Anglin v. State

• Decision Date: 26 July 1974
• Docket Number: No. 7331,7331
• Citation: 525 P.2d 34,90 Nev. 287
• Parties: Morris Edwin ANGLIN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. *
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 34

525 P.2d 34

90 Nev. 287

Morris Edwin ANGLIN, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Nevada, Respondent. ^*

No. 7331.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

July 26, 1974.

H. Rodlin Goff, State Public Defender, Reno, and Gary A. Sheerin, Carson City, for appellant.

Robert List, Atty. Gen., Carson City, and Robert E. Rose, and Kathleen M. Wall, Reno, for respondent.

[90 Nev. 288] Morgan D. Harris, Public Defender, Thomas D. Beatty, Asst. Public Defender, Las Vegas, amici curiae.

OPINION

MOWBRAY, Justice:

The main issue presented in each of these appeals is whether an indigent defendant who is financially unable to post bail should be given credit on his prison term for detention in the county jail pending his trial and sentencing.

The appeal of Morris Edwin Anglin, Jr., No. 7331, was the principal case argued before the court. The remaining 13 appeals, involving the same or related issues, have been consolidated herein for disposition. Our opinion, however, will be anchored on the factual history of the Anglin case.

1. The Facts.

Anglin was convicted of forgery on April 19, 1969. He was sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual criminal. The sentence was later commuted to 10 years, the statutory maximum for the crime of forgery.

Anglin was never given any credit for the 99 days he spent in the Washoe County jail while awaiting trial. Although bail had been fixed, Anglin was financially unable to post the required bail. The issue presented is what credit, if any, Anglin should be allowed for his presentence detention on his 10-year prison term.

Both this court and the Legislature have considered the general question of sentence credit, but not in the context of a person financially unable to post bail.

2. This Legislative Background.

In 1967, our Legislature granted discretion to our district courts to order that credit be allowed on county jail sentences for time spent in the jail prior to conviction. NRS 176.055 (1967). ¹ In 1971, credit for pretrail confinement was extended to state prison commitment. NRS 176.055 (1971). ² In 1973, the statute was amended to provide that, while credit may be applied to the duration of the sentence, credit so allowed may not alter the date from which the term of imprisonment is computed. ³

Since the enactment of NRS 176.055 in 1967, the Legislature has expanded the scope of its coverage by giving the district courts the power to allow presentence credit on prison terms. By so doing, our Legislature has implemented a suggestion of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code § 7.09 (Proposed Official Draft, May 4, 1962), ⁴ and has followed the action of the Federal Government, which permits a similar sentence credit under the Bail Reform Act of 1966. 18 U.S.C. § 3568. ⁵ Further, this legislation comports with ABA Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 3.6(a) (Approved Draft, 1968). ⁶

Presentence detention is behind-bars confinement. Legal categories do not remove the punitive aspects of the rigors and restraints of detention. As legal commentators have noted, the denial of credit for 'dead time'--time spent in incarcertaion before delivery of the defendant to the state prison--is basically a failure to recognize the punitive aspect of predispositional confinement. ⁷ Sensitive to these concerns, our Nevada Legislature has afforded the district courts an opportunity to grant credit for presentence deprivation of liberty.

3. The Court Background.

Anglin predicates his constitutional claim for the 99 days' presentence jail detention credit on the ground that he was an indigent and therefore unable to secure a bond for his predispositional release.

The claim of invidious discrimination because of lack of wealth is based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as announced in Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). ⁸

Williams v. Illinois, supra, applied the well established doctrine of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), prohibiting invidious discrimination against a defendant without funds so as to preclude his incarceration beyond the statutory maximum for confinement because of a default on a fine. Williams was a precursor of Tate v. Short, supra, which extended the Williams holding to preclude Texas from confining a traffic offender who had received fines totaling $425 but who was financially unable to pay the fines. In each case, the State was prohibited from exploiting the impecuniarity of the defendant. The rules announced on these cases are relevant to a consideration of the presentence confinement of an indigent defendant.

