Anne Arundel County v. McCormick
Decision Date | 01 September 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 6,6 |
Citation | 594 A.2d 1138,323 Md. 688 |
Parties | ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, Maryland v. Kim McCORMICK et al |
Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Michele A. Dane, Asst. County Atty. (Stephen R. Beard, County Atty., both on brief), Annapolis, for appellant.
Michael L. Dailey (William J. Jackson, Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, all on brief), Baltimore, for appellees.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.
On July 2, 1984, Carl Retz was injured while operating an automobile in the course of his employment with Anne Arundel County when the vehicle he operated collided with an automobile owned by James McCormick and driven by Kim McCormick. Retz sought workers' compensation from his employer, but the County resisted his claim. On March 30, 1988, the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) denied Retz compensation on the ground that his claim was barred by limitations. Retz appealed that ruling to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. While that appeal was pending, on October 19, 1989, the County filed a stipulation with the Commission that Retz's claim was not barred by limitations and that Retz had sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by the County on July 2, 1984. In light of that stipulation, the Commission rescinded its order denying Retz's claim for workers' compensation, and on March 14, 1990, awarded Retz compensation. Thereafter, the County, which was self-insured, paid $6,020.80 in workers' compensation to and on behalf of Retz.
On May 10, 1990, the County filed suit in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Anne Arundel County, against Kim McCormick and James McCormick, alleging that the negligence of Kim McCormick, while acting as the agent, servant or employee of James McCormick, was the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by Retz on July 2, 1984. The County sought recovery of the $6,020.80 which it had paid Retz in workers' compensation. The McCormicks demanded a jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The McCormicks then moved for summary judgment on the ground that the County's suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations codified in Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 1 The circuit court granted that motion and entered judgment in favor of the McCormicks. The County appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. Before that court considered the case, we issued a writ of certiorari on our own motion.
The County presents these questions in its appeal:
The County's argument that its suit to recover compensation paid to and on behalf of Retz is not time-barred is based upon its construction of Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 58. That provision of our workers' compensation law deals with suits against third parties to the employer-employee relationship. It gives the employer 2 the right to recover from a third party who causes an injury to its employee any workers' compensation which the employer has been required to pay to its employee because of that injury. For two months after compensation is awarded or paid, the employer has the exclusive right to sue the third party. Thereafter, the employer and employee have concurrent rights to do so. The second paragraph of Article 101, § 58 provides:
"When any employee has a right of action under this section against a third party, the period of limitations for such action, as to such employee, shall not begin to run until two months after the first award of compensation made to such employee under this article, and this section shall apply to past and future rights of action under this section."
The County asserts that since its right to recover the compensation it paid its employee did not arise until that compensation was awarded by the Commission, limitations did not begin to run until that award. Alternatively, the County suggests that its suit to recover the compensation it paid to its employee was excepted from the time bar of § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article because the suit was filed within the two month period during which Article 101, § 58 provided it with the exclusive right to enforce the third-party liability. We disagree with those propositions.
The basic flaw in the County's analysis of Article 101, § 58 is its construction of that statute as one that creates the cause of action which the employer asserts against the third party who injured its employee. To the contrary, it is well settled that this statute does not create a cause of action in the employer but rather subrogates it to the claim of its injured employee against the responsible third party. Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 303 Md. 213, 222, 492 A.2d 1286, 1290 (1985); Johnson v. Miles, 188 Md. 455, 460, 53 A.2d 30, 32 (1947); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 678, 39 A.2d 858, 860 (1944); Railway Co. v. Assurance Corp., 163 Md. 97, 102, 161 A. 5, 7 (1932).
As a subrogee, the County had no greater rights than its subrogor, and it was bound by the same statute of limitations which governed its employee's action. In Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra, we addressed the issue of limitations in light of Article 101, § 58 in a third-party action instituted by an employee. We rejected the employee's contention that his third-party action was not barred by § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article because he had not yet received an award of the workers' compensation for which he had made a claim. Judge Rodowsky, speaking for the Court, observed the community of interest which the employer and employee have in any third-party action under Article 101, § 58:
303 Md. at 228, 492 A.2d at 1293. See Foster v. Peddiccord, 826 F.2d 1370, 1373 (4th Cir.1987); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Rys., 307 Ill. 322, 325, 138 N.E. 658, 659 (1923); Employers' Liab. Assurance Co. v. Indianapolis & C. Traction Co., 195 Ind. 91, 97-99, 144 N.E. 615, 617 (1924); Waters v. Transit Auth. of River City, 799 S.W.2d 56, 57-58 (Ky.Ct.App.1990); Marquette Casualty Co. v. Brown, 235 La. 245, 254, 103 So.2d 269, 273 (1958); American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co. v. J.T. Construction Co., 106 N.M. 195, 197, 740 P.2d 1179, 1181 (Ct.App.1987). See also United Materials, Inc. v. Landreth, 196 Neb. 525, 528-29, 244 N.W.2d 164, 166 (1976); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Richmond Mach. Co., 309 Pa.Super. 430, 437-38, 455 A.2d 686, 690 (1983).
It is undisputed that Retz's cause of action against the McCormicks accrued on July 2, 1984. Consequently, the suit by the County, as Retz's subrogee, when filed on May 10, 1990, was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations codified in § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
The ancient common law maxim of nullum tempus occurrit regi 3 has been adopted in this State and exempts the State and its agencies from the bar of a statute of limitations such as § 5-101 of the Courts...
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