Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 September 2021
• Docket Number: 19-CV-0397
• Parties: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Appellant, v. Hormel Foods Corp., Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

Animal Legal Defense Fund, Appellant,
v.
Hormel Foods Corp., Appellee.

No. 19-CV-0397

Court of Appeals of The District of Columbia

September 2, 2021

Argued June 30, 2020

Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CAB-4744-16) (Hon. Anthony C. Epstein, Trial Judge)

David S. Muraskin, with whom Kelsey Eberly, of the bar of the State of California, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, was on the brief, for appellant.

Aaron D. Van Oort, of the bar of the State of Minnesota, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, with whom Frank S. Swain, Tyler A. Young, of the bar of the States of Massachusetts and Minnesota, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, and Martin J. Demoret, of the bar of the States of Iowa and Nebraska, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, were on the brief, for appellee.

Allison M. Zieve and Scott L. Nelson filed an amicus curiae brief for Public Citizen Litigation Group in support of appellant.

Cheryl Leahy, Sarah Hanneken, and Wendy Watts filed an amicus curiae brief for Animal Outlook f/k/a Compassion Over Killing, Animal Equality, and The Humane League in support of appellant.

Craig L. Briskin filed an amicus curiae brief for National Consumers League in support of appellant.

Katherine Campbell, Robert George, of the bar of the States of Arkansas and Oklahoma, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, and Kathy McCarroll, of the bar of the State of Arkansas, pro hac vice, by special leave of court, filed an amicus curiae brief for The North American Meat Institute, American Association of Meat Processors, National Pork Producers Council, Grocery Manufacturers Association, National Chicken Council, National Turkey Federation, and Southwest Meat Association in support of appellee.

Before Thompson, McLeese, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

Deahl, Associate Judge:

The Animal Legal Defense Fund sued Hormel Foods in connection with meat products it advertises as "Natural Choice." ALDF claims the ads are misleading in violation of the District of Columbia's Consumer Protection Procedures Act. See D.C. Code §§ 28-3901 et seq. (2013 Repl.). In its view, the ads falsely convey to consumers that the animals were treated humanely and that the products are free from preservatives. The D.C. Superior Court granted summary judgment in Hormel's favor, finding that ALDF lacked standing to bring suit. Despite finding a lack of standing, the court proceeded to address the merits, concluding that ALDF's claims were preempted by federal laws regulating the labeling of meat and poultry products.

ALDF now brings this appeal. It argues: (1) contrary to the trial court's ruling, the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, or CPPA, modifies Article III standing requirements with a statutory test that it satisfies; (2) in any event, it had Article III standing under the "organizational standing" doctrine; and (3) its claims are not preempted by federal law.

We agree with ALDF on its first point. The CPPA confers standing upon "public interest organization[s]" bringing suit "on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers," so long as they have a "sufficient nexus" to "adequately represent those interests." D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D). That recent addition to the CPPA conveys a clear legislative intent to modify Article III's strictures with a statutory test governing public interest organizations' standing to bring a CPPA claim. Because ALDF meets that statutory test, it has standing to sue without regard to whether it also satisfies traditional Article III standing requirements. Our agreement with ALDF on its first argument renders it unnecessary to address its second, so we do not resolve it. As to the third question, we conclude that federal labeling laws do not preempt ALDF's claims, which attack only Hormel's advertisements beyond its product labels (and not the labels themselves). We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I.

ALDF is a nonprofit organization whose core mission is to "protect the lives and advance the interests of animals through the legal system." It advances that objective through a variety of strategies, including legal advocacy and public outreach related to animal welfare. Important here, ALDF fulfills its mission, in part, by trying to ensure consumers are provided with accurate information about the treatment of animals raised for consumption so as to reduce demand for factory-farmed products. Factory farming, as ALDF describes it, "involves packing animals into cramped, unsanitary settings, in many cases so small the animals are barely able to move."

