Angelia D.B., In Interest of, 95-3104

• Decision Date: 20 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-3104,95-3104
• Citation: 211 Wis.2d 140,564 N.W.2d 682
• Parties: , 118 Ed. Law Rep. 1191 In the Interest of ANGELIA D.B., a Person Under the Age of 18. STATE of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANGELIA D.B., Respondent-Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 682

564 N.W.2d 682

211 Wis.2d 140, 118 Ed. Law Rep. 1191

In the Interest of ANGELIA D.B., a Person Under the Age of 18 STATE of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANGELIA D.B., Respondent-Respondent.

No. 95-3104.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 9, 1997.

Decided June 20, 1997.

For the petitioner-appellant the cause was argued by Gregory M. Posner-Weber, Assistant Attorney General with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, Attorney General.

For the respondent-respondent there was a brief and oral argument by John D. Lubarsky, State Public Defender.

¶1 JANINE P. GESKE, Justice

Angelia D.B. was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.12 and 941.23 (1993-94), after a school liaison police officer found a nine-inch knife hidden in her clothing. The Circuit Court for Winnebago County, Judge Robert A. Haase, suppressed the knife and all derivative evidence obtained from Angelia D.B., because it concluded that the search violated her state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appealed these orders, and the court of appeals certified two questions for our review.

¶2 First, in determining the reasonableness of a search conducted in a public school by a police officer in conjunction with school authorities, is the proper Fourth Amendment standard the less stringent "reasonable grounds" standard set forth in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), or the general standard of "probable cause"? Second, was the search conducted by the police school liaison officer in the instant case reasonable under the circumstances? We hold that the T.L.O. reasonable grounds standard applies to a search conducted on school grounds by a police officer at the request of, and in conjunction with, school authorities. Because the search of Angelia D.B. was reasonable under this standard to insure the safety of the students and school officials, we reverse the orders of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 On October 12, 1995, a Neenah High School student informed the assistant principal, David Rouse, that he had observed a knife in another student's backpack earlier that day. The informant also indicated that the other student might have access to a gun. Rouse called Officer Dan Dringoli, a City of Neenah police officer and school liaison officer on duty at Neenah High School at the time. After arriving at Rouse's office, Dringoli interviewed the informant, who repeated what he had observed and identified the other student by her first name, Angelia. When Rouse checked the computer and determined Angelia's last name, the student said he believed her to be the person. Dringoli then went to Angelia D.B.'s classroom with Dean of Students Mark Duerwaechter, who entered the classroom and escorted Angelia D.B. to the hallway outside.

¶4 Dringoli identified himself and informed Angelia D.B. that they had received information that she may be carrying a knife or gun. While in the hallway, Dringoli conducted a brief pat down search of her jacket and pants and had Angelia D.B. search her backpack while he observed. No weapons were discovered. Angelia D.B. then accompanied Dringoli back to his office, where another police officer, Corporal Radtke, was present. Before returning to Dringoli's office, Duerwaechter searched Angelia D.B.'s locker as authorized by school policy, but did not discover any weapons.

¶5 After Angelia D.B. denied that she possessed any weapons, Dringoli informed her that he was going to check her further. Angelia D.B. first removed her jacket for Dringoli to search. When he did not find a weapon in her jacket, Dringoli lifted up the bottom of her shirt to reveal her waistband. Dringoli then observed two inches of a brown knife handle tucked in her waistband by her right hip. After Dringoli removed the nine-inch knife, which was locked in an open position, Dringoli informed Angelia D.B. that she was under arrest and advised her of her Miranda rights.

¶6 The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Angelia D.B. with carrying a concealed weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 48.12 and 941.23. Seeking to suppress the use of the knife as evidence, Angelia D.B. argued to the circuit court that Officer Dringoli's search of her person, specifically his lifting of her shirt, was highly intrusive and required a showing of probable cause. Because the search was based solely on the informant's allegation without further corroboration, Angelia D.B. further asserted that Dringoli's search was not supported by probable cause. The circuit court granted Angelia D.B.'s motions to suppress the knife and all derivative evidence, ruling that the search of her person was unreasonable under all the circumstances. ¹ The State appealed. The court of appeals certified this appeal for our review on July 17, 1996.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 The reasonableness of a search is a constitutional question of law that this court reviews independently, benefiting from the analysis of the lower court. Isiah B. v. State, 176 Wis.2d 639, 646, 500 N.W.2d 637, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 884, 114 S.Ct. 231, 126 L.Ed.2d 186 (1993). We will uphold the circuit court's findings of evidentiary and historical fact as they relate to whether the search was reasonable, unless they are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. State v. Griffin, 131 Wis.2d 41, 62, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).

¶8 Because the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, sec. 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution are substantially similar, ² we conform the law of search and seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution to that developed by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment to prevent the confusion caused by differing standards. State v. Fry, 131 Wis.2d 153, 172-73, 388 N.W.2d 565, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 583, 93 L.Ed.2d 586 (1986).

APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS

¶9 In this case, we are asked to determine the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a search of a student on school grounds by a police officer at the request of, and in conjunction with, school authorities. Specifically, the question is whether such a search is governed by the reasonable grounds standard set forth in T.L.O. or the general standard of probable cause.

¶10 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution proscribe unreasonable searches and seizures. As indicated by the text of these provisions, the constitutionality of a government search is measured by its reasonableness. Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 2390, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). In measuring the reasonableness of a search, the search's "intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" must be balanced "against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1414, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). In most cases, a search is not considered reasonable unless it is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. at 1413-14. Nonetheless, "a warrant is not required to establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and when a warrant is not required ..., probable cause is not invariably required either." Acton, 515 U.S. at ---- - ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2390-91 (1995).

¶11 As the T.L.O. Court made clear, "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental interests and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, [the Supreme Court has] not hesitated to adopt such a standard." 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742; see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (holding that at time of search and seizure on the street, officer had reasonable grounds to believe person was armed and dangerous); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)(brief traffic stops by roving patrol in border area were subject to reasonable suspicion standard); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3085, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)(routine stops at permanent check-points to check for smugglers and illegal aliens may be made without individualized suspicion); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (discretionary spot checks by police must be based on at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that motorist is unlicensed or vehicle is unregistered).

¶12 We begin our analysis by reviewing the leading United States Supreme Court decision on individual searches of students in public schools. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court evaluated the appropriate standard of reasonableness to apply to a search of a high school student's purse conducted by a school official. 469 U.S. at 331, 105 S.Ct. at 737. After a teacher discovered the student smoking in the lavatory, in violation of a school rule, an assistant vice principal searched the student's purse for cigarettes. Id. at 328, 105 S.Ct. at 735-36. The search revealed cigarettes, marijuana, and other evidence implicating the student in drug dealing. Id. The student moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse, arguing that the assistant principal's search violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 329, 105 S.Ct. at 736.

¶13 The T.L.O. Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to searches conducted by public school officials as well as by police officers. The Court, however, dispensed with the warrant and...