Antcliff v. State Employees Credit Union

Decision Date07 December 1982
Docket NumberNo. 2,Docket No. 64670,2
Citation327 N.W.2d 814,414 Mich. 624
PartiesHoward ANTCLIFF and Geraldine Antcliff, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE EMPLOYEES CREDIT UNION, Defendant, and Spider Staging Sales Company, Inc., a Washington corporation, doing business in Michigan, Defendant-Appellee, and MANSON, JACKSON & KANE, Defendants, and Christman Construction Company, Inc., Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. AUSTIN'S PAINTERS, FLINT, INC., (Associated Indemnity Corporation), Third-Party Defendant. Calendar414 Mich. 624, 327 N.W.2d 814
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Church, Wyble, Kritselis, Anderson & Robinson, P.C., Lansing by Thomas H. Hay, and William N. Kritselis, Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Joselyn, Rowe, Jamieson, Grinnan, Callahan & Hayes, P.C., Detroit by William A. Joselyn, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

FITZGERALD, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs appeal trial court rulings which precluded the advancement of a theory that defendant Spider Staging Sales Company, Inc., breached its duty to instruct on or give directions for the safe rigging of a powered scaffold which it manufactures and sells. The Court of Appeals concluded that a manufacturer does not have a duty to provide instructions for the safe use of its product apart from its duty to warn. We hold only that on the facts of this case this defendant was under no duty to instruct on or give directions for the safe rigging of its product.

I

This products liability action is an outgrowth of a construction accident which occurred on July 7, 1970, at the site of the State Employees Credit Union building in Lansing. Plaintiff Howard Antcliff was seriously and permanently injured when the support system of a powered scaffold on which he was standing gave way unexpectedly and fell to the ground. Antcliff's safety line apparently failed, and he fell with the scaffold. Antcliff and a co-worker personally designed the support system and rigged the scaffold. The scaffold was manufactured and sold by Spider to Antcliff's employer, Austin's Painters, Flint, Inc.

In a complaint filed on July 5, 1973, and a first amended complaint filed on April 11, 1977, Geraldine Antcliff, for herself and as the legal guardian of Howard Antcliff, her husband, brought an action for damages against the credit union, owner of the building, the general contractor of the construction project, the architect of the building, and Spider. Prior to trial, plaintiffs settled with the general contractor for $900,000 and released the general contractor, the credit union, and the architect. 1

At trial, plaintiffs were precluded from offering any evidence and from making any argument in support of a theory that Spider was negligent in failing to instruct on or give directions for the safe rigging of the powered scaffolds which it manufactures and sells. The trial court also refused to charge the jury that Spider had a duty to give instructions. In addition, the court stated:

"I instruct you that the defendant Spider Staging has no duty to provide instructions or to educate the users of its product in how to rig, assemble or suspend the Spider Staging units and platform. Therefore, you are not to concern yourself with any claim that Spider Staging had such a duty in this instance. This is not an issue in the case. Spider Staging did not have such duty and you are not to concern yourself with it."

Plaintiff's other theories of liability were presented to the jury. 2 The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action.

Plaintiffs claimed error in the Court of Appeals, because of, inter alia, the adverse trial court rulings and related omissions from the requested jury charge. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding, in part, that Michigan law does not impose a duty on a manufacturer to provide instructions for the safe use of its product in addition to any duty to warn. 95 Mich.App. 224, 235, 290 N.