Anglin Family Invs. v. Hobbs, s. SD 31655

• Citation: 375 S.W.3d 244
• Decision Date: 24 August 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. SD 31655,SD 31666.,s. SD 31655
• Parties: ANGLIN FAMILY INVESTMENTS, Plaintiff–Appellant/Respondent, v. Aimee Deanne HOBBS, n/k/a Aimee Deanne Hodson, Defendant–Respondent/Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

375 S.W.3d 244

ANGLIN FAMILY INVESTMENTS, Plaintiff–Appellant/Respondent,

v.Aimee Deanne HOBBS, n/k/a Aimee Deanne Hodson, Defendant–Respondent/Cross–Appellant.

Nos. SD 31655, SD 31666.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Aug. 24, 2012.

Abe R. Paul, Pineville, MO, for appellant.

James B. Fleischaker, Joplin, MO, for respondent.

DON E. BURRELL, J.

This consolidated appeal and cross-appeal arise from a contract for deed (“contract”) between Anglin Family Investments (“Seller”) and Aimee Deanne Hobbs (now Hodson, “Buyer”) that went wrong when a third party acquired title by adverse possession to a portion of the real property to be conveyed. After Buyer stopped making payments, Seller sued to eject Buyer from the property on the theory of unlawful detainer. Buyer counter-claimed, seeking a rescission of the contract based on a material decrease in the size of the real property that Seller could convey.

Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Buyer on her rescission claim. The judgment also ordered Seller to pay Buyer $9,528.47—the difference between the sum of the payments she had made under the contract and what the court determined to be the fair rental value of the property for the time period in which Buyer occupied it.

Seller claims: 1) the trial court erred as a matter of law in rescinding the contract because there was no mutual mistake; and 2) the trial court erred in finding that Seller materially breached the contract based upon the difference between the acreage Seller purported to be conveying and what Seller was subsequently adjudged to own. Buyer claims the trial court erred in awarding Seller a reasonable rental value because: 1) the contract provided that all payments would be returned to Buyer; and 2) Seller did not seek any recovery of rent in its petition. Based on a combination of briefing deficiencies and a failure to demonstrate prejudicial error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural Background¹

The parties executed the contract on January 23, 2009. The property to be conveyed consisted of a tract of land (“the land”) with “a 16'x80' Fleetwood Mobile Home [listed serial number omitted] and improvements[.]” The description of the land was attached to the contract as “Exhibit A.” Exhibit A contained a boundary survey and a legal description. The legal description concluded with, “This tract contains 5.09 acres, more or less.” The survey showed that the boundary line of the land extended beyond a fence located near the southeastern edge of the land. The promissory note signed by Buyer described the property to be conveyed as “being 5.09 acres of land and improvements and a 16'x80' Fleetwood Mobile Home [listed serial number omitted] located near [t]he Bethpage [c]ommunity.”

Concerning the eventual conveyance of title, the contract provided:

5. This contract shall be closed upon full payment of the purchase price at which time [Seller] shall deliver to [Buyer] a General Warranty Deed containing the usual and customary warranties, conveying title good in fact and marketable of record, marketable within the meanings of the standards of the Missouri Bar Association.

Paragraph 8 of the contract provided that “if title shall be defective in such a way that it cannot be corrected within a reasonable time, then [Seller] shall return all payments made by [Buyer] to [Buyer] and this contract shall be null and void.”

When she executed the contract, Buyer was aware that “the survey line” for the land extended past an old fence, and she believed that she could move the fence at any time because it was located inside the property line. After taking possession of the property from Seller, Buyer and her husband cleared brush from the “bottom part” of the land, “picked up all the rocks[,]” and put in a garden. Buyer also had a new fence installed along the property line as shown on the survey. Buyer and her husband made improvements to the mobile home by doing such things as painting, building cabinets, patching the roof, and removing old carpet.²

In February 2010, Buyer received a summons in connection with a lawsuit filed against Buyer and Seller by a neighboring property owner, “Mr. O'Brien.” ³ Mr. O'Brien's petition claimed that he had acquired title by adverse possession to approximately .23 acre of the land located between the old fence and the property line (“the disputed land”).⁴ Buyer had not previously talked with Mr. O'Brien about the property line or the disputed land.