Although the United States Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the issue, the action of the Court in Gaines v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 2195, 29 L.Ed.2d 428 (1971), provides guidance in the instant case. Bernard Gaines was sentenced to serve 2 years on a federal narcotics charge, and then he was delivered to the New York authorities to answer State murder and robbery charges. More than a year after Gaines was first jailed by the State without bail, the State court set bail in the amount of $7,500, but Gaines was unable to post it. On a federal post-conviction petition, Gaines requested the federal authorities to credit his federal sentence for the time spent in State custody, because he was financially unable to post bail. The federal district court and the United States Court of Appeals denied relief because the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3568, did not provide for such credit. In response to Gaines' petition for certiorari before the United States Supreme Court, the Solicitor General acknowledged that the express terms of the aforementioned statute did not grant to the federal authorities the right to give credit for time spent in State custody for nonfederal purposes, but the Solicitor General did state:

'. . . To construe Section 3568 to deny Nelson (a petitioner similarly situated to Gaines) relief under these circumstances would be inconsistent with the spirit of numerous decisions of this Court requiring that justice be applied to all persons equally and not on the basis of ability to pay. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586; cf. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 482, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39; Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214, 78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891. Section 3568 is in our view not so inflexible in its provisions as to be incompatible with an interpretation that would give Nelson the relief he seeks.' (Footnote omitted.) Memorandum for the United States at 14, 15, Nelson v. United States, 402 U.S. 1006, 91 S.Ct. 2193, 29 L.Ed.2d 428 (1971).

Upon remand to the Court of Appeals, the High Court held:

'. . . Gaines' lack of weath has resulted in his having to serve a sentence that a richer man would not have had to serve, an impermissible discrimination according to Tate and Williams. Accordingly, Gaines ought to be credited with the time spent in state custody after bail was set.' ⁹ United States v. Gaines, 449 F.2d 143, 144 (2d Cir. 1971).

We agree with the Court's reasoning in Gaines and therefore hold that our statute, NRS 176.055, should also be construed to provide credit for confinement prior to a defendant's arrival at the state prison, where (1) bail has been set for the defendant and (2) the defendant was financially unable to post the bail. Under such circumstances, the district courts must allow such credit. To provide otherwise would tolerate invidious discrimination based upon a defendant's financial status.

Our decision in Ibsen v. Warden, 86 Nev. 540, 471 P.2d 229 (1970), does not direct a contrary result. The statute applicable at that time did not permit a credit on a state prison sentence, and, more importantly, we there were concerned with a defendant charged with murder who, prior to his trial and retrial, had been held without bail. The granting of credit in cases such as Ibsen more properly falls within the general guidelines of Summers v. Warden, 84 Nev. 326, 440 P.2d 388 (1968).

The authorities relied upon by the State to deny the credit Anglin seeks, including Ibsen, either antedate Gaines or fail to discuss its ruling. The fair impact of Williams and Tate are to place the indigent defendant, insofar as possible, on a par with the affluent defendant. If the moneyed defendant may secure release prior to trial, then the indigent defendant who stands convicted should be able to offset his term of imprisonment in all respects as if the confinement served prior to sentencing was served after sentence. ¹⁰

Presentence confinement under the circumstances presented shall be applied in the determination of the maximum duration or term of imprisonment, the minimum term, 'good time' credits under NRS 209.280 ¹¹ and 209.285, ¹² and 'good time' credits for county jail time. ¹³

4. Retroactive Sentence Credit.

Anglin was sentenced in 1969, when NRS 176.055 did not expressly provide for credit on a state prison sentence. Ibsen v. Warden, supra. Our Legislature had provided for a sentence credit if the sentence was to the county jail, and later, in 1971, extended this credit to state prison sentences. A similar situation arose in California. In In re Young, 32 Cal.App.3d 68, 107 Cal.Rptr. 915 (1973), a prisoner sought the...