Annie Andrews v. Kate Andrews

• Decision Date: 19 January 1903
• Docket Number: No. 23,23
• Citation: 47 L.Ed. 366,188 U.S. 14,23 S.Ct. 237
• Parties: ANNIE ANDREWS, Plff. in Err. , v. KATE H. ANDREWS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

188 U.S. 14

23 S.Ct. 237

47 L.Ed. 366

ANNIE ANDREWS, Plff. in Err.,

v KATE H. ANDREWS.

No. 23.

Argued February 28, 1902.

Decided January 19, 1903.

The plaintiff and the defendant in error, each claiming to be the lawful widow of Charles S. Andrews, petitioned to be appointed administratrix of his estate. The facts were found as follows.

Charles S. and Kate H. Andrews married in Boston in April, 1887, and they lived together at their matrimonial domicil in the state of Massachusetts. In April, 1890, the wife began a suit for separate maintenance, which was dismissed in December, 1890, because of a settlement between the parties, adjusting their property relations.

In the summer of 1891, Charles S. Andrews, to quote from the findings, 'being then a citizen of Massachusetts and domiciled in Boston, went to South Dakota to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here while the parties resided here, and which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth; he remained personally in that state a period of time longer than is necessary by the laws of said state to gain a domicil there, and on November 19, 1891, filed a petition for divorce in the proper court of that state.'

Concerning the conduct of Charles S. Andrews and his purpose to obtain a divorce in South Dakota, while retaining his domicil in Massachusetts, the facts were found as follows:

'The husband went to South Dakota, and took up his residence there to get this divorce, and that he intended to return to this state when the business was finished. He boarded at a hotel in Sioux Falls all the time, and had no other business there than the prosecution of this divorce suit. I find, however, that he voted there at a state election in the fall of 1891, claiming the right to do so as a bona fide resident under the laws of that state. His intention was to become a resident of that state for the purpose of getting his divorce, and to that end to do all that was needful to make him such a resident, and I find he became a resident if, as a matter of law, such finding is warranted in the facts above stated.'

And further, that——

'The parties had never lived together as husband and wife in South Dakota, nor was it claimed that either one of them was ever in that state, except as above stated.'

With reference to the divorce proceedings in South Dakota it was found as follows:

'The wife received notice, and appeared by counsel and filed an answer, denying that the libellant was then or ever had been a bona fide resident of South Dakota, or that she had deserted him, and setting up cruelty on his part toward her. This case was settled, so far as the parties were concerned, in accordance with the terms of the agreement of April 22, 1892, signed by the wife and consented to by the husband, and, for the purpose of carrying out her agreement 'to consent to the granting of divorce for desertion in South Dakota,' she requested her counsel there to withdraw her appearance in that suit, which they did, and thereafterwards, namely, on May 6, 1892, a decree granting the divorce was passed, and within a day or two afterwards the said Charles, having attained the object of his sojourn in that state, returned to this commonwealth, where he resided and was domiciled until his death, which occurred in October, 1897.'

By the agreement of April 22, 1892, to which reference is made in the finding just quoted, it was stipulated that a payment of a sum of money should be made by Charles S. Andrews to his wife, and she authorized her attorney, on the receipt of the money to execute certain papers, and it was then provided as follows:

'Fourth. Upon the execution of such papers, M. F. Dickinson, Jr., is authorized in my name to consent to the granting of divorce for desertion, in the South Dakota sourt.'

Respecting the claim of Annie Andrews to be the wife of Charles S. Andrews, it was found as follows:

'Upon his return to this state he soon met the petitioner, and on January 11, 1893, they were married in Boston, and ever after that lived as husband and wife in Boston, and were recognized as such by all until his death. The issue of this marriage are two children, still living.'

It was additionally found that Annie Andrews married Charles S. Andrews in good faith, and in ignorance of any illegality in the South Dakota divorce, and that Kate H. Andrews, as far as she had the power to do so, had connived at and acquiesced in the South Dakota divorce, had preferred no claim thereafter to be the wife of Charles S. Andrews until his death, when in this case she asserted her right to administer his estate as his lawful widow.