Buyer believed that the disputed land was “ruled” to be Mr. O'Brien's property in December 2010. At the request of Buyer's counsel, the trial court took judicial notice of a court file referred to as “O'Brien Enterprises v. Anglin Family Investments Partnership[.]” ⁵ As to the quality of the disputed land, Buyer testified that it “was about the only level spot [located on the “bottom part” of the land], other than up on the top by the trailer.” As to its quantity, she said, “[W]hen there's only 5.09, .23 is a lot.” Buyer admitted that she had received late notices on some of her payments, that she fell two months behind on payments, and that the last payment she paid on the contract was made in January 2011 for the installment due in November 2010.⁶

In February 2011, Buyer sent Seller a letter via her attorney that purported to rescind the contract because Seller could not provide “clear title” for the entire 5.09 acre tract of land she had agreed to purchase. Buyer then received Seller's summons in the instant case and moved from the property “around the 3rd or 4th of March[, 2011].” Buyer filed a counterclaim that specifically sought a “judgment declaring the contract and promissory note null and void[.]”

Bobby H. Anglin testified on behalf of Seller, without objection, that he estimated the reasonable rental value of the property “sold” to Buyer to be $600–$625.⁷

In its judgment, the trial court found: “that the acreage lost was material and [it] denie[d Seller's] unlawful detainer action”; that Buyer was entitled to prevail on her action to rescind the contract; that the reasonable rental value of the property during Buyer's time of possession was $15,300.00; and that “[s]ince [Buyer] paid [Seller] $24,828.47 she is entitled to reimbursement of $9,528.47 plus costs.” After Seller timely appealed the judgment, Buyer timely filed her cross-appeal.

Analysis

Our preference is to reach the merits of every appeal that comes before us. Citizens for Ground Water Prot. v. Porter, 275 S.W.3d 329, 346 n. 5 (Mo.App. S.D.2008). Before engaging in that process to the greatest extent possible in this case, we must first address deficiencies in the parties' briefs that impede such a review.

The appropriate standard of review is a basic and critical concern in any appeal. Rule 84.04(e) requires the appellant's argument to “include a concise statement of the applicable standard of review for each claim of error.” Although it may sometimes be possible to reach the merits of a claim of error that does not comply with Rule 84.04(e), “[n]oncompliance with this rule justifies dismissal of the point.” Citizens for Ground Water Prot., 275 S.W.3d at 347 n. 6. It is not that the appellate court cannot “determine the applicablestandard of review, [rather] it is not our duty to supplement the deficient brief with our own research.” Waller v. Shippey, 251 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Mo.App. W.D.2008). Here, neither Seller nor Buyer cites any standard of review for their respective claims of error. We will discuss the effect of those omissions as we address each point relied on.

Seller's Appeal

Point I—Mutual Mistake

Seller's failure to address the standard of review compounds other problems inherent in its first point, which states: “The [trial court] erred as a matter of law in entering judgment on [Buyer's] counter-claim to rescind the real estate contract between the parties because there was no mutual mistake as to the terms of the contract or the property to be conveyed by [Seller] to [Buyer].” This point does not conform to the requirement in Rule 84.04(d)(1) that a point must identify the ruling or action alleged to be erroneous.

“The error contemplated by Rule 84.04(d) in a court-tried case is not the judgment itself but the trial court's actions or rulings on which the adverse judgment is based, such as explicitly or implicitly making or failing to make a certain factual finding, applying or failing to apply a particular rule of law, taking or failing to take a certain procedural action, etc.” Wheeler v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 999 S.W.2d 279, 283 n. 2 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). “As appellate courts are fundamentally courts of error, a point relied on that does not identify specific error preserves nothing for appellate review.” Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Long, 258 S.W.3d 469, 473 (Mo.App. W.D.2008). “The requirements of Rule 84.04(d) are mandatory.” Hampton v. Francis, 226 S.W.3d 234, 235 (Mo.App. E.D.2007).

While we may sometimes address ex gratia the arguments raised in such a defective point, see Columbia Mut. Ins. Co., 258 S.W.3d at 474;Wheeler, 999 S.W.2d at 283 n. 2, it is difficult to do so in regard to Seller's first point because its apparent focus—whether there was a mutual mistake by the parties—does not appear to be the subject of any express ruling of the trial court. The point also fails to explain—in the context of the case as required by Rule 84.04(d)(1)(C)—why the trial court must have implicitly made such a finding. Indeed, the point also fails to “state concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error” as required by Rule 84.04(d)(1)(B). In other words, to satisfy subsections (B) and (C), Seller's point should have asserted why the trial court must have found that there was a mutual mistake of material fact and why it was wrong to have done so in the context of the case.

Without such an assertion, addressing the claim on any...