Los Angeles Teachers Union, Local 1021, Am. Federation of Teachers v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Ed.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1969
• Citation: 455 P.2d 827,71 Cal.2d 551,78 Cal.Rptr. 723
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 455 P.2d 827 LOS ANGELES TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1021, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 29637.

Page 723

78 Cal.Rptr. 723

71 Cal.2d 551, 455 P.2d 827

LOS ANGELES TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1021, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOS ANGELES CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29637.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

June 30, 1969.

Levy, DeRoy, Geffner & Van Bourg and Leo Geffner, Los Angeles, for plaintiffs and appellants.

John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Alfred Charles De Flon, Deputy County Counsel, and Jerry F. Halverson, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

PETERS, Justice.

The Los Angeles Teachers Union, Local 1021, American Federation of Teachers, and certain of its officers, on behalf of all its officers and members, appeal from a judgment of the superior court denying their petition for writ of mandate. Plaintiffs ¹ seek to compel defendants to cease and desist from enforcing any rule or regulation prohibiting employees of the Los Angeles City School Districts or the Los Angeles City Board of Education from circulating for signatures during duty-free lunch periods on school premises a petition relating to the financing of public education and addressed to various concerned public officials. For reasons hereinafter stated, the judgment must be reversed.

On or about January 30, 1967, the union distributed to its representatives for circulation by and to teachers on off-duty time in the elementary and secondary public schools within the school district a brief, respectful petition addressed to the Governor, the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Los Angeles City Board of Education, opposing proposed cutbacks in funds for higher education and imposition of tuition at college and university campuses and urging these officials to increase the revenues for public education at all levels to meet soaring enrollments and big city problems. ²

On February 1 the personnel division of the school district issued a memo to administrators of each school instructing them that circulation of the petition was in conflict with board rule 1276 ³ of the Los Angeles City Board of Education rules and that the petition should not be circulated on the school premises, unless provisions of the Civic Center Act ⁴ were met. Plaintiffs, rather than attempting to circulate the petition in contravention of this memo, requested permission from defendant Board of Education to circulate the petition during duty-free periods, but such permission was denied.

At the request of a representative of the union, the director of administrative services for the school district agreed to issue a permit under the Civil Center Act (see fn. 4, Ante) so that plaintiffs could use school facilities to hold meetings shortly after the close of the school day for the purpose of obtaining signatures for the petition. Apparently concluding that such after-hours meetings would not sufficiently enable them to reach all teachers, plaintiffs filed the present action in superior court, seeking, by way of mandamus, permission to circulate their petition in areas, such as lunchrooms and faculty rooms, apart from students and classes during the duty-free lunch period ⁵ provided for teachers in the Los Angeles schools pursuant to state policy. ⁶

During their duty-free lunch period, teachers are not required to render any services for the school district; they are merely required to remain on school premises so that they are available in cases of emergency. Since duty-free lunch periods are staggered in most schools, and since some teachers in faculty rooms or lunchrooms at any given time are engaged in 'planning period' work rather than taking their duty-free time, plaintiffs specified that the petition would be circulated only by and to off-duty teachers.

Defendants' arguments in support of their prohibition of the circulation of plaintiffs' petition, which are contained in the written declarations of various administrators in the Los Angeles city school system, and, based on this 'expert' testimony, were found to be true by the trial court may be summarized as follows: (1) Circulation of the petition, the subject of which is controversial, will cause teachers to take and defend opposing political positions, thereby creating discord and lack of harmony which is 'foreign to the educational environment' and which will reduce the 'cooperation and coordination required' for the proper functioning of the schools. (2) Circulation of the petition in faculty rooms and lunchrooms, which are at any given time used both by teachers on off-duty time and by teachers engaged in required 'planning period' work, ⁷ will disturb and distract teachers in the latter category. (a) Some teachers engaged in 'planning period' work will be approached by petition circulators who do not know they are doing such work. These teachers will be distracted from their work at least long enough to explain that they are working and do not wish to be disturbed. Others will be distracted longer since they will take the time either to read and sign the petition or to discuss it before or instead of signing it. (b) Discussions between petition circulators and off-duty teachers will inevitably involve some disagreements and resultant debates. These debates may become noisy and disturb teachers engaged in 'planning period' work.

When, as here, the impairment of First Amendment rights appears, and when, as here, the facts constituting such impairment are not contradicted, the question as to whether such impairment is permissible is one of law and not of fact, and not the subject of such 'expert' testimony. When the effective exercise of First Amendment rights relating to speech is impaired by governmental regulation, a court must weigh the extent of the impairment against both the importance of the governmental interest and the substantiality of the threat which the forbidden speech or related activity poses to that interest. Both alternatives available to the government--to achieve its regulatory objective in a manner less restrictive of those rights--and alternatives available to the speaker--to exercise his right to effective communication in a manner less hostile to the governmental interest--must be appraised. The more substantial the infringement of First Amendment rights is, the more compelling the governmental interest and the more ominous the threat to that interest must be. (E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376--377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430; Huntley v. Public Util. Com., 69 A.C. 62, 69, 69 Cal.Rptr. 605, 442 P.2d 685; Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist., 65 Cal.2d 499, 501--502, 505--509, 55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409; Wollam v. City of Palm Springs, 59 Cal.2d 276, 284--288, 29 Cal.Rptr. 1, 379 P.2d 481.) ⁸

In such cases the usual deference by courts to the wisdom and judgment of legislators (e.g., Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind, 67 Cal.2d 536, 544--545, 547, 63 Cal.Rptr. 1, 432 P.2d 717) and administrators acting in a quasi-legislative capacity (e.g., Pitts v. Perluss, 58 Cal.2d 824, 832, 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83) is impermissible. (E.g., Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel, 69 A.C. 171, 179, 70 Cal.Rptr. 407, 444 P.2d 79; cf. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 565, 568--573, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811.) Such deference would amount to an abdication of responsibility for determining whether a regulation has exceeded constitutional limitations. (Cf. Rosenfield v. Malcolm, 65 Cal.2d 559, 563, 55 Cal.Rptr. 505, 421 P.2d 697.) In addition, the reviewing court in free speech cases must make an independent examination of the whole record. (Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal.2d 901, 909, 31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152, 10 A.L.R.3d 707.)

Teachers, like others, have the right to speak freely and effectively on public questions ⁹ as well as the 'inseparable' and 'cognate' (Thomas v. Collins, Supra, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430; see also, Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141--142, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637) 'right * * * to petition the Government for a redress of grievances' (U.S. Const. Amend. I). They do not 'shed' these rights 'at the schoolhouse gate.' (Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community Sch. Dist. (U.S. Supreme Court, February 24, 1969) 393 U.S. 503, 506, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731.) On the other hand, school officials have 'comprehensive authority * * * consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools' and the 'special characteristics of the school environment' affect the exercise of First Amendment rights on school premises. (Id., at p. 507, 89 S.Ct., at p. 737.) Thus, we must strike 'a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.' (Pickering v. Board of Education, Supra, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734, 20 L.Ed.2d 811.)

The government has no valid interest in restricting or prohibiting speech or speech-related activity simply in order to avert the sort of disturbance, argument or unrest which is inevitably generated by the expression of ideas which are controversial and invite dispute. The danger justifying restriction or prohibition must be one which 'rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.' (Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 896, 93 L.Ed. 1131.) This is so because the free expression of ideas concerning controversial matters is essential to our system of government. '(I)t is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.

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'Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It...