Anonymous Hosp. v. Spencer

• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Writing for the Court: Crone, Judge.
• Citation: Anonymous Hosp. v. Spencer, 158 N.E.3d 380 (Ind. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 08 October 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-393
• Parties: ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Mason SPENCER, Appellee-Respondent, and Steve Robertson, Commissioner of The Indiana Department of Insurance, and Doug Hill, Medical Review Panel Chair, Third Party Respondents.

158 N.E.3d 380

ANONYMOUS HOSPITAL, Appellant-Petitioner,

v. Mason SPENCER, Appellee-Respondent,andSteve Robertson, Commissioner of The Indiana Department of Insurance, and Doug Hill, Medical Review Panel Chair, Third Party Respondents.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CT-393

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed October 8, 2020

Attorneys for Appellant: Brett T. Clayton, Katherine M. Haire, Reminger Co., LPA, Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Christopher Gambill, Katherine Gambill, Wagner, Crawford & Gambill, Terre Haute, Indiana

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Indiana Trial Lawyers Association: Jerry Garau, Garau Germano, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] The medical review panel (MRP) stage of a medical malpractice proceeding is an informal process that parties must participate in within the medical malpractice framework. The narrow single issue presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether a vicarious liability theory of recovery against a hospital is preserved at this informal stage of the proceedings regarding conduct of physicians not named in the proposed medical malpractice complaint and for which the statute of limitations has now run to add them as parties. Mason Spencer spent twenty-five days in Anonymous Hospital (the Hospital) undergoing multiple procedures and being cared for and treated by numerous individuals, including physicians. He later filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint alleging that he suffered injuries and damages as a result of negligence and malpractice on the part of the Hospital. When, more than a year later, Spencer tendered his MRP submission that included assertions of vicarious liability for the physicians that treated him, the Hospital requested a preliminary determination of law or definitive ruling from the trial court. Specifically, the Hospital requested that the court strike the allegations of vicarious liability, and except the conduct of any physicians from the MRP's review because no physicians are named in the proposed complaint, nor were they identified during initial discovery, and the statute of limitations has expired. The trial court reviewed Indiana case law and initially granted the Hospital's petition, concluding that Spencer was precluded from proceeding with his vicarious liability claims. However, the court later reversed course and granted Spencer's motion to reconsider, concluding that current Indiana law does not preclude those claims from proceeding at the MRP stage, and even thereafter under appropriate circumstances. We agree that the vicarious liability claims against the Hospital may be presented to and considered by the MRP, and therefore affirm the trial court's grant of Spencer's motion to reconsider.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Spencer is a mentally disabled young man who suffers from Pierre Robbins Syndrome, a congenital condition that results in a smaller than typical lower jaw, a tongue that falls back into the throat, and difficulty breathing. On May 21, 2016, then eighteen-year-old Spencer was brought to the emergency department of the Hospital by his parents with complaints of nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. He was subsequently discharged and directed to follow up with his family doctor. On May 23, 2016, Spencer's family doctor directed him to return to the Hospital's emergency department, where he was seen and diagnosed with community acquired pneumonia and thrombocytopenia (low blood platelet count). Spencer was later admitted to the Hospital's intensive care unit for respiratory insufficiency, and was intubated. Spencer's admission to the Hospital continued for twenty-five days and finally ended when he was transferred to Riley Children's Hospital for further care on June 15, 2016.

[3] During his stay at the Hospital, Spencer allegedly developed bed sores, skin deterioration, a dislocated jaw, and several other ailments. Spencer filed his proposed complaint against the Hospital with the commissioner of the Indiana Department of Insurance on October 3, 2017. The complaint alleged in pertinent part:

3. That [the Hospital] provided healthcare to [Spencer] on May 21, 2016, and thereafter.

4. That at all relevant times herein [the Hospital] held themselves out as being capable of making proper diagnosis and treatment of medical conditions and diseases and invited the public, including [Spencer], to engage their services for remuneration to be charged by them.

