Andrus v. Ellis

Decision Date04 November 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2003-IA-01842-SCT.,2003-IA-01842-SCT.
Citation887 So.2d 175
PartiesBetty ANDRUS, Keith Barrett, Debera Bridges, Gary Coleman and Phillip Price v. Charlie C. ELLIS, Sammy Hancock, Azzie Mae Starr and Wanda N. Woods.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

H. Mitchell Cowan, Vikki J. Taylor, Jackson, John R. Chiles, Reid Stephens Manley, Robert D. Gholson, Marcus Douglas Evans, Laurel, attorneys for appellants.

T. Roe Frazer, F. Lee Bowie, Jackson, attorneys for appellees.

Before SMITH, C.J., CARLSON and DICKINSON, JJ.

CARLSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. On March 22, 2002, several Plaintiffs1 filed suit against eight individual Defendants claiming that the Defendants fraudulently induced them to purchase credit insurance policies in connection with consumer loans made by Commercial Credit Corporation. Plaintiffs allege either that they were not aware that they had purchased credit insurance, or they were aware, but thought such was required to obtain the loans. All Defendants are either current or former employees of Commercial Credit, which is now known as CitiFinancial, Inc. Plaintiffs did not sue Commercial Credit.

¶ 2. Following discovery, Defendants filed two motions: one to sever and transfer and the other for summary judgment. A hearing before the circuit court was held regarding both. Both motions and Defendants' subsequent motion for interlocutory appeal certification were denied. On August 21, 2003, this Court granted Defendants' motion for emergency stay and request for interlocutory appeal. See M.R.A.P. 5. No brief has been submitted on the Plaintiffs' behalf.

¶ 3. Finding that the claims are barred by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003), this Court reverses and renders the trial court's denial of summary judgment.

FACTS

¶ 4. Plaintiffs jointly commenced this action alleging that the Defendants fraudulently and negligently induced them to purchase various types of credit insurance in connection with their loans.2 The transactions at issue are independent of each other, and all occurred from 1988 to 1995 while the Defendants were employees of Commercial Credit.

¶ 5. The facts surrounding the Plaintiffs' loans are as follows:

Charles C. Ellis

¶ 6. Ellis's claim is based on two loans and against Defendants Coleman and Andrus, former employees of Commercial Credit. Both loans were transacted at the Hattiesburg office of Commercial Credit. Ellis contracted for credit life and credit disability insurance in connection to both loans.

¶ 7. The first loan was prepared by Coleman and agreed to on August 1, 1991. Ellis testified that he believed the credit insurance was required but only remembered it being recommended to him or suggested that "he needed it." Ellis received copies of the documents resulting from the transaction, which he kept at home. Ellis testified that he read part of the document, but he did not remember reading the insurance disclosure. He testified that had he read the documents he would have known that the insurance was not required. There was no testimony that after receiving the loan he had any further contact with the Defendants regarding the loan or insurance.

¶ 8. The second loan was on January 16, 1993. Ellis was unsure who solicited him but he alleged that it was either Defendant Andrus or Boleware. This loan was wholly separate from the 1991 loan, which at this time was paid off. During his deposition, Ellis stated that he wanted credit insurance in case something happened to him and that is why he accepted it. There was no testimony that after receiving the loan he had any further contact with the Defendants regarding the loan or insurance.

Sammy Hancock

¶ 9. Hancock received several loans from Commercial Credit. He admitted that he requested credit disability insurance in connection to each loan, but claimed that he was unaware that he also contracted for credit life and property insurance. He testified that there was no discussion between him and the employees of Commercial Credit concerning credit life and property insurance. Hancock actually collected disability benefits under the coverage he purchased. As a result of these benefits, his loan was paid in full. Hancock can read and received copies of the loan documents, which he kept at home.

¶ 10. Hancock's first loan was on June 23, 1993, and was prepared by Defendant Bridges-Pankowski. He claims that Bridges-Pankowski never told him that he was purchasing credit life and property insurance in connection to this loan. He testified that he only requested credit disability.

