Anne Arundel Medical Center, Inc. v. Condon

Decision Date01 September 1994
Docket NumberNo. 278,278
Citation102 Md.App. 408,649 A.2d 1189
PartiesANNE ARUNDEL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. v. Nancy CONDON. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
Luther Zeigler (Richard McMillan, Jr., Daniel Aronowitz and Crowell & Moring, Washington, DC, Roy B. Cowdrey, Jr. and Cowdrey, Thompson & Karsten, P.A., Easton, on the brief), for appellant

Andrew H. Kahn (Kahn, Smith & Collins, P.A., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Daniel R. Lanier, Virginia A. Stuelpnagel and Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore, for amicus curiae, Maryland Ass'n of Defense Trial Counsel.

John James Sellinger and Greenberg and Bederman, Silver Spring, for amicus curiae, Maryland Trial Lawyers' Ass'n.

Argued before MOYLAN, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ.

MOYLAN, Judge.

This appeal and cross-appeal arise out of a medical malpractice action in which the appellee/cross-appellant, Nancy Condon (appellee), was misdiagnosed as not having breast cancer after a routine mammogram and subsequent biopsy were done. The appellant/cross-appellee, Anne Arundel Medical Center (AAMC or appellant), appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County denying its Second Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of its Second Motion for Summary Judgment, AAMC claimed that a settlement signed on the eve of trial releasing Dr. William A. Williams from liability also released AAMC from liability as a matter of law. This argument is premised on the fact that Dr. Williams was an agent of AAMC and that any liability attributed to AAMC was exclusively vicarious in nature.

As this Court agrees with the reasoning of the appellant, we reverse the order of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County denying appellant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. Our disposition of the appeal on this ground renders the other three contentions of the appellant and the sole contention of the appellee/cross appellant moot.

On July 1, 1988, Nancy Condon underwent a routine mammogram ordered by her gynecologist, which revealed suspicious microcalcifications in her right breast. Advised by her doctor that her breast needed further examination, Ms. Condon selected Dr. Robert C. Moore to perform a biopsy of the breast tissue. The biopsy was ultimately performed on July 19 at the Anne Arundel Medical Center.

Ms. Condon knew that Dr. Moore was not a pathologist, and therefore, she did not expect him to perform the actual test on the breast tissue. Instead, the tissue was tested by Dr. William A. Williams, an independent contractor of the pathology corporation of William R. Weisburger, M.D., P.A. The pathology corporation, in turn, had an independent contract with AAMC to provide pathology services for hospital patients. The agreement between the pathology corporation and AAMC provided that all corporate pathologists who provide pathology services pursuant to the agreement "are not in any way considered employees of [AAMC]." AAMC's only role in the pathologist's interpretation was to provide necessary support services and equipment to enable the independent pathology corporation to interpret or to refer out pathology specimens.

Dr. Williams reported that the biopsy tissue was characterized by "fibrocystic change with sclerosing adenosis and microcalcifications with focal atypical intraductal hyperplasia." Based on this report, Dr. Moore advised Ms. Condon that she did not have cancer, but that she should undergo frequent mammograms.

On February 7, 1990, Nancy Condon consulted Dr. Moore complaining of an inflammation of her right breast in the same area of her previous biopsy. Dr. Moore again recommended In the complaint filed with the Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCA), Ms. Condon alleged that the first biopsy specimen was incorrectly interpreted by Dr. Williams. She further alleged that Dr. Williams was acting as an employee, officer, or agent of the pathology corporation William R. Weisburger, M.D., P.A., and, at the same time, was also an employee, servant, or agent of AAMC. She also alleged that Dr. Williams' failure to interpret invasive carcinoma was a departure from reasonable and proper standards of medical care, and was the proximate cause of her injuries. The HCA panel ruled in favor of all three defendants.

and performed a biopsy on February 15. Based on this second biopsy, Nancy Condon was advised that she was suffering from invasive carcinoma of the breast. On February 23, she underwent a bilateral modified radical mastectomy.