5. That as a direct and proximate result of the acts of negligence and malpractice on the part of [the Hospital], Spencer suffered damages and losses.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 27. Written discovery ensued, and the parties thereafter agreed to and formed an MRP consisting of three Indiana healthcare providers. On July 2, 2019, Spencer timely tendered his evidentiary submission to the MRP. The submission included allegations that the Hospital should be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts committed by the various physicians, as well as other hospital employees and/or agents, who treated Spencer during his hospitalization.

[4] On July 22, 2019, the Hospital invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court through a motion for preliminary determination of law or discovery sanctions. The Hospital sought a definitive ruling or discovery sanctions striking Spencer's vicarious liability claims involving physician negligence, for which the Hospital claimed it had no notice. Specifically, the Hospital complained that the statute of limitations had expired, so the unnamed physicians could not be added as parties.

[5] The trial court held oral argument on the Hospital's motion on September 30, 2019. Thereafter, the trial court issued its order granting the Hospital's motion. The trial court stated that it believed, based upon current Indiana case law, that Spencer's failure to name specific physicians in his proposed complaint and/or during initial discovery was fatal to any claims of vicarious liability on the Hospital's part, and therefore that he is prohibited from proceeding with these claims before the MRP. Accordingly, the trial court instructed in its order:

The best remedy appears to be to order that the Medical Review Panel is only charged with reviewing the conduct of Hospital employees, agents, and representatives, except for physician conduct since no physicians were named in the proposed complaint and/or identified during discovery. This will require that Patient amend/modify its Submission or that the Medical Review Panel Chairman instruct the Panelists to limit their review and analysis to Hospital employees and staff, except for any physicians.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 149-50.

Spencer thereafter filed a motion to reconsider. On November 14, 2019, the trial court granted the motion to reconsider in light of its determination that, in its prior order, it had misinterpreted this Court's opinions in Columbus Regional Hospital v. Amburgey , 976 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied (2013) and Helms v. Rudicel , 986 N.E.2d 302 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied . Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Spencer "may proceed with his arguments and allegations of physician negligence (even if those physicians were not named in the proposed Complaint) in his submission to be evaluated by the [MRP]." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 170.

[6] The Hospital filed a motion to certify the issue for interlocutory appeal. The trial court granted the motion for certification following oral argument, noting, "I think my last order is probably a correct recitation of the current law ... [but] the best thing is [to] let an Appellate Court decide now." Tr. Vol. 2 at 56. This Court accepted jurisdiction on March 19, 2020, and this appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act (the Act), enacted in 1975, dictates the statutory procedures for medical malpractice actions. See Ind. Code § 34-18-1-1 et seq. Pursuant to the Act, a party to a malpractice action may request the appropriate trial court to "preliminarily determine an...issue of law or fact." Ind. Code § 34-18-11-1(a)(1). The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion filed under this chapter only during that time after a proposed complaint is filed with the commissioner under this article but before the MRP gives the panel's written opinion under Indiana Code Section 34-18-10-22. Ind. Code § 34-18-11-1(c). A preliminary-determination proceeding is unique in nature but is inextricably linked to the larger medical malpractice case as a mechanism to decide threshold issues. Ramsey v. Moore , 959 N.E.2d 246, 253 (Ind. 2012).

[8] The Hospital contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for preliminary determination and granting Spencer's motion to reconsider and determining that Spencer may proceed with his allegations of physician negligence/vicarious liability in his submission to be evaluated by the MRP, even if those physicians were not named in the proposed complaint or during initial discovery, and the statute of limitations has expired to join them to the case or add them as non-parties. Specifically, the Hospital argues that the trial court erred in interpreting Indiana case law which formed the basis for the court's decision. A trial court's interpretation of statutes and/or case law is a question of law to which this Court owes no deference. Harlett v. St. Vincent Hosps. & Health Servs. , 748 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied . Accordingly, our appellate review of the trial court's determination here is de novo.¹

[9] We begin by underscoring that this case is simply at the MRP stage. Before a plaintiff may pursue a malpractice complaint in court against a qualified healthcare provider, the Act requires the plaintiff to present a proposed complaint to an MRP, and the MRP must give its opinion as to whether the provider breached the standard of care. See Ind. Code § 34-18-8-4. Our supreme court has emphasized that the MRP process is...