Ansell v. Statewide Grievance Committee
Decision Date | 08 February 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 25255.,25255. |
Citation | 87 Conn.App. 376,865 A.2d 1215 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Denise ANSELL v. STATEWIDE GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE. |
Joseph D. Courtney, Vernon, the appellant (plaintiff).
Cathy A. Dowd, assistant bar counsel, for the appellee (defendant).
SCHALLER, DiPENTIMA and PETERS, Js.
The plaintiff, Denise Ansell, an attorney licensed to practice of law in Connecticut, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the reprimand issued to her by the defendant, the statewide grievance committee (committee). On appeal, Ansell claims that the court improperly concluded that (1) there was no legal significance to the fact that those judges presiding at the time of the ethics violations failed to reprimand her, (2) the evidence supported a reprimand under rule 3.4(5) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and (3) the evidence supported a reprimand under rule 8.4(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
This case has its origin in a contentious family case in which Ansell and the complainant, attorney Gary Traystman, represented opposing parties. During the proceedings before the trial court, Ansell's predecessor, attorney James K. Kelley, filed a motion to preclude the psychological evaluation by and testimony of Ronald D. Anderson, alleging that Traystman had improper ex parte communications with Anderson. In cross-examining Anderson at a hearing on the motion, Kelley elicited that Anderson had spoken with Traystman regarding scheduling matters only and that the substantive information allegedly provided by Traystman had in fact come directly from his clients. Ansell was thereafter retained in lieu of Kelley.
On August 15, 2001, before Hon. Robert I. Berdon, judge trial referee, Ansell raised the issue of ex parte communication between Anderson and Traystman, stating: When asked by the court what kind of information the ex parte communication had involved, Ansell was initially unable to answer. When pressed again by Traystman and the court as to the nature of the ex parte communication, Ansell stated:
On August 20, 2001, the parties appeared before Judge McLachlan for a hearing on whether Anderson's evaluation should be updated. During that hearing, Ansell again raised the issue of ex parte communications, stating: "[P]art of the appealable issues, which are preserved per Justice — per the — well, per Justice Berdon's most recent letter to [the chief clerk of the appellate courts] is that ... Anderson was subject to ex parte communication with both the guardian ad litem ... and attorney Traystman, rendering a problem." Later, the following colloquy took place between Ansell and the court:
At the close of the hearing Judge McLachlan ordered that Anderson update the psychological evaluation.
On August 24, 2001, Traystman sent a facsimile to Ansell expressing surprise that she had represented to Judge Berdon and Judge McLachlan that he had had ex parte communications with Anderson. He requested a copy of the transcript that confirmed the communication and warned her that he would be filing a grievance against her should the transcript not confirm her claim. Ansell replied by facsimile the same day, stating that she did not believe Traystman's surprise and attaching a copy of the motion to preclude originally filed by Kelley. Traystman filed a grievance with the committee on September 10, 2001.
On September 14, 2001, the parties again appeared before Judge McLachlan, and Ansell once again raised the issue of ex parte communications, stating that she had the supporting transcript excerpts. The following exchange ensued:
Ansell proceeded to read from the transcript of the hearing where Kelley cross-examined Anderson, who testified that the only communication between him and Traystman concerned scheduling.
The court again asked Ansell what information Traystman improperly gave Anderson. Following Ansell's response, the court stated: Ansell replied that her predecessor and client had initially claimed that background reports had been supplied, but that it had later been determined that those reports were given to Anderson directly by Traystman's clients. Thereupon, Traystman directed the court's attention to the fact that Ansell had indicated to Judge Berdon and to Judge McLachlan that her information on the ex parte communication came from the transcripts. The court replied, "And I've asked her that three times, and she has not — the only thing she has told me [was that] there was some dispute about information."
On November 5, 2001, the New London judicial district grievance panel found probable cause to believe that Ansell violated rules 3.1, 3.3(a)(1) and (4), 3.4(5) and 8.4(1) and (3). The reviewing committee conducted a hearing on January 10, 2002, at which Ansell, with counsel, and Traystman were present, and testimony was heard from Kelley, Ansell and Ansell's client in the family case. The reviewing committee issued its decision May 9, 2003, finding by clear and convincing evidence that Ansell had violated rules 3.3(a) (1), 3.4(5) and 8.4(3) and issued a reprimand accordingly. On June 2, 2003, Ansell filed a request for review, which was considered by the committee on June 19, 2003. The committee concluded that the reviewing committee correctly determined that Ansell had violated rules 3.4(5) and 8.4(3), but erred in finding she had violated rule 3.3(a)(1) and, accordingly, dismissed the finding as to that rule.
Ansell appealed from the committee's determination to the Superior Court. By memorandum of decision dated March 1, 2003, the court determined that it could not "find that the imposition of the reprimand was not supported by substantial evidence or involved a clearly erroneous application of law" and dismissed the appeal. This appeal followed.
"[I]n reviewing a decision of the `statewide grievance committee to issue a reprimand, neither the trial court nor this court takes on the function of a fact finder. Rather, our role is limited to reviewing the record to determine if the facts as found are supported by the evidence contained within the record and whether the conclusions that follow are legally and logically correct.... Additionally, in a grievance proceeding, the standard of proof applicable in determining whether an attorney has violated the [Rules] of Professional [Conduct] is clear and convincing evidence.... The burden is on the statewide grievance committee to establish the occurrence of an ethics violation by clear and convincing proof....
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...and adopt it here." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) See also Ansell v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 87 Conn. App. 376, 388, 865 A.2d 1215 (2005) ("[f]urthermore, we have held that rule 8.4(4) does not contain such a requirement [of intent]"). The foc......
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...rules 3.1, 8.2 (a), and 8.4 (4) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court relied on Ansell v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 87 Conn. App. 376, 384, 865 A.2d 1215 (2005), in rejecting the defendant's defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata, which were based on the argum......
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TABLE OF CASES
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CHAPTER 4 - 4-3 RULE 8.4: THE "CATCHALL"
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CHAPTER 1 - 1-8 CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
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