Thereafter, Nancy Condon appealed the decision of the HCA panel by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, asserting the same causes of action against all three defendants. Once in the circuit court, both AAMC and the pathology corporation filed motions for summary judgment on the ground that neither entity was responsible for the conduct of Dr. Williams because he was an independent contractor of the pathology corporation with no direct or indirect relationship with AAMC. The trial court granted the pathology corporation's motion and dismissed it from the action. The trial court, however, denied AAMC's motion.

On the eve of trial, December 9, 1992, counsel for Dr. Williams offered to settle the claim against his client for $1,000,000. 1 Nancy Condon agreed to the settlement and signed a release with Dr. Williams' estate for $1,000,000. The After the release was executed, AAMC immediately filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that its liability was solely vicarious in nature. AAMC claimed that its liability was only derivative and that since Dr. Williams had been released from liability, so too must AAMC be released as a matter of law. The circuit court denied AAMC's motion and the case against AAMC proceeded to trial.

execution of the release, therefore, dismissed all claims against Dr. Williams, the only active tortfeasor in the action. 2

After a trial on the merits, a special verdict sheet was given to the jury allowing for only one conclusion--whether AAMC was vicariously liable or not. 3 The jury returned the special verdict in favor of Nancy Condon and awarded damages in the amount of $3,061,719. After the special verdict was entered, AAMC filed three post-trial motions: 1) a Motion for Judgment The trial court denied AAMC's motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, but granted the request to reduce the award. The court reduced the amount of non-economic damages from $1.8 million to $350,000, and also deducted $1 million from the total verdict which represented the consideration for the settlement and release with Dr. Williams' estate. After the court's reduction, the award stood at $611,719.

Notwithstanding the Verdict on the ground that the release of Dr. Williams extinguished appellee's claims against AAMC; 2) a Motion for a New Trial on the ground that the appellee's damages were excessive; and 3) a Motion to Reduce the Judgment by the Credit for the appellee's settlement with Dr. Williams and by the amount the verdict for non-economic damages exceeded the $350,000 statutory cap.

The appellant is appealing on the ground that an agent and his principal, whose liability is solely vicarious, are not joint tortfeasors under Maryland's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act (UCATA). Md.Code Ann., art. 50 §§ 16-24. The appellant claims that the common law rule, which states that the release of an agent discharges the principal from liability, should, therefore, apply. We agree.

At common law, an individual injured by the negligence of more than one tortfeasor could proceed against any one for payment of damages recovered. Payment by one tortfeasor, however, would not only act as satisfaction to the injured individual, but would release all other tortfeasors liable for the injury. Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957); Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60, 66-67 (1876); Mamalis v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 522 Pa. 214, 560 A.2d 1380 (1989) citing Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959). The purpose of such a rule was two-fold. First, in the eyes of the law, although there might have been two tortfeasors, there was but one cause of action. Therefore, a release to one of two tortfeasors who acted in concert necessarily released the other. Second, courts were afraid of promoting double recoveries In 1941, however, the Maryland Legislature adopted its own version of UCATA. That new law, regulating the treatment of joint tortfeasors in Maryland, abrogated the common law rule by enabling an individual to settle with one joint tortfeasor and still have recourse against the remaining tortfeasors.

by plaintiffs. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 49, at 332-33 (5th ed. 1984).

Md.Ann.Code art. 50, § 19, titled "Effect of release on injured person's claim," states that "[a] release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before of after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release...." Section 21, moreover, provides that any right of indemnity under existing law is not impaired. In effect, the Act provided for the first time for a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. Cf. Theophelis v. Lansing General Hosp., 430 Mich. 473, 424 N.W.2d 478, 482 (1988).

In order for the Act to apply to the case at hand, however, Dr. Williams and AAMC must be shown to be joint tortfeasors. No Maryland court has yet squarely addressed the issue of whether an agent and his principal, whose liability is solely vicarious, are joint tortfeasors under Maryland's version of UCATA. Several other jurisdictions, however, have had opportunities to consider this issue. The courts that have confronted the issue have fallen on both sides of the proverbial fence; either they hold that their respective versions of UCATA include...

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