Angarita v. Hypertoyz, Inc.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 23-20695-Civ-Scola
• Decision Date: 12 August 2024
• Parties: Carlos Angarita and Paula Botero-Paramo, individually and on behalf of their children, C.A. and D.A., Plaintiffs, v. Hypertoyz, Inc. and Eric Marabini d/b/a Hyperpowersports, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

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Carlos Angarita and Paula Botero-Paramo, individually and on behalf of their children, C.A. and D.A., Plaintiffs, v. Hypertoyz, Inc. and Eric Marabini d/b/a Hyperpowersports, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 23-20695-Civ-Scola

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

August 12, 2024

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT

Robert N. Scola, Jr., United States District Judge

PlaintiffsCarlos Angarita and Paula Botero-Paramo, individually and on behalf of their children, C.A. and D.A. (collectively the “Angaritas”), initiated this lawsuit to recover damages they sustained when an electric scooter they bought from DefendantsHypertoyz, Inc., and Eric Marabini, doing business as Hyperpowersports (“Marabini”) exploded and burned down their family home.(Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.)The Court has entered a default judgment in favor of the Angaritas, amounting to nearly $3 million in total against both Defendants, jointly and severally.(Order on Judgment as to Liability, ECF No. 41;Order Awarding DamagesECF No. 53;Final Judgment, ECF No. 57.)Marabini now asks the Court to set aside the defaults, arguing that the judgment against him is void based on ineffective service of process.(Def.'sMot., ECF No. 78.)The Angaritas have responded in opposition (Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 86) but Marabini has not replied and the time to do so has passed.After considering the briefing, the record, and the relevant legal authorities, the Courtdenies the motion to vacate(ECF No. 78) for the reasons that follow.

1.Background

Hypertoyz was served in February 2023(Ret. of Service re Hypertoyz, ECFNo. 35-1) and a process server filed a return of service as to Marabini, indicating that he had been served on April 24, 2023, via substitute service (Ret. of Serv. re Marabini, ECF No. 14).When neither Defendant timely responded to the complaint or otherwise appeared in the case, the Clerk of Court entered defaults against them, in May 2023.(ECF Nos. 18, 20.)Upon the Angaritas' motion, the Court thereafter entered default judgment as to liability (ECF Nos. 38, 41), followed by an evidentiary hearing as to damages (Min. Entry, ECF No. 52).As a result of that proceeding, where the Court heard testimony from all four Plaintiffs, the Court awarded the Angaritas close to $3 million in compensatory damages, against the Defendants, jointly and severally.(Order Awarding Damages, ECF No. 53.)Over three months after the Court entered its March 18, 2024, final judgment (ECF No. 57) and well over a year since Marabini was served, Marabini now asks the Court to set aside the judgment, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), as void for ineffective service of process.(Def.'sMot., ECF No. 78.)

2.Legal Standard

A.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4)

In relevant part, Rule 60(b)(4) permits a Court on “motion or just terms” to “relieve a party” from a “final judgment” when the “judgment is void.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4).Under Rule 60(b)(4), “[a]n in personam judgment entered without personal jurisdiction over a defendant is void as to that defendant.”Oldfield v. Pueblo de Bahia Lora, S.A., 558 F.3d 1210, 1217(11th Cir.2009).Motions raising jurisdictional challenges under Rule 60(b)(4) are ordinarily not subject to Rule 60(c)(1)'s “reasonable time” limitation or “a typical laches analysis.”Stansell v. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 771 F.3d 713, 737(11th Cir.2014);Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 16 F.3d 1126, 1130(11th Cir.1994).But “there are limitations on this doctrine,”Oldfield,558 F.3d at 1218 n. 21, and“Rule 60(b)(4)does not provide a license for litigants to sleep on their rights,”United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 275(2010).

