Angland v. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 June 2013
• Citation: 66 A.3d 1252,213 N.J. 573
• Parties: Daniel ANGLAND and Daniel Wheeler, Co–Administrators of the Estate Of Robert E. ANGLAND, and Charles Johnson, IV, Administrator of the Estate of Nancy Angland, Plaintiffs–Respondents, v. MOUNTAIN CREEK RESORT, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant–Respondent, and William Tucker Brownlee, Defendant–Appellant. Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., Third–Party Plaintiff/Respondent, v. William Tucker Brownlee, Third–Party Defendant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

213 N.J. 573

66 A.3d 1252

Daniel ANGLAND and Daniel Wheeler, Co–Administrators of the Estate Of Robert E. ANGLAND, and Charles Johnson, IV, Administrator of the Estate of Nancy Angland, Plaintiffs–Respondents,

v.MOUNTAIN CREEK RESORT, INC., a New Jersey Corporation, Defendant–Respondent,andWilliam Tucker Brownlee, Defendant–Appellant.

Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., Third–Party Plaintiff/Respondent,

v.William Tucker Brownlee, Third–Party Defendant.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued Jan. 14, 2013.

Decided June 6, 2013.

John Burke, Parsippany, argued the cause for appellant (Burke & Potenza, attorneys).

Phillip C. Wiskow, Dover, argued the cause for respondents Daniel Angland and Daniel Wheeler, Co–Administrators of the Estate of Robert E. Angland, and Charles Johnson, IV, Administrator of the Estate of Nancy Angland (Gelman Gelman Wiskow & McCarthy, attorneys).

Samuel J. McNulty, Florham Park, argued the cause for respondent Mountain Creek Resort, Inc. (Hueston McNulty, attorneys; Mr. McNulty, John F. Gaffney, Livingston, and Stephen H. Shaw, Newton, on the brief).

Justice HOENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Plaintiffs' decedent, Robert Angland, was skiing on the slopes at the ski resort operated by defendant Mountain Creek Resort, Inc., when he was involved in a collision with defendant William Tucker Brownlee. At the time of the collision, Brownlee was snowboarding on the same slope. Although there is little direct evidence and no agreement among the parties about how or why Angland and Brownlee collided, it is undisputed that following the collision, Angland fell and slid down the slope. When he was found by Brownlee, Angland was lying unconscious near a concrete bridge that spanned the trail. Angland was transported to the hospital and treated, but he died several days later.

There is no question about the applicability of the New Jersey Ski Act, N.J.S.A. 5:13–1 to –12, to the claims brought by plaintiffs against defendant Mountain Creek, the ski resort. The question raised in this appeal, rather, is whether that statute also applies to plaintiffs' claim against Brownlee, as plaintiffs assert, or whether Brownlee's liability, as he contends, instead is governed by common law standards that generally apply to claims between participants involving injuries sustained in recreational sporting activities.

I.

Because we review this matter in the context of Brownlee's motion for summary judgment, our recitation of the facts gives the benefit of all favorable inferences to plaintiffs. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 520, 523, 666 A.2d 146 (1995).

Angland, described as a “very good skier” who had a season pass to use the facilities at Mountain Creek, was skiing on a beginner trail on January 19, 2007. Brownlee, who was an intermediate-level snowboarder, was on the same trail when his snowboard and Angland's skis made contact, causing both him and Angland to fall. After the collision, Angland slid down the hill toward the base of a concrete bridge that spanned the trail. Brownlee, however, was able to get up quickly and look around for the person with whom he had collided.

Brownlee saw Angland lying near the concrete bridge supports and went to his aid. Realizing that Angland was unconscious, Brownlee called for help and he remained in the area as Angland was taken from the resort and transported to the hospital. Based on the findings of the treating doctors, Angland sustained a skull fractureconsistent with having collided with the concrete bridge. He died a few days after the accident without having regained consciousness.

Brownlee has given several statements concerning how the contact between his snowboard and Angland's skis happened. Although those statements differ about some of the details, the essence of his explanation is consistent. Brownlee asserts that as he was snowboarding down the hill, a person whose identity has never been established either fell in front of him or cut him off, causing him to turn as he attempted to avoid a collision with that person. Brownlee's evasive maneuver, however, caused him to lose control of his snowboard, which became entangled in Angland's skis, resulting in the collision between the two of them.

