Ann S. v. Saul
| Decision Date | 02 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 19 CV 1661,19 CV 1661 |
| Parties | ANN S., Claimant, v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant Ann S.1 ("Claimant") seeks review of the final decision of Respondent Andrew Saul,2 Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying Claimant's application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 73.1, the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of final judgment. [ECF No. 8]. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 14, 23] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). For the reasons discussed below, Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 14] is granted in part, and the Commissioner's Motion [ECF No. 23] is denied in part. This matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
On December 18, 2014, Claimant filed a Title II application for DIB alleging disability beginning on September 30, 2014. (R. 299-300). Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which Claimant requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (R. 161-71). On April 26, 2017, Claimant appeared and testified at an initial hearing before the ALJ. (R. 24-64). The ALJ also heard testimony on that date from vocational expert ("VE") Dennis W. Gustafson. (R. 24-64). After the hearing and at Claimant's request, Claimant subpoenaed medical records from Claimant's therapist, Mr. Thomas Buonomo, LMHC. (R. 903-21). She received and considered those records, and also received completed interrogatories on September 25, 2017 from independent medical expert Dr. Varsha Gillala. (R. 923-37). On April 20, 2018, ALJ held a supplemental hearing where Claimant, VE Richard T. Fisher, and another medical expert, Dr. Kathryn Rohr, M.D., testified. (R. 65-102).
On July 5, 2018, the ALJ denied Claimant's claim for DIB after considering her limitations. (R. 134-51). In finding Claimant not disabled, the ALJ followed the five-step evaluation process required by Social Security regulations for individuals over the age of 18. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of September 30, 2014. (R. 137). At step two, the ALJ found that Claimant had a severe impairment or combination of impairments as defined by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(c). (R. 137-38). Specifically, Claimant suffered from affective disorder, anxiety disorder (panic without agoraphobia),3 post-traumatic stress disorder, and hypertension. (R. 137). The ALJ also concluded that as of May 15, 2015, Claimant had severe degenerative disc disease as a result of injuries sustained in two car accidents.4 (R. 137). The ALJ also acknowledged several non-severe complaints - obesity, status-post tendon repair, and carpal tunnel syndrome - and concluded that although they did not rise to the level of severe impairments, she would nevertheless address or incorporate Claimant's limitations from each of these areas into the RFC, if appropriate. (R. 137-38).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. 138). The ALJ considered listing 1.04 for disorders of the spine, as well as listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.15 for Claimant's mental impairments. (R. 138-39). As for listing 1.04, the ALJ noted that Claimant did not have the neurological deficits necessary to satisfy listing 1.04A, nor did she have the spinal arachnoiditis for listing 1.04B or lumbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudo-claudication for listing 1.04C. (R. 138). Listings 12.04, 12.06, and 12.15 were also not satisfied, the ALJ reasoned, because Claimant did not meet either the "paragraph B" or "paragraph C" criteria. (R. 139-40). Although Claimant did have moderate limitations in all four functional areas - (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information, (2) interacting with others, (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and (4) adapting or managing oneself - the ALJ concluded that the "paragraph B" criteria were not satisfied because Claimant's mental impairments did not result in two "marked" limitations or one "extreme" limitation. (R. 138-39). Nor were the "paragraph C" criteria satisfied, as the ALJ concluded that the file contained no support for marginal adjustment of the minimal capacity to adapt to changes in the environment or to demands that are not already part of daily life. (R. 139).
The ALJ then found Claimant had the RFC,5 from September 30, 2014 through May 14, 2015, to:
"perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 but is limited to work that involving [sic] simple, routine and repetitive tasks, in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements, requiring only simple, work-related decisions, with few, if any, work place changes, and occasional interaction with the public and co-workers." (R. 139).
Beginning on May 15, 2015, the ALJ found Claimant had the RFC to:
(R. 139).
Based on this RFC, the ALJ found at step four that Claimant had past relevant work as a radio dispatcher but that she was unable to perform this work, as it requires semi-skilled tasks that are precluded by Claimant's mental health limitations. (R. 149). At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Claimant's age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity, she is capable of performing other work within the national economy and that those jobs exist in significant numbers. (R. 150-51). Specifically, the VE's testimony from the 2017 hearing identified jobs at the medium level that would be available to Claimant in the national economy as an industrial cleaner, (R. 57, 150), and jobs involving light work in the general area of housekeeping cleaning work, or building cleaning. (R. 58). The VE's testimony from Claimant's second hearing in 2018, on which the ALJ also relied, identified light, unskilled jobs including as a marker, routing clerk, or mail clerk that would be available to Claimant in significant numbers. (R. 92). The ALJ then concluded, based on the testimony of both VEs, that Claimant would be able to perform jobs including as an industrial cleaner for the period of September 30, 2014 through May 14, 2015. (R. 150). After May 15, 2015, the ALJ noted that Claimant could perform work as a marker, routing clerk, or mail clerk. (R. 150-51). The ALJ then found Claimant was not disabled under the Act. (R. 151). The Appeals Council declined to review the matter on September 18, 2018, (R. 1-3), making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by this Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see, e.g., Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2019); Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005).
A decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner's final decision if the Appeals Council denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000). Judicial review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards in reaching his or her decision. See Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment "affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence "means - and means only - such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (internal quotations omitted); see also, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A "mere scintilla" of evidence is not enough. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154; Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). Even where there is adequate evidence in the record to support the decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not "build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to the conclusion." Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, if the Commissioner's decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it cannot stand. See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009). Though the standard of review is deferential, a reviewing court must "conduct a critical review of the evidence" before affirming the Commissioner's decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The reviewing court may not, however, "displace the ALJ's judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility determinations." Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008).
Claimant raises three substantive points on appeal. First, she argues that the ALJ incorrectly concluded that her mental limitations did not meet...
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