under which the court required them to demonstrate an injury different from that sustained by the community as a whole. Rather, they contend, the trial court should have applied the standing analysis applicable to independent actions, under which they need to prove only that they have suffered an injury in fact that falls within the zone of interest of the laws claimed to have been violated. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges the following facts, which we accept as true for purposes of the motions to dismiss. The Elmwood section of the town is an area of mixed uses, ranging from heavy industry to single-family homes. In 1996, many residents of Elmwood successfully mobilized to oppose the town's approval of a proposed supermarket. Because of the efforts of these residents, the town adopted a plan to develop Elmwood in a manner that would improve the relationships among residential, commercial, industrial and public areas. In May, 1998, the West Hartford town council (town council) adopted the neighborhood ordinance, entitled "An Ordinance Establishing a Traditional Neighborhood Design District for. Elmwood Center," now codified at § 177-44.1 of the West Hartford Code. The stated purpose of the neighborhood ordinance is: "[T]o encourage the development of fully integrated, mixed use, pedestrian-oriented neighborhoods. The intent is to minimize traffic congestion, suburban sprawl and environmental degradation. The Traditional Neighborhood Design District diversifies and integrates land uses within close proximity to each other and provides for the daily recreational and shopping needs of the residents. The Traditional Neighborhood Design District is a sustainable, long-term development which enhances the quality of life to ensure the highest possible economic and social benefits for all residents." West Hartford Code § 177-44.1(A). The neighborhood ordinance applies under the following condition: "If any parcel of property within the Traditional Neighborhood Design District is proposed to be improved to an extent greater than 50 [percent] of its fair market value, as determined by' the Director of Assessments, then such parcel shall be developed in compliance with the requirements of this section." West Hartford Code § 177-44.1(C).

On or about April 24, 2003, the town council voted to convey a parcel of public property in Elmwood to the defendant Ginsburg Development CT, LLC (Ginsburg), for the development of a 148 unit condominium complex (condominium parcel). The condominium parcel, approximately 1.52 acres in size, formerly was a portion of the property known as James Talcott Junior High School, located at 999 Quaker Lane South. The condominium parcel is part of Beachland Park, which is a park dedicated for the benefit of the public. It is the site of public tennis courts and is a buffer between developed property and the home of two of the plaintiffs, Pamela J. Andross and Brian S. Caron.

At some other unspecified time, the defendants Mark Investments, LLC (Mark), and Nixon Plainville, LLC (Nixon), began development on another parcel of land in the Elmwood section, the site of the former Elm Theater, located at 1110 New Britain Avenue. Mark and Nixon were developing the property for the construction of a Walgreens pharmacy (pharmacy parcel).

The record reveals the following additional undisputed facts and procedural history concerning the litigation involving these two parcels. Two zoning appeals involving the subject properties preceded the present action. In May, 2003, the plaintiff Patti Sanko-Lowry filed an administrative appeal from the decision of the town council, sitting as the town's zoning authority, approving Ginsburg's application to build the 148 unit subdivision on the condominium parcel. See Sanko-Lowry v. West Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 030825381S, 2003 WL 22853722 (November 17, 2003) (Sanko-Lowry 1).2 Sanko-Lowry claimed that the application did not conform to the neighborhood ordinance and that the town wrongfully had permitted the conveyance of the parcel as part of the application because certain voting and notice requirements had not been met. In July, 2003, Sanko-Lowry and several other plaintiffs to this action filed an administrative appeal from the decision of the town zoning board of appeals sustaining the site plan approval for the development of the pharmacy parcel. See Sanko-Lowry v. West Hartford, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 030827307S, 2004 WL 944813 (April 14, 2004) (Sanko-Lowry II). In that action, the plaintiffs similarly sought equitable relief to force compliance with the requirements of the neighborhood ordinance. The plaintiffs also asserted claims relating. to the condominium parcel, but thereafter withdrew those claims.3

Thereafter, the defendants in Sanko-Lowry I and Sanko-Lowry II filed motions to dismiss the zoning appeals for, inter alia, lack of standing. In memoranda of decision separately issued in each case, the trial court, Berger, J., dismissed the actions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, In Sanko-Lowry I, Judge Berger concluded with respect to the actions pertaining to the condominium parcel that Sanko-Lowry was not statutorily aggrieved under General Statutes § 8-8(a)(1), that her generalized concerns about increased traffic did not satisfy classical aggrievement because such concerns were no different from those of the public at large and that her other concerns did not meet the requirements for taxpayer standing. In Sanko-Lowry II, Judge Berger concluded with respect to the claims pertaining to the pharmacy parcel that, inter alia, the plaintiffs were not statutorily aggrieved and that their claim of depreciated property values was too speculative to establish classical aggrievement. The plaintiffs in Sanko-Lowry II filed a petition for certification to appeal from the trial court's judgment dismissing their appeal, which the Appellate Court denied; no petition for certification to appeal was filed from the judgment dismissing the appeal in Sanko-Lowry I.

In December, 2003, during the pendency of the administrative appeal in Sanko-Lowry II, the plaintiffs commenced the present action. In count one of their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the town's decision to convey public park land was unlawful because: (1) the town had failed to comply with certain procedural requirements of the town charter governing the disposal of surplus town property; and (2) the conveyance would constitute an exclusive public emolument in violation of article first, § 1, of the state constitution.4 In count two, the plaintiffs alleged generally that the development of the condominium and pharmacy parcels violates the neighborhood ordinance and specifically that the town officials improperly had refused to implement the ordinance by: (1) purposely relying on outdated financial data to determine that the pharmacy parcel was not being improved to an extent greater than 50 percent of its fair market value, the dispositive factor in determining whether the parcel must be developed in compliance with the ordinance; and (2) determining that the condominium parcel is in a special design district that "trumps" the neighborhood ordinance.5 The plaintiffs claimed that the proposed development of the two parcels would injure them because of the loss of public park land, greater traffic congestion, suburban sprawl, environmental deg" radation and decreased property values. By way of relief, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the town from transferring the park land to Ginsburg and to enjoin the development of both parcels. They also sought a declaratory judgment that, inter alia, the town defendants had failed to comply with the requirements of the neighborhood ordinance and the town charter, as well as an order mandating compliance with that ordinance.

Thereafter, Mark and Nixon filed a motion to dismiss the claims regarding the pharmacy parcel for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They contended that: (1) the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by the zoning decision permitting development of that parcel; (2) all of the plaintiffs except Sanko-Lowry had failed to exhaust administrative remedies regarding said zoning decision; and (3) the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from raising the same issues on which Judge Berger had determined they lacked standing in the zoning appeal. The town defendants also filed...

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