The original complaint in this matter, which was filed on behalf of the Estate of Robert E. Angland, sought damages from defendant Mountain Creek and was premised solely on a violation of the Ski Act. The complaint asserted that the concrete bridge was a man-made hazard and that the ski resort was liable because it failed to remove the bridge from the trail, make it safe, or warn Angland and others of its existence, contrary to the resort's statutory duty of care. See N.J.S.A. 5:13–3(a)(3).

When Mountain Creek filed its answer to the complaint, it included a third party complaint against Brownlee. Mountain Creek alleged that Brownlee failed to comply with the duties of care that are imposed on skiers by the Ski Act, see N.J.S.A. 5:13–4, and that he therefore was liable to the ski resort for his negligent conduct. In the same pleading, Mountain Creek also asserted claims against Brownlee based on theories of contract and indemnity. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, through which they added direct claims against Brownlee. Plaintiffs' claims were premised on their assertion that Brownlee was subject to the statutory duties established in the Ski Act and that he therefore owed Angland a duty of care which he had violated.

Following discovery, Brownlee moved for summary judgment. He did not dispute that snowboarding is an activity that is generally covered by the Ski Act. See N.J.S.A. 5:13–2(c) (defining skier to include person operating toboggan, sled and similar equipment); Murray v. Great Gorge Resort, Inc., 360 N.J.Super. 395, 399–400, 823 A.2d 101 (Law Div.2003) (concluding that snowboarding is included within statutory definition of skiing). Rather, Brownlee argued that the Ski Act does not apply to claims made between skiers and that the appropriate standard of care instead is the standard established by the common law. He asserted that the common law standard of care that applies to claims between participants in recreational activities is recklessness rather than mere negligence, see Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 500–01, 643 A.2d 600 (1994), and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was no evidence that his conduct was reckless.

Plaintiffs, in opposing Brownlee's motion, pointed out that the Ski Act includes a section that specifically defines the duties of skiers. See N.J.S.A. 5:13–4. They argued that by including this section in the Ski Act, the Legislature made clear its intention that the statute would apply to claims arising from behavior between individuals who are participants in skiing activities. Arguing in the alternative, plaintiffs asserted that even if the common law recklessness standard applied to claims between skiers, Brownlee's motion should be denied because there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a finder of fact could conclude that he was reckless.

The trial court, in agreeing with plaintiffs, relied on three sources of support for its analysis. First, focusing on the statutory duties imposed on skiers, the court noted that two of those duties refer to avoiding collisions with or injury to other skiers. See N.J.S.A. 5:13–4(b)(4), (b)(5). Second, the court looked to the stated purpose of the Ski Act which is to “define[ ] the responsibility of ski area operators and skiers.” N.J.S.A. 5:13–1(b). Third, the court relied on language found in an opinion of this Court which described the Ski Act as “completely ... displac[ing] the common law” and “occupying the entire field.” Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, 144 N.J. 479, 502, 677 A.2d 705 (1996). Relying on those three sources, the trial court concluded that Brownlee's conduct was governed by the negligence standard of the Ski Act rather than by the common law recklessness standard. The court therefore denied Brownlee's motion, finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a genuine issue of material fact about his conduct and therefore about whether he violated the statutory duty of care.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of the trial court, agreeing that the Ski Act establishes the duty of care that applies to all skiers and that there was sufficient evidence in the record to create a question for the jury as to whether Brownlee violated that duty of care.

We granted Brownlee's motion for leave to appeal, 209 N.J. 99, 35 A.3d 682 (2012), and we thereafter permitted Mountain Creek, which in the interim had reached a settlement with plaintiffs, to participate as an amicus curiae.

II.

Brownlee, relying on the language used in the Ski Act and the legislative history surrounding its enactment, argues that the statute does not apply to claims between skiers. He points out that the legislative history makes it clear that the Ski Act was not designed to regulate claims between skiers, but instead was enacted to address only claims that arise between a skier and the ski resort operator. Brownlee contends that the trial and appellate courts, by focusing on the statute's recitation of the duties of skiers, missed the larger context in which the statute was enacted and overlooked the very specific concerns the Legislature intended to address when enacting the Ski Act.

As part of this argument, Brownlee points out that there are ski statutes in other states that include skier-to-skier liability provisions that are absent from our Ski Act. He argues that because some of those statutes were enacted around the same time as our Ski Act, we should presume that our Legislature was aware of this possible approach and chose not to adopt it. In his view, this lends further support to his assertion that the Ski Act does not govern plaintiffs' claim against him.

Based on his assertion that the Ski Act does...