Anspach v. City of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 29 October 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 08-CV-2600.
• Citation: 630 F.Supp.2d 488
• Parties: Melissa L. ANSPACH, Kurt A. Anspach, and Karen E. Anspach v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Dept. of Public Health, et. al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

630 F.Supp.2d 488

Melissa L. ANSPACH, Kurt A. Anspach, and Karen E. Anspach v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Dept. of Public Health, et. al.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-2600.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

October 29, 2008.

Joseph P. Stanton, Jenkintown, PA, for Melissa L. Anspach, Kurt A. Anspach, and Karen E. Anspach.

Jeffrey S. Simons, City of Philadelphia Law Department, Ann Marie H. Tammara, Charles A. Fitzpatrick, III, Edward C. Mintzer, Jr., Rawle & Henderson LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for City of Philadelphia, Dept. of Public Health, et. al.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOYNER, District Judge.

This civil action has been brought before the Court on Motion of the Defendant, Dr. Jitendra Shah, to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for a More Definite Statement Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e), and to Strike Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) (Docket No. 7). For the reasons outlined below, the Motion shall be granted in part and this case again remanded to state court.

History of the Case

This case, which is another incarnation of a matter which was previously before us as Civil Action No. 05-810, arose out of a visit by Plaintiff Melissa Anspach to the City of Philadelphia's Public Health Center No. 10 on January 26, 2004. Some three days before her visit to the clinic Melissa, who was then sixteen years old, had unprotected sexual intercourse and went to the Health Center to request a pregnancy test. Apparently, the center only administered pregnancy tests on family planning days and the date on which Melissa appeared at the center was not such a day. Although she left the center after learning this, Melissa returned a short time later at the urging of a friend and asked instead for the "morning after," emergency contraceptive pill.¹ Presumably because of her age, the receptionist directed her to the pediatric section of the clinic where she first was interviewed by Defendant Maria Fedorova, a social worker, and later seen by Defendant Mary Gilmore, a registered nurse. After allegedly signing a consent form and having her blood pressure and temperature checked, Melissa was given the pills with instructions to take 4 immediately and 4 more in twelve hours. At approximately 5:00 a.m. the following morning, shortly after taking the second dosage of 4 pills, Melissa began suffering severe stomach pains and became violently ill, her face became swollen and red and she suffered from subconjunctive hemorrhaging in the eyes caused by the violent vomiting.

By their complaint against the various defendants, Plaintiffs allege that despite knowing that "a 16 year old child can not fully comprehend the pros and cons of taking prescription only medication without the help of a parent or a medical doctor and that a unemancipated immature minor does not have the legal capacity to sign such forms," Ms. Fedorova told Melissa that she could have the pills but only if she first signed a consent form. (Pl's Am. Compl., ¶ 30). It is alleged that Nurse Gilmore gave Melissa the pills, but that she did so only after receiving instructions from Ms. Fedorova on how they should be taken and after advising the pediatrician on duty that day, Defendant Dr. Jitendra Shah, that there was a sixteen-year-old patient who had not been examined or tested for pregnancy to whom she was about to give the morning after pills. Dr. Shah allegedly responded "Mary, whatever you want to do." (Pl's Am. Compl., ¶¶ 36-37). When Melissa inquired into the availability of medication to prevent nausea or vomiting as was referenced in the consent form, Plaintiffs allege that Nurse Gilmore again consulted with Dr. Shah and that she returned to Melissa and told her that no such medication was available and that she should just drink tea and ginger ale.

As in their complaint in the previous lawsuit (which was also first filed in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas and subsequently removed to this Court), the Anspachs again invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants' actions violated their federal constitutional rights to familial privacy, to their parental constitutional right to be free from unnecessary or unwarranted governmental intrusions into the raising of their children, to Melissa's constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity, and that, by giving Melissa a purportedly "harmful medication," Defendants were in violation of Title X of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300, et. seq. (governing projects and grants to state and local agencies for family planning services). In Counts III and IV, Plaintiffs make these same claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Additionally, the Anspachs assert common law claims against the various defendants for assault and battery, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, breach of contract and for violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 73 P.S. § 201-1, et. seq.

Defendants move to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). First, as to Counts I-IV alleging causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Pennsylvania Constitution, Defendants submit that these claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit previously considered and addressed them in the earlier action and because the plaintiffs have failed to assert a private cause of action under Title X. Defendants move for dismissal of the complaint's remaining counts on the grounds that they fail to state viable claims on which relief may be granted and, as to the plaintiffs' claims under the theories of Title X, coerced consent and false information about medication, as barred by the Statute of Limitations. Alternatively, Defendants assert that these remaining claims cannot stand due to Defendants' immunity from suit or that they should be stricken due to insufficient specificity.

Standard of Review

In response to a pleading, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a Defendant may assert by motion that the Plaintiff's complaint "[fails] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008) (citations omitted). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a civil plaintiff must allege facts that `raise a right to relief above the speculative level ....'" Id. at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must provide "enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s]" of a particular cause of action. Id. at 234. In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court may consider documents "integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Rockefeller Sec. Lit., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir.1999).

Generally speaking, motions for a more specific pleading pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) should be granted only when "a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that the opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice to himself." Jeremy M. v. Central Bucks School District, Civ. A. No. 99-4954, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1863 at *6, 2001 WL 177185 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 31, 2001), citing 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice P. 12.18[1] at 12-161 (1995) and Hicks v. Arthur, 843 F.Supp. 949, 959 (E.D.Pa.1994). "The basis for granting such a motion is unintelligibility, not lack of detail. As long as the defendant is able to respond, even if only with a simple denial, in good faith, without prejudice, the complaint is deemed sufficient for purposes of Rule 12(e)." Id.

Thus, because Rule 8 requires only that a complaint include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," the test for the sufficiency of a complaint requires the plaintiff to set forth a set of facts that serves to put the defendant on notice as to the nature and basis for the claim. See, Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F.Supp.2d 358, 367 (E.D.Pa.2002).

Discussion

A. Issue Preclusion/Collateral Estoppel.

As noted, the defendants first seek dismissal of Counts I-IV of the plaintiffs' complaint because these claims were previously fully litigated in the earlier action, docketed in this Court at No. 05-810.

Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or a different claim. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748-749, 121 S.Ct. 1808, 1814, 149 L.Ed.2d 968 (2001). Although its decisions have employed slight variations, the Third Circuit has consistently applied the following four standard requirements for the application of collateral estoppel embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27: "(1) the identical issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating the issue was fully represented in the prior action." Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir.2006), quoting Henglein v. Colt Industries Operating Corporation, 260 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.2001). The Third Circuit has additionally considered whether the party being precluded "had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in the prior...