Angel v. Behnke
| Decision Date | 19 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 3--1173A160,3--1173A160 |
| Citation | 166 Ind.App. 541,337 N.E.2d 503 |
| Parties | Nick ANGEL, individually and on behalf of all other taxpayers similarly situated and as Treasurer of Lake County, Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. Martin BEHNKE, individually and as a member of the Board of Commissioners of Lake County, Indiana, and as a member of the Lake County Data Processing Board, et al., Appellees (Defendants below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jerry L. Colglazier, Phillip E. Bainbridge, Highland, William M. Evans, Indianapolis, for appellant.
William J. Muha, Highland, Martin H. Kinney, Gary, for appellees.
Angel brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of his application for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 4(B). Angel, individually, as a taxpayer, and as Treasurer of Lake County, filed this action in the trial court to enjoin the members of the Lake County Board of Commissioners and the Lake County Data Processing Board from carrying out a lease for data processing equipment with National Cash Register, Inc. Angel raises the following issues on appeal:
Issue One: Did the trial court err in determining that the Lake County Board of Commissioners had established a data processing system prior to the effective date of IC 1971, 17--3--88--1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.)?
Issue Two: Did the trial court err in determining that the Lake County Board of Commissioners is not required to comply with competitive bidding statutes in awarding a lease of data processing equipment. 1
We conclude that the trial court correctly determined the above questions of law and find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Angel's application for a preliminary injunction.
Initially, we must clear up some confusion regarding this Court's function in reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary injunctions. Behnke is correct in his assertion that basically this Court reviews the trial court's grant or denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. clearly, undeR IC 1971, 34--1--10--2 (burnS codE ed.) 2 and Indiana case law, the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Gariup v. Stern (1970), 254 Ind. 563, 261 N.E.2d 578; Rosenberg v. Village Shopping Center, Inc. (1968), 251 Ind. 1, 238 N.E.2d 642; Elder v. City of Jeffersonville (1975), Ind.App., 329 N.E.2d 654. However angel is also correct in his contention that this Court must review the trial court's findings of fact to determine if they are clearly erroneous pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52. Pursuant to TR. 52(A) and TR. 65(D), the trial court in granting or refusing to grant preliminary injunctions is required to make special findings of fact and state its conclusions thereon. 3 Under TR. 52(A), this Court '. . . shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous . . ..' Therefore, in every appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, we are necessarily involved with a review of the findings of fact and the conclusions made from those findings of fact. If the findings of fact or conclusions are clearly erroneous, this Court may conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. The decision of the trial court to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests on many factors. See Elder v. City of Jeffersonville, supra. When a trial court has made one or more erroneous findings of fact or has come to an erroneous conclusion, an abuse of discretion does not always follow. When viewing the totality of the circumstances, the preliminary injunction may have been correctly denied or granted on other grounds.
In the instant case, the essential facts underlying the trial court's denial of the preliminary injunction are not in dispute. The sole contention of error on appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied Angel's application for a preliminary injunction because of its allegedly incorrect determination of the two questions of law discussed below.
In 1967, the Legislature passed IC 1971, 17--2--74--1--17--2--74--10 (Burns Code Ed.) enabling boards of county commissioners in counties with one or more second-class cities to establish data processing agencies. Pursuant to the 1967 Act, the Lake County Board of Commissioners passed a resolution establishing a study committee to determine if a data processing agency and board should be created for Lake County. See IC 1971, 17--2--74--2 (Burns Code Ed.). Upon the study committee's recommendation, the Lake County Board of Commissioners passed a resolution on February 8, 1971 establishing a data processing agency and a data processing board. Pursuant to IC 1971, 17--2--74--7 (Burns Code Ed.), the board was to consist of:
'(a) the county auditor
(b) the county treasurer
(c) the county assessor
(d) a member of the board of county commissioners, and
(e) a representative appointed by each governmental unit which shall contract with the county for the use of the county's data processing equipment . . ..'