Hormel produces and sells food products containing meat and poultry. In 2006, it launched its Natural Choice® line of deli meats, which include beef, ham, turkey, and chicken products. Before they hit the market, Hormel was required by law to submit proposed labeling to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for approval. It did so, and the USDA approved labels describing Hormel's Natural Choice meat products as "Natural," "All Natural," "100% Natural," and containing "No Preservatives." Nine years later, the company launched its "Make the Natural Choice" advertising campaign. The campaign included print and video ads that, like the products' labels, described Natural Choice deli meats as "100% natural," "all natural," with "no [added] preservatives." The ads also used descriptors like "clean," "honest," "higher standards," and "wholesome."

Shortly after Hormel began its campaign, ALDF discovered that the pigs slaughtered to make Hormel products had been subjected to what it describes as "egregious and stomach-churning" treatment. It made that discovery while covertly investigating a pig-breeding facility it later identified as a Hormel supplier. ALDF lobbied the USDA to prohibit use of the term "natural" on the labels of all meat and poultry products that are factory-farmed-a particularly inhumane and unnatural means of animal husbandry, in its view. According to ALDF, the descriptor trades on consumers' mistaken beliefs that meat products described as natural are sourced from humanely raised livestock. It specifically identified Hormel's Natural Choice deli meats as misleading consumers in that way, despite the USDA's approval of their labeling. ALDF later published its advocacy efforts online, along with the findings from its covert investigation. ALDF also engaged in other advocacy it maintains was, at least in part, undertaken to combat Hormel's Natural Choice campaign. It lobbied against a regulation proposed by the USDA concerning a pig slaughter inspection program, and it continued to challenge so-called "Ag-Gag" laws-prohibiting undercover investigations of agricultural facilities^[1]-as it had done since 2011.

In addition to its advocacy efforts, ALDF sued Hormel in the D.C. Superior Court, alleging its advertising campaign violated the CPPA. See D.C. Code § 28-3904 (making it unlawful for "any person to engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice"). The crux of its complaint is that Hormel's Natural Choice campaign misleads consumers into believing that the animals slaughtered to make Natural Choice deli meats were treated humanely, even though they were not. The ads also tout the absence of preservatives and nitrates, even though the meats contain naturally-occurring nitrates from celery juice and cherry juice powder. ALDF sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but no monetary damages. In particular, it asked for a judicial declaration that Hormel's "Make the Natural Choice" ads violate the CPPA, and it called for cessation of those ads and "corrective advertising."

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Hormel's motion. It concluded ALDF lacked standing to sue under the CPPA. It also concluded that ALDF's claims were preempted by federal labeling laws- namely, the Federal Meat Inspection Act and the Poultry Products Inspection Act. ALDF now appeals, challenging those rulings.

II.

The threshold question on appeal is whether ALDF has standing to maintain its suit under the CPPA. In ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment regarding standing, the trial court rejected ALDF's argument that it had standing as a matter of law and granted Hormel's motion, concluding that ALDF lacked standing. We review those legal determinations de novo. Aziken v. District of Columbia, 194 A.3d 31, 34 (D.C. 2018). Standing analysis "is different at the successive stages of litigation." Grayson v. AT&T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 232 (D.C. 2011) (en banc) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). At the summary judgment stage, standing (or lack thereof) is established if, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 109 A.3d 1118, 1120 (D.C. 2015).

ALDF asserts on appeal, as it did in opposing summary judgment, that it has standing under two distinct theories. First, it argues that it has so-called "representational standing" under D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D), a provision it maintains modifies traditional Article III standing requirements with a statutory test, which it satisfies. The trial court rejected both facets of that argument, concluding subsection (k)(1)(D) did not modify traditional Article III standing requirements and that ALDF did not satisfy the statutory prerequisites to standing in any event. Second, regardless of that statutory argument, ALDF argues it satisfies traditional Article III standing requirements under a theory of "organizational standing," so that it may independently proceed under § 28-3905(k)(1)(C).

A.

ALDF claims it has representational standing under CPPA provision § 28-3905(k)(1)(D). The parties disagree about three big-picture points critical to...