¶ 11. Hancock's next loan was on October 4, 1993, and again handled by Defendant Bridges-Pankowski. Hancock admitted that during this transaction he knew that he was purchasing credit life and property insurance. He testified that he reviewed the documents at home following the transaction. He made no objections.

¶ 12. Hancock renewed this loan on November 25, 1994. It is unclear which Commercial Credit employee handled the transaction. Hancock testified that he again was aware that he was purchasing credit life and property insurance and that he assumed the loan was being renewed under the same terms. Hancock did not remember any discussion between him and employees of Commercial Credit regarding insurance.

¶ 13. The final transaction was on August 23, 1995, when Hancock renewed the previous loan. Again, he was aware that he had credit disability, life and property coverage. His recollection was that he became aware of this after he reviewed the documents several weeks later.

Azzie Mae Starr

¶ 14. Starr obtained a loan on November 8, 1995. Her claim is against Defendant Moss. Starr purchased only property insurance and paid a one-time fee. Starr testified that she remembered being told that she needed to get property insurance. Starr testified that she read the loan documents, which she saved at home. She never objected to the insurance. Starr did not know she was suing individual Defendants and did not recall anything that employees at Commercial Credit told her was untrue.

Wanda Woods

¶ 15. The claims of Woods and her husband were against Defendants Barrett and Coleman.3 She obtained three loans, with the first being on November 20, 1988. As collateral for this loan, Woods pledged her mobile home. Woods believed that she had bought credit health insurance, not life or disability, in connection with her loan. She thought credit insurance was required to receive the loan. She does not remember who prepared the loan, and none of the named Defendants signed the documents in connection with the loan.

¶ 16. Her second loan was obtained on August 13, 1990. With a one time premium, she purchased credit life insurance in connection to this loan. Though she could not remember who, Woods testified that an employee represented to her that she was purchasing health insurance which was required. Woods signed beside the disclosure of credit life premium on the promissory note and disclosure statement. Also, contained in the loan agreement was a disclosure statement informing her that credit insurance was optional. Woods testified that she understood the disclosure statement and that the loan agreement indicated that credit insurance was not mandatory.

¶ 17. Woods's second loan was on February 17, 1994. Woods does not remember which employee handled this loan, though Defendants Barrett and Coleman signed the loan documents. She purchased joint credit life insurance in connection with this loan. Though her signature appears on the note next to the disclosure, Woods testified that no one informed her that she was purchasing life insurance. Woods admitted that she never read the documents, even though she received copies of the documents and kept them at home.

¶ 18. Because she believed that she had health insurance, Woods attempted to make a claim on her insurance in 1990 and 1991. At this time, she was informed that she only had credit life insurance, not health.

¶ 19. Woods has satisfied her obligations under the loans. Woods believed that she was suing Commercial Credit and not individual Defendants. She could not recall anything that Defendants Barrett and Coleman told her about her loans.

ANALYSIS

¶ 20. Defendants raise the following issues:

I. Are the Claims Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
II. Did the Circuit Court Err When it Denied the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for Fraudulent and Negligent Misrepresentation.
III. Did the Circuit Court Err When it Denied the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Punitive and Emotional Distress Damages.
III. Should the Plaintiffs' Claims be Severed in Accordance with M.R.C.P. 21 and Transferred to the Proper Venue.

¶ 21. Because it is dispositive, we address only the statute of limitations issue.

I. Statute of Limitations

¶ 22. It is undisputed that the three-year statute of limitations set forth in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (Rev.2003) is controlling in the instant case. See Stephens v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 850 So.2d 78 (Miss.2003)

; Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Wells, 819 So.2d 1196 (Miss.2001). Section 15-1-49 provides in part:

(1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after.

This Court employs de novo review when considering issues of law such as statutes of limitations. Stephens, 850 So.2d at 82.

¶ 23. The trial court provided no reasons as to why it denied summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. Seemingly, the application and resulting bar under § 15-1-49 is certain. The most recent loan transaction at issue occurred in 1995. With filing of the complaint occurring on March 22, 2002, the statute would bar all claims that accrued prior to March 22, 1999. Thus, in the absence of an exception, statutory or otherwise, the claims are barred.

¶ 24. As noted, no brief was filed on behalf of ...

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