The new data processing board held its first meeting in June, 1971 and submitted its first proposed budget prior to September, 1971. The budget for the new data processing agency was approved by the Lake County Council in September, 1972, and an agency director was appointed in March, 1973.
In 1971, the Legislature passed IC 1971, 17--3--88--1--17--3--88--23 (Burns Code Ed.) allowing the boards of county commissioners of any county to establish a county automatic data processing board. Explicitly exempted from the 1971 Act are:
'(1) Those counties having data processing systems established under and pursuant to previously enacted laws whose powers, rights and duties under said laws are hereby, in all respects approved and affirmed.' IC 1971, 17--3--88--1 (Burns Code Ed.)
The effective date of the 1971 Act was September 2, 1971. It is not disputed that the Lake County Data Processing Agency had no director, budget or employees prior to the effective date of the 1971 Act. Angel would have this Court interpret 'having data processing systems' in IC 1971, 17--3--88--1(1), to mean having a data processing board and agency already carrying on the business of data processing. Appellee National Cash Register, on the other hand, would have this Court interpret 'having data processing systems' to mean having an existing board and agency regardless of whether the agency was in fact funded and supplying data processing services.
The 1971 Act does not define 'data processing system.' When a statute is unclear or ambiguous, this Court's primary function is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue (1974), Ind.App. 321 N.E.2d 215; Wayne Township v. Lutheran Hospital (1974), Ind.App., 312 N.E. If more than one construction is possible, this Court may consider the consequences of a particular construction. State ex rel. Bynum v. LaPorte Superior Court No. 1 (1973), 259 Ind. 647, 291 N.E.2d 355; Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue, supra. We note that under the 1971 Act, the county automatic data processing board is to consist of only three members whereas under the 1967 Act, the board is to consist of four or more members. IC 1971, 17--3--88--4 and IC 1971, 17--2--74--7. The 1971 Act provides that the county auditor is to serve as the board secretary and as chief administrator of the board, and shall supervise the operation of the automatic data processing center. IC 1971, 17--3--88--5 IC 1971, 17--3--88--9. However, under the 1967 Act, the board members are allowed to elect a chairman and secretary from their membership. IC 1971, 17--2--74--7. Also, under the 1967 Act, the data processing agency is to be under the control and direction of the data processing board. IC 1971, 17--2--74--7. To conclude that Lake County did not have an established data processing system within the meaning of IC 1971, 17--3--88--1(1), would be to require the Lake County Board of Commissioners to pass a new resolution establishing a new data processing board in compliance with the 1971 Act. Clearly the legislative intent in exempting certain counties from the 1971 Act was to avoid interference with existing data processing boards and agencies and to avoid delay in the availability of data processing services to those counties that had already taken the initial steps to secure such services. The trial court correctly concluded that the Lake County Board of Commissioners had an established 'data processing system' prior to the effective date of the 1971 Act.
On May 21, 1973, five vendors had submitted sealed proposals to lease data processing equipment to the Lake County Board of Commissioners. No newspaper notification calling for proposals as required by various competitive bidding statutes was given by the Board. Using a point system, the director of the data processing board ranked the National Cash Register proposal as the best. The data processing board members were divided in favor of the National Cash Register proposal and the UNIVAC proposal. On June 18, 1973, the Lake County Board of Commissioners accepted National Cash Register's proposal and entered into a five year lease of data processing equipment at a monthly rental of $14,600.00. On appeal, Angel contends that IC 1971, 5--16--1--1--5--16--1--3 (Burns Code Ed.) is applicable to the lease of data processing equipment and that failure of the Board to comply with the newspaper notification requirements of IC 1971, 5--16--1--3 (Burns Code Ed.) renders the rental contract with National Cash Register void.
Before reviewing the applicable competitive bidding statutes, we would again point out that our primary concern in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. Economy Oil Corp. v. Indiana Dept. of State...
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