Annette S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-10614 (BRM)
• Parties: ANNETTE S., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

ANNETTE S., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-10614 (BRM)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

June 27, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

HON BRIAN R. MARTINOTTI United States District Judge

Before the Court is an appeal by Plaintiff Annette S (“Plaintiff”) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”),^[1] denying her application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and Supplemental Security Income under Title XVI of the Act. This Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Having considered the submissions of the parties without oral argument, pursuant to L. Civ. R. 9.1(f), and for the reasons set forth below and for good cause shown, the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.

I. Background

This case arises out of Plaintiff's challenge to the administrative decision of the Commissioner regarding her application for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. Plaintiff alleges she became disabled and was unable to work because she suffers from degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis, obesity, and bipolar disorder. (Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 4.) Plaintiff is claiming both physical and mental disability. (Tr. 887.)

In May and June 2014, Plaintiff applied for disability and supplemental income benefits, respectively, alleging onset of disability beginning March 21, 2014. (Id. at 22.) The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration on April 1, 2015. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing on April 7, 2015. (Id.) On March 17, 2017, Plaintiff appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge Richard West (“ALJ West”). (Id.) An impartial vocational expert also appeared and testified at the hearing. (Id.) On September 8, 2017, ALJ West issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 19-35.) On April 16, 2018, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of her appeal. (Id. at 1-7.) On June 13, 2018, Plaintiff filed a civil action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. (Id. at 942.) On July 9, 2019, the Honorable John M. Vasquez issued an Opinion and Order, remanding the action to the Commissioner, finding ALJ West “improperly assessed [Plaintiff]'s obesity impairment.” (Id. at 925-37.) On August 27, 2019, the Appeals Council vacated the decision of ALJ West and remanded the action to be heard before ALJ Marguerite Toland (“ALJ Toland”).^[2] (Id. at 943-47.) A hearing before ALJ Toland was held on June 12, 2020. (Id. at 899-922.) Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and amended her claims to a period of disability from April 8, 2016 through January 1, 2018. (Id. at 903.) Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the hearing. (Id. at 887.) She has an eleventh-grade education and past relevant work experience as a home health care aide.

(Id. at 46 47, 908, 919.) Dr. Gammal Hassanien, her treating physician, and Dr. Daniel Bascara, her treating psychiatrist, offered their medical opinions on Plaintiff's condition and limitations. (Id. at 27, 889.)

As reflected in her written decision dated July 1, 2020, ALJ Toland, after considering the entire record, made the following determinations concerning Plaintiff:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2018.

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017. The claimant returned to work and began engaging in substantial gainful activity as of: January 1, 2018, and through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et seq.)

3. There was a continuous 12-month period(s) during which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity, from March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, i.e., the “referenced period”. The remaining findings address this period during which the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity.

4. During the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, the claimant had the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the right knee, status post right knee arthroscopic surgery; osteoarthritis of the left knee with tendinosis; a;tear [sic] of the posterior horn of the medial meniscus of the left knee, left knee bursitis; tendinopathy of the Achilles tendon in the left ankle; obesity and major depressive disorder with psychotic features (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

5. During the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, the claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

6. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that, during the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, the claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except as follows: she could sit up to 6 hours per day but no more than 1 hour at a time. She would then need to stand or shift positions for 5 minutes every hour, while remaining on task. She could only occasionally climb ramps and stairs. She could only occasionally stoop. She could only occasionally kneel. She could never crawl. She would be limited to low stress work (defined as unskilled work involving simple, routine tasks having no fast production rate pace and no strict production quotas).

7. During the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, the claimant was unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).

8. The claimant was born on December 12, 1968 and was 45 years old on the alleged disability onset, and a younger individual age 4549, during the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017 (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

9. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

10. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 8241 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). The claimant did not attain age 50 until after the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017.

11. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy during the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

12. The claimant was not been [sic] under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, during the referenced period of March 21, 2014 through December 31, 2017, and through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).

(See id. at 883-91). Accordingly, on July 1, 2020, ALJ Toland denied Plaintiff's application for benefits, finding Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 878-98.)

Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Plaintiff filed an appeal with this Court on May 3, 2021. (ECF No. 1.) The administrative record is set forth in the transcript. (ECF No. 8.) On February 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in support of her appeal. (ECF No. 18.) On March 24, 2022, the Commissioner filed opposition. (ECF No. 19.)

II. Standard of Review

On a review of a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court “shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). The Commissioner's decisions regarding questions of fact are deemed conclusive by a reviewing court if supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. Id.; see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000). This Court must affirm an ALJ's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Newhouse v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence “is more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may be less than a preponderance.” Newell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 545 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial evidence standard in Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). To determine whether an ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must review the evidence in its totality. Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1984). “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, this Court may not set an ALJ's decision aside, “even if [it] would have decided the factual inquiry differently.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).

III. The Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

Under the Act, the Social Security Administration is authorized to pay Social Security Insurance to “disabled” persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). A person...