De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: COOKE
• Citation: De Angelis v. Lutheran Medical Center, 58 N.Y.2d 1053, 462 N.Y.S.2d 626 (N.Y. 1983)
• Decision Date: 29 March 1983
• Parties: , 449 N.E.2d 406 Barbara DE ANGELIS, Individually and as Natural Guardian of Deirdre De Angelis and Others, Infants, Appellant, v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants. M. Philip AMODEO, as Administrator of the Estate of Yves Le Henaff, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. Thomas N. PRECIOUS et al., Respondents.

Page 626

462 N.Y.S.2d 626

58 N.Y.2d 1053, 449 N.E.2d 406

Barbara DE ANGELIS, Individually and as Natural Guardian of

Deirdre De Angelis and Others, Infants, Appellant, v. LUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

M. Philip AMODEO, as Administrator of the Estate of Yves Le

Henaff, Deceased, et al., Appellants, v. Thomas N. PRECIOUS et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 29, 1983.

Keith V. La Rose, Poughkeepsie, William J. Stutman, New York City, and Donald D. Brown, Jr., Poughkeepsie, for appellants.

Roger P. McTiernan, New York City, Frank E. Maher, Brooklyn, and Katherine Hargas, New York City, for Lutheran Medical Center and another, respondents.

B. Jennifer Jaffee and Steven B. Prystowsky, New York City, for Thomas N. Precious and others, respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 84 A.D.2d 17, 445 N.Y.S.2d 188, in each of these appeals should be affirmed, with costs.

In each case, a child seeks recovery in a derivative action for loss of consortium against an alleged tort-feasor who inflicted disabling injuries on one of the child's parents. Such actions, however real the loss incurred, were not recognized at common law and we find no reason to recognize such a right now. In particular, the existence of the right of a husband or wife, in view of the nature of the marital relation, to bring an action derived from injuries to his or her spouse, to whatever extent it may be said to be analogous, does not warrant extending this right to a child and certainly not on the equal protection grounds asserted by the appellants.

Duty is essentially a legal term by which we express our conclusion that there can be liability (see, generally, Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 Col.L.Rev. 1014). It tells us whether the risk to which one person exposes another is within the protection of the law. In fixing the bounds of that duty, not only logic and science, but policy play an important role (Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 408, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807; Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car, 45 N.Y.2d 950, 411 N.Y.S.2d 555, 383 N.E.2d 1149; Pagan v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 510, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549; Ortiz v. Kinoshita & Co., 30 A.D.2d 334, 336-337, 292 N.Y.S.2d 48; Prosser, Torts [4th ed], § 42, pp. 244-249).

A line must be drawn between the competing policy considerations of providing a remedy to everyone who is injured and of extending exposure to...