“One such limitation is that objections to personal jurisdiction” are “waivable.”Oldfield,558 F.3d at 1218 n. 21.To that end, “[w]here a defendant does not raise the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction at the appropriate time in the district court, the objection is waived and the defendant is considered to have conferred jurisdiction by consent.”Harris Corp. v. Nat'l Iranian Radio & Tele., 691 F.2d 1344, 1353, n.18(11th Cir.1982).Similarly, where a party“knowingly s[its] on his rights” for significant time before “filing anything at all with the district court, he waive[s] his right to object” under Rule 60(b)(4).Stansell, 771 F.3d at 737(party waived service and personal jurisdiction arguments under Rule 60(b)(4) due to unexplained several-month delay in filing anything in the district court);Nat'l Loan Acquisitions Co. v. Pet Friendly, Inc., 743 Fed.Appx. 390, 392(11th Cir.2018)(“Objections to personal jurisdiction, however, are waived if a defendant fails to raise that objection in a timely manner,” and holding defendant waived such objections by failing to timely file a Rule 60(b)(4) motion).

B.Service of Process and Rule 60(b)(4)

Where a plaintiff has initially established valid service of process, the burden then shifts to the defendant challenging service to show, by “clear and convincing evidence,” that it was insufficient.SeeFriedman v. Schiano, 777 Fed.Appx. 324, 331(11th Cir.2019)(“While a plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving valid service of process, a return of service that is regular on its face is presumed to be valid absent clear and convincing evidence presented to the contrary.”)(cleaned up).“‘Regular on its face' means the return of service attests to all the information required by the service statute.”Id.And “[c]lear and convincing evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”Id.(cleaned up).

While actual notice alone is insufficient to establish proper service, notice can nonetheless be “an important factor in considering whether service of process is adequate.”Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916, 925(11th Cir.2003).As such, the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that the requirements of service are, in some respects, “flexible,” to be “liberally construed so long as a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint.”Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 900(11th Cir.1990).Thus, so long as “a summons is in substantial compliance with Rule 4(b) and a defendant has not been prejudiced by the defect in the summons,”a defendant risks waiving an objection to service “if he or she waits until final default judgment has been entered” to raise it.Id.(emphasis added).

3.Analysis

Marabini argues that the Angaritas' substituted service of process on a receptionist at 1726 N.W. 20^th Street in Miami, Florida, was defective under both Rule 4 as well as under Florida law.(Def.'s Mot.at 5.)According to Marabini, (1) the affidavit of service failed to specify that 1726 N.W. 20^th Street is Marabini's place of business; (2) even if the affidavit did so specify, Marabini has provided a declaration in which he maintains that this address is not, in fact, his business address and never has been; and (3) even if that address was his business address, the person served was not in charge of the business at the time of service.(Id. at 6-7.)In response, the Angaritas argue that Marabini's motion fails for two independent reasons: their service on Marabini complied with Florida law; and Marabini has waived his right to raise any challenge to the effectiveness of service.(Pls.'Resp. at 10.)After careful review, the Court finds Marabini's motion misses the mark: he fails to show that service on him was defective and, further, even if there was a technical defect in service, he fails to explain why it has taken him so long to object.

As set forth in Florida Statutes section 48.031(2)(b), “[s]ubstituted service may be made on an individual doing business as a sole proprietorship” where service is effected at the sole proprietor's “place of business,” during regular business hours; two attempts to serve the sole proprietor had previously been made at that same place of business; and the person served is the person who is “in charge of the business at the time of service.”Fla. Stat. § 48.031(2)(b).As to these conditions, there is no dispute that Marabini was doing business as Hyperpowersports as a sole proprietor; that the process server had previously made two attempts to serve Marabini at the 1726 N.W. 20^th Street address; and that all attempts at service were conducted during regular business hours.Instead, Marabini's quarrel relates to the whether 1726 N.W. 20^th Street was his “place of business” and whether the person served was “in charge of the business at the time of service.”

Marabini's argument starts with his premise that the return itself is “defective on its face.”^[1](Def.'s Mot.at 6.)This is because, according to Marabini, there is nothing in the affidavit itself that “indicate[s] that” the address where service was effected-1726N.W. 20^th Street-“was Mr. Marabini's place of business.”(Id.)This barebones argument falls short.

Missing from Marabini's theory of the return's facial invalidity is any legal support for his suggestion that a service affidavit is rendered invalid on its face if it fails to affirmatively state that the address where substitute service was effected is the location of the sole-proprietor's place of business.Indeed, Florida law requires that only the following information be included in a return-of-service form: (1) the date and time that the process server received the process paperwork; (2) the date and time that process was served; (3) the name of the person served, and, if the person was served in a representative capacity, the position...