Anna J. Gould v. Estate of Margaret C. Coleman

Decision Date08 November 1944
Citation39 A.2d 746,114 Vt. 92
PartiesANNA J. GOULD v. ESTATE OF MARGARET C. COLEMAN ET AL
CourtVermont Supreme Court

October Term, 1944.

Jurisdiction of Court of Chancery.

1. A demurrer admits facts that are well pleaded.

2. Where a party alleges facts which, if established, would entitle such party to a judgment transferring to him the legal title to real estate and personal property, he has no adequate remedy at law and chancery has jurisdiction.

3. One in possession of real estate under an oral contract for the conveyance thereof to him, who has made substantial improvements thereon, or who for other reasons cannot be placed in statu quo, is entitled to specific performance of such contract.

BILL FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. The defendants demurred and the demurrer was sustained. In Chancery, Rutland County, Black Chancellor.

The decree sustaining the defendants' demurrer upon the grounds that the bill does not allege facts which entitle the plaintiff to relief in equity and that she has a plain complete and adequate remedy at law, is reversed and cause remanded.

Lindley S. Squires and Frank E. Barber for the plaintiff.

Lawrence & O'Brien for the defendants.

Present MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS, JJ.

OPINION
STURTEVANT

This is a bill for specific performance. The Chancellor sustained the defendants' demurrer and the plaintiff excepted. The case is here under the provisions of P. L. 2072 as amended by No. 34 of the Acts of 1941, for the determination of a single question, namely; are the facts alleged in the bill sufficient to give a court of chancery jurisdiction of this action?

Among others, the bill contains the following allegations. Margaret C. Coleman was the plaintiff's sister and the wife of William T. Coleman. Margaret deceased at Rutland, February 12, 1941, and her husband died there, March 13, of that year. The defendants are the Administrators of both of the Coleman estates. For several years the Colemans lived in Paris France, where William was engaged in business. Failing health caused him to resign his position in 1928 and at Margaret's request the Colemans came to the plaintiff's home on Pine Street in Rutland and resided there with the plaintiff and her husband until the latter's death in 1932. During that time Margaret many times expressed a desire to the plaintiff that the Colemans might permanently make their home with the plaintiff, but no definite arrangement concerning that matter was made until after the death of the plaintiff's husband in October, 1932. Margaret then knew that she was afflicted with arthritis, diabetes and arteriosclerosis and she understood the seriousness of her condition. She knew that she would require constant care and attention during the remainder of her life and that she could not get these from her husband. In the Fall of 1932, Margaret, desiring the companionship, affection, care, attention and consideration which she well knew the plaintiff could bestow upon her, requested the plaintiff to permit her and her husband to live in the plaintiff's home and she requested the plaintiff to give her constant care and attention, be her companion, supervise her nursing and medical care, go with her and be with her at all times and constantly attend to her needs and comfort as she might require during the remainder of her life. To compensate the plaintiff therefor, Margaret offered to leave to her all the property, both real and personal, which she, the said Margaret, should own at the time of her decease. The plaintiff accepted that offer and has faithfully performed her part of the contract.

The Pine street house which was rented by the plaintiff was not suitable as a place where Margaret could be properly cared for. As a further consideration for the plaintiff's promises, Margaret stated that she would purchase a comfortable and convenient home for the plaintiff and that this would be the plaintiff's property at Margaret's death. In compliance with this agreement, in July of 1934 Margaret purchased a house at 21 Cottage street in the City of Rutland and same was paid for with money belonging to Margaret which her husband then had under his control and he caused the title thereto to be taken to himself and Margaret as tenants by the entirety. Immediately after such purchase, Margaret and the plaintiff began moving the plaintiff's belongings into that house where they have since remained, but, because of the eccentric habits of William, the moving was discontinued and the house remained unoccupied until May of 1940 when the plaintiff moved in all her furniture and ever since has lived there and been in possession of the premises. A. considerable amount of repairing was done on the house soon after its purchase and this was paid for in part by money belonging to the plaintiff and the balance was paid for by Margaret with money belonging to her. At all times here material the plaintiff has claimed that home as her own, which fact was well known to the defendant Keale and in recognition of that claim he has promised that as administrator of William's estate he would deliver to her a deed of the premises but he...

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