From the evidence above stated the ultimate facts were found to be that Andrews had always retained his domicil in Massachusetts, had gone to Dakota for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, in fraud of the laws of Massachusetts, and with the intention of returning to that state when the divorce was procured, and hence that he had never acquired a bona fide domicil in South Dakota. Applying a statute of the state of Massachusetts forbidding the enforcement in that state of a divorce obtained under the circumstances stated, it was decided that the decree rendered in South Dakota was void in the state of Massachusetts, and hence that Kate H. Andrews was the widow of Charles S. Andrews and entitled to administer his estate. 176 Mass. 92, 57 N. E. 333.

Messrs. Elbridge R. Anderson and Charles W. Bartlett for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 18-22 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Frank Dewey Allen, Wayne McVeagh and Frederic D. McKenney for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 22-28 intentionally omitted]

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Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court:

It was suggested at bar that this court was without jurisdiction. But it is unquestionable that rights under the Constitution of the United States were expressly and in due time asserted, and that the effect of the judgment was to deny these rights. Indeed, when the argument is analyzed, we think it is apparent that it but asserts that, as the court below committed

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no error in deciding the Federal controversy, therefore there is no Federal question for review. But the power to decide whether the Federal issue was rightly disposed of involves the exercise of jurisdiction. Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Austin (1897) 168 U. S. 685, 42 L. ed. 626, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 223. As the Federal question was not unsubstantial and frivolous, we pass to a consideration of the merits of the case.

The statute of the state of Massachusetts in virtue of which the court refused to give effect to the judgment of divorce, is as follows:

'Sec. 35. A divorce decreed in another state or country according to the laws thereof, by a court having jurisdiction of the cause and of both the parties, shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another state or country to obtain a divorce for a cause which occurred here, while the parties resided here, or for a cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth.' 2 Mass. Comp. Laws 1902, chap. 152, p. 1357; Pub. Stat. chap. 146, § 41.

It is clear that this statute, as a general rule, directs the courts of Massachusetts to give effect to decrees of divorce rendered in another state or country by a court having jurisdiction. It is equally clear that the statute prohibits an inhabitant of Massachusetts from going into another state to obtain a divorce, for a cause which occurred in Massachusetts while the parties were domiciled there, or for a cause which would not have authorized a divorce by the law of Massachusetts; and that the statute forbids the courts of Massachusetts from giving effect to a judgment of divorce obtained in violation of these prohibitions. That the statute establishes a rule of public policy is undeniable. Did the court fail to give effect to Federal rights when it applied the provisions of the statute to this case, and, therefore, refused to enforce the South Dakota decree? In other words, the question for decision is, Does the statute conflict with the Constitution of the United States? In coming to the solution of this question it is essential, we repeat, to bear always in mind that the prohibitions of the

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statute are directed solely to citizens of Massachusetts domiciled therein, and that it only for bids the enforcement in Massachusetts of a divorce obtained in another state by a citizen of Massachusetts who, in fraud of the laws of the state of Massachusetts, while retaining his domicil, goes into another state for the purpose of there procuring a decree of divorce.

We shall test the constitutionality of the statute, first, by a consideration of the nature of the contract of marriage, and the authority which government possesses over the subject; and, secondly, by the application of the principles thus to be developed to the case in hand.

1. That marriage, viewed solely as a civil relation, possesses elements of contract is obvious. But it is also elementary that marriage, even considering it as only a civil contract, is so interwoven with the very fabric of society that it cannot be entered into except as authorized by law, and that it may not, when once entered into, be dissolved by the mere consent of the parties. It would be superfluous to cite the many authorities establishing these truisms, and we, therefore, are content to excerpt a statement of the doctrine on the subject contained in the opinion of this court delivered by Mr. Justice Field, in Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U. S. 190, 31 L. ed. 654, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723:

'Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and civilization of the people than any other institution, has always...