Anonymous v. City of Rochester
Decision Date | 09 June 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 81,81 |
Citation | 915 N.E.2d 593,886 N.Y.S.2d 648,13 N.Y.3d 35 |
Parties | Jiovon ANONYMOUS, an Infant, by His Father and Legal Guardian, Thomas Anonymous, et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF ROCHESTER et al., Appellants. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
The issue before this Court is whether the juvenile nighttime curfew adopted by the Rochester City Council violates the Federal and New York State Constitutions. We hold that it does.
In 2006, the Rochester City Council (City Council) adopted chapter 45 of the Code of the City of Rochester (City Code) which established a nighttime curfew for juveniles. Under the curfew:
"It is unlawful for minors to be in or upon any public place within the City at any time between 11:00 P.M. of one day and 5:00 A.M. of the immediately following day, except that on Friday and Saturday the hours shall be between 12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m. of the immediately following day" (Rochester City Code § 45-3).
Under section 45-6 of the City Code, "[a] police officer may approach a person who appears to be a minor in a public place during prohibited hours to request information, including the person's name and age and reason for being in the public place" and "may detain a minor or take a minor into custody based on a violation of [the curfew] if the police officer ... [r]easonably believes that the [curfew has been violated] and ... that none of the exceptions ... apply" (Rochester City Code § 45-6[A], [B][1], [2]). "A police officer who takes a minor into custody based on a violation of [the curfew] [must] take the minor to a location designated by the Chief of Police" (Rochester City Code § 45-6[C]).2 Additionally, the ordinance states that "a violation of [the curfew] shall constitute a `violation' as . . . defined in the ... Penal Law" (Rochester City Code § 45-5).
Plaintiffs, father and son, commenced the instant action challenging the validity of the curfew. They seek a declaration that the ordinance is unconstitutional and to enjoin defendants, the City of Rochester (City) and other city officials, from enforcing the ordinance on the grounds that the curfew violated Jiovon's federal and state constitutional rights to freedom of movement, freedom of expression and association, and equal protection under the law, and Thomas' due process rights under the Federal and State Constitutions to raise his children without undue interference from the government. In addition, plaintiffs assert that the ordinance conflicts with, among other statutes, section 305.2 of the Family Court Act and section 30.00 of the Penal Law. Supreme Court granted the City's motion to dismiss finding that the curfew (1) was not inconsistent with New York statutes, (2) did not violate the constitutional rights of the minor, (3) did not unreasonably interfere with the rights of the parent, and (4) was not facially defective.
Declaring the ordinance unconstitutional, the Appellate Division, with two Justices dissenting, reversed and enjoined its enforcement. The court determined that the curfew was inconsistent with Family Court Act § 305.2 and Penal Law § 30.00 because it authorized what was indistinguishable from a warrantless arrest of a minor under the age of 16 upon an alleged violation of the curfew and created criminal responsibility for a "violation" as defined in the Penal Law (56 A.D.3d at 144-145, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804). The court further determined that, as to minors between the ages of 16 and 17, the curfew violated the constitutional rights of both the parent and child. The court held that neither the crime statistics for the City3 nor the statements and opinions from political officials and the Chief of Police provided the requisite nexus to withstand even intermediate scrutiny; in other words, there was no demonstrated substantial relationship between the ordinance and its stated goals (id. at 147-149, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804). The court also determined that the curfew impermissibly interfered with parents' fundamental substantive due process right to direct and control the upbringing of their children (id. at 150, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804).
In arguing that the curfew should be upheld, the dissenting Justices concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard of review and that crime statistics from Dallas, Texas, a city with a similar curfew, provided the necessary substantial relationship because defendants "need not produce evidence to a scientific certainty" (id. at 153, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804 [Lunn, J., dissenting]). The dissent argued that the ordinance imposed no unconstitutional burden on a minor's First Amendment rights and that its interference with a parent's due process rights was minimal. Additionally, the dissent found no inconsistency between the ordinance and Family Court Act § 305.2 because the ordinance only authorized a "temporary detention" and not an arrest (id. at 156-157, 865 N.Y.S.2d 804 [Lunn, J., dissenting]). Defendants appealed to this Court as of right, and we now affirm on different grounds.
Plaintiffs challenge the curfew on multiple constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds. Because plaintiffs' nonconstitutional arguments do not wholly dispose of this appeal, we address only their constitutional arguments here (see generally Matter of Clara C. v. William L., 96 N.Y.2d 244, 250 [2001]; id. at 251, 727 N.Y.S.2d 20, 750 N.E.2d 1068 [Levine, J., concurring] ). Specifically, we focus primarily on the substantive due process rights of minors to enjoy freedom of movement and of parents to control the upbringing of their children.4
Curfew ordinances have long been enacted in cities around the country and numerous cases, both state and federal, have addressed similar constitutional issues implicated by these curfews (see e.g. State v. J.P., 907 So.2d 1101 [Fla. 2005]; Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 [Alaska 2004]; Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171 [2d Cir.2003]; City of Sumner v. Walsh, 148 Wash.2d 490, 61 P.3d 1111 [2003]; Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 [C.A.D.C. 1999]; Schleifer by Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 [4th Cir.1998]; Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 [9th Cir.1997]; Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 [5th Cir.1993]; Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065 [5th Cir.1981]). Recent decisions analyzing the constitutionality of curfews have differed as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply: some courts have favored intermediate scrutiny (see e.g. Hodgkins, 355 F.3d at 1057; Ramos, 353 F.3d at 181; Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 541; Schleifer, 159 F.3d at 847), while others have adopted strict scrutiny (see e.g. J.P., 907 So.2d at 1116; Treacy, 91 P.3d at 265-266; Nunez, 114 F.3d at 946; Qutb, 11 F.3d at 492). Regardless of the level of scrutiny ultimately applied, these cases highlight a number of important factors relevant to constitutional review of a curfew ordinance.
Initially, we note that a municipality has general police powers and, under the traditional powers of parens patriae, a strong interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children (see Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 539). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the City Council, pursuant to its broad police powers, has the authority...
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