Anglin v. State

• Decision Date: 13 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 57A03-0210-CR-370.,57A03-0210-CR-370.
• Citation: 787 N.E.2d 1012
• Parties: Todd D. ANGLIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

787 N.E.2d 1012

Todd D. ANGLIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 57A03-0210-CR-370.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 13, 2003.

Kimberly A. Jackson, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Christopher L. Lafuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

SULLIVAN, Judge.

Todd D. Anglin appeals from his conviction for Escape, as a Class C felony.¹ He presents the following three issues for our review which we restate as:

I. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction II. Whether the trial court, in sentencing, erred in considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances; and

III. Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate.

We affirm.

A review of the record reveals that on August 30, 2001, Anglin was sentenced to serve one year in the Noble County Jail and one year on probation following a guilty plea arising out of his arrest for possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine or a narcotic drug, and maintaining a common nuisance. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Anglin to wait in the hall for the transport officer from the Sheriff's Department to come and pick him up. Instead of waiting in the hall as ordered, Anglin walked out of the courthouse and was apprehended on September 16, 2001, in DeKalb County. He was subsequently charged with escape and, following his conviction, was ordered to serve six and one-half years incarceration.

I Sufficiency of the Evidence

When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Lycan v. State, 671 N.E.2d 447, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). We consider only the evidence which is favorable to the judgment along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom to determine whether there was sufficient evidence of probative value to support a conviction. Id.

Indiana Code § 35-44-3-5 provides that "[a] person, except as provided in subsection (b), who intentionally flees from lawful detention commits escape, a Class C felony."² "Lawful detention," as defined in Indiana Code § 35-41-1-18(a) (Burns Code Ed. Supp.2002), includes:

"(1) arrest;

(2) custody following surrender in lieu of arrest;

(3) detention in a penal facility;

(4) detention in a facility for custody of persons alleged or found to be delinquent children;

(5) detention under a law authorizing civil commitment in lieu of criminal proceedings or authorizing such detention while criminal proceedings are held in abeyance;

(6) detention for extradition or deportation;

(7) placement in a community corrections program's residential facility;

(8) electronic monitoring;

(9) custody for purposes incident to any of the above including transportation, medical diagnosis or treatment, court appearances, work, or recreation; or

(10) any other detention for law enforcement purposes."

However, the statute also states that except as provided in subsection (a)(7) and (a)(8), lawful detention "does not include supervision of a person on probation or parole or constraint incidental to release with or without bail." Id. The State asserted in the charging information that Anglin was subject to lawful detention under subpart (10), in that he was being detained for law enforcement purposes.³

Anglin alleges that the State failed to prove that he was subject to a lawful detention at the time that he walked out of the courthouse. To support his argument, he notes that the charging information alleged that he was in the custody of the Noble County Sheriff's Department. In addition, he quotes from the trial court's statement which ordered that Anglin begin serving his sentence. The portion of the statement quoted by Anglin reads, "`(t)he bond posted will be released at ... the time that you are incarcerated, which will be momentarily.'" Appellant's Brief at 9 (quoting transcript at 135). Moreover, he claims that a lawful detention cannot take place until a police officer performs a traditional police function. Finally, he claims that filing a charge for contempt, and not escape, would have been the proper recourse for the State in this case.

The State claims that it is not necessary that an individual be in the physical custody of a police officer in order to be lawfully detained. In addition, the State also alleges that the trial court's entire sentencing order effectively placed Anglin in the immediate custody of the Noble County Sheriff's Department.

While several Indiana cases have addressed at what point in time lawful detention begins, none of them have addressed the specific question before this court, i.e., whether a trial court's order that a defendant wait for the police to arrive and transport him so that he may serve his sentence serves as a valid detention. Rather, the cases upon which the parties rely to support their assertions all address lawful detention when the defendant is within the physical presence of a police officer so that there was no question whether the individual was subject to lawful detention according to statute. See Leshore v. State, 755 N.E.2d 164 (Ind. 2001)

(holding that defendant was lawfully detained when a police officer placed him in handcuffs pursuant to a Writ of Body Attachment); Triplett v. State, 669 N.E.2d 993 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (holding that defendant was subject to lawful detention when he was under the supervision of an Indianapolis Police Department transportation officer after leaving a hospital where he received treatment); Ellis v. State, 634 N.E.2d 771 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (upholding convictions for criminal contempt and escape when defendant fled from the officer who was escorting him to a detention room after being ordered to go with the officer by the trial court); and Pier v. State, 446 N.E.2d 985 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (upholding conviction for escape after defendant had been told he was under arrest and was ordered to sit in a squad car), trans. denied. Because we are not faced with such a factual situation here, these cases are of little value to our analysis. Instead, we must focus upon the meaning of the term "any other detention for law enforcement purposes" to determine whether the trial court's order placed Anglin under lawful detention. Consequently, we must interpret the statute defining "lawful detention."

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which is reserved for the courts. Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 430 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). When construing a statute, our foremost objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Melrose v. Capitol City Motor Lodge, Inc., 705 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ind.1998). We examine the statute as a whole and give common and ordinary meaning to the words employed. Robinson v. Wroblewski, 704 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind.1998). We presume that the legislature intended the language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statute's underlying policy and goals. Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Indiana Statewide Ass'n of Rural Elec. Coops., Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1324, 1327 (Ind. Ct.App.1998). Turning to the exact phrase upon which the State relied in charging Anglin, we must determine what the General Assembly meant through the use of the words "any other detention for law enforcement purposes." Anglin cites to various authorities which reference the term "law enforcement purposes." See e.g., State v. Gerschoffer, 763 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. 2002)

(considering whether roadblock was sufficiently related to law enforcement purpose of combating drunk driving); Hart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 420 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (discussing detainment for the law enforcement purpose of requiring an individual to submit to urine analysis to determine whether he had been driving under the influence of a controlled substance). As Anglin correctly asserts, these cases address situations in which a law enforcement officer⁴ was performing an action which the State asserted was done for law enforcement purposes. Anglin is also correct in noting that a member of the judiciary is not considered a law enforcement officer according to applicable statutory law. See I.C. § 35-41-1-17. Nonetheless, Anglin's entire argument presupposes that the detention must be performed by a law enforcement officer to be considered for law enforcement purposes. It is this supposition which is not supported by the statute.

Indiana Code § 35-41-1-18 does not explicitly limit its application to situations in which a law enforcement officer has control of an individual. While that would generally be the accepted view of many of the factors which are considered as lawful detention, it is not necessarily so. Further, what is critical in determining the meaning of "any other detention for law enforcement purposes" is that an individual is being detained so that he is subject to legitimate law enforcement purposes. In this case, the law enforcement purpose for which Anglin was ordered to wait in the hallway was for transportation to the jail and incarceration to serve the sentence which he had just been ordered to serve. While the initial detention itself was not performed by a law enforcement officer, that is not fatal to the conviction for the crime as charged by the State. The trial court's order indicated that the sentence was to begin immediately, that actual incarceration would take place momentarily, and that Anglin was being turned over to the Sheriff's Department as soon as the hearing was over. Anglin was "detained" by the trial court in that he was not free to leave the building as soon as he was informed that the Sheriff's Department would pick him up at the designated location in the courthouse. That Anglin was not in the physical custody of the transport officer at the time that he fled does not exclude the conclusion that he was in "detention for law enforcement purposes." Based upon this consideration,...