Ankeny v. Pomeroy Grain Growers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 October 1932
• Docket Number: 23691.
• Citation: Ankeny v. Pomeroy Grain Growers, Inc., 170 Wash. 1, 15 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1932)
• Parties: ANKENY v. POMEROY GRAIN GROWERS, Inc., et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

15 P.2d 264

170 Wash. 1

ANKENY v. POMEROY GRAIN GROWERS, Inc., et al.

No. 23691.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 13, 1932

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, Garfield County; E. V. Kuykendall Judge.

Action by John D. Ankeny against the Pomeroy Grain Growers, Inc. and others.From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Affirmed.

Francis A. Garrecht, of Spokane, and C. Alex McCabe of Pomeroy, for appellants.

Pedigo, Watson & Gose, of Walla Walla, for respondent.

BEALS J.

Under date December 18, 1922, Mr. & Mrs. H. F. Clodius leased to George W. Shepherd and A. L. Grover(Mr. Grover later transferring to Mr. Shepherd all his interest in the lease) a large tract of farm land in Garfield county for the term ending October 1, 1930, at an annual rental of $8,000, payable on or Before December 1st of each year.The lease expired October 1, 1930, although the rental for the last year would not, according to the terms of the lease, be payable until the first day of December following.October 1, 1930, after several months of negotiations, during all of which time Mr. Shepherd was farming the lands covered by his lease, Mr. and Mrs. Clodius by warranty deed conveyed the property to the plaintiff in this action, who, October 3, filed his deed for record.During the months of August and September, 1930, Mr. Shepherd harvested his year's crop of wheat and stored the same in convenient warehouses, receiving therefor negotiable warehouse receipts, upon which receipts the defendantsPomeroy Grain Growers, Inc., North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc., and Farmers National Grain Corporation(herein referred to as the grain companies) advanced Mr. Shepherd approximately $16,000.February 17, 1931, plaintiff instituted this action against Mr. Shepherd, the three grain companies, and two warehouse companies, for the purpose of recovering judgment against Mr. Shepherd for $8,000, which plaintiff alleged was due him for the last year's rent under the lease from Mr. Clodius; plaintiff also asking that he be awarded a landlord's lien upon wheat which he alleged had been grown on the land covered by the lease.In his complaint plaintiff alleged that the other defendants claimed some interest in the wheat upon which plaintiff was seeking to establish his lien.The warehousemen with whom Mr. Shepherd had stored his wheat having issued therefor the usual negotiable warehouse receipts, Mr. Shepherd, in the course of his dealings with the defendant grain companies, assigned the warehouse receipts to them as security for the advances made to him, as above mentioned.The issue here tried was the question of priority of claim as against certain parcels of wheat between plaintiff under his alleged landlord's lien and the defendant grain companies under their claim for advances made upon the security of the warehouse receipts.Trial to the court sitting without a jury resulted in a decree awarding plaintiff a lien upon a quantity of wheat held in storage by Ilia Warehouse & Milling Company, and upon another quantity of wheat in a warehouse operated by Pacific Coast Elevator Company.From this decree awarding plaintiff priority over their claims as to the quantities of wheat above referred to, the defendant grain companies have appealed.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in not sustaining their demurrer to respondent's complaint and in overruling their objection to the introduction of any testimony thereunder, appellants contending that the complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the property sought to be charged with a lien not being sufficiently described.Appellants further assign error upon rulings of the trial court admitting, over appellants' objection, evidence offered on behalf of respondent; in denying appellants' motion to dismiss at the close of the case; upon the order of the court reopening the case for the taking of further testimony, and other rulings of the trial court in connection with this matter; and, finally, upon the entry of the decree awarding respondent a lien on the wheat described in the decree and in directing foreclosure.

At all stages of the case, appellants have been vigorously contending that respondent's complaint is defective in that it fails to sufficiently describe the wheat which respondent seeks to subject to his lien.Ever since the decision in the case of Chambers v. Hoover, 3 Wash. Terr. 107, 13 P. 466;Id., 3 Wash. Terr. 20, 13 P. 905, it has been the law of this jurisdiction that, in determining whether or not a complaint is sufficient as against a demurrer, the complaint will be liberally, not strictly, considered, and 'even inferences from averments amounting to mere conclusions of law' will be construed in favor of the pleader.In the case of Isaacs v. Holland,4 Wash. 54, 29 P. 976, 978, this court said: 'Under our practice, the old rule that a pleading must be most strongly construed against the pleader is not recognized.It must be liberally construed, with an aim to arrive at substantial justice between the parties.'

The case of Harris v. Halverson,23 Wash. 779, 63 P. 549, is to the same effect, and in the recent case of Johnson v. Berg,151 Wash. 363, 275 P. 721, 723, this court said: 'Pleadings should be liberally construed for the purpose of enabling the parties to present their respective contentions to the court, to the end that substantial justice may be accomplished.'

We have examined the authorities cited by appellants in support of their contention that respondent's complaint is defective, but we are convinced that, upon the record Before us, there appears nothing which in this connection requires a reversal of the decree appealed from.The complaint is in its terms very general, but we hold that the trial court did not err in overruling appellants' demurrer thereto.

Mr. Shepherd, in applying to appellants for advances against his wheat, certified in writing that he was the owner of the wheat, and that there were no liens or incumbrances against the same.For the purpose of this opinion, we assume that, in all matters in connection with their dealings with Mr. Shepherd, appellants were acting in entire good faith.

Respondent's right to a lien upon any of the wheat raised by Mr. Shepherd is, of course, based upon the Clodius lease.This lease was, shortly after its execution, filed for record in the office of the auditor of Garfield county, and a certified copy thereof is Before us.On the auditor's records, Mr. Shepherd's name, as the same appears in the body of the lease, is correctly spelled.His signature to the lease, according to the record thereof made by the auditor, reads 'Geo. W. Sherherd,' and appellants contend that because of this error their objection to the introduction in evidence of the certified copy should have been sustained.The auditor testified, over appellants' objection, that in the indices referring to the volume and page at which the lease would be found, Mr. Shepherd's name was correctly spelled.We find no merit in appellants' contention that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of the county auditor in connection with the recording of the lease and the indexing thereof.

Appellants also object to the lease, because it appears that Mr. Clodius acknowledged the same Before a court commissioner for Garfield county, who failed to attach his seal to the certificate of acknowledgment.Under Rem.Comp. Stat. § 85, paragraph (j), a court commissioner has authority to take acknowledgements of deeds, and, under paragraph (k) of the same section, he is authorized to provide an official seal, and to use the same in authenticating his official acts.By article 4, section 23, of the Constitution of this state, a court commissioner is vested with 'authority to perform like duties as a judge of the superior court at chambers,' and a judge of the superior court, who has no personal seal, has, under the law, authority to take and certify acknowledgments.Rem.Comp. Stat. § 59.In the case of State ex rel. Lockhart v. Claypool,132 Wash. 374, 232 P. 351, this court held that article 4, section 23, of the State Constitution, providing for the appointment of a court commissioner, was self-executing, and that a regularly appointed court commissioner has all the powers that a judge of the superior court at his chambers had at the time of the adoption of the State Constitution.

Rem.Comp. Stat. § 10564, referring to certificates of acknowledgment to deeds and other instruments, provides that the officer certifying to the acknowledgment shall affix thereto his official seal, 'if any he has.'The law does not require that every court commissioner have a seal; it merely authorizes him to provide himself with one.The certificate of acknowledgment is sufficient on its face.In this connection, section 8, chapter 33, p. 34, Laws of 1929, referring to conveyances of real estate, is to be considered.

Consideration of appellants' objections to the admission of the lease from Clodius to Shepherd convinces us that the same were without merit, and that the trial court did not err in receiving in evidence the certified copy of the lease.

Appellants contend that the lease is insufficient to support a landlord's lien, in that the same does not describe the crops to be raised on the land, other than in general terms, and that any possible right to a lien which might have existed under the lease was lost as soon as the crops were severed from the ground.One phase of the litigation, involving this lease and wheat grown thereunder, was Before this court in the case of State ex rel. Pacific Coast Elevator Co. v. Superior Court(Wash.)13 P.2d 900.We are satisfied that, under the lease now Before us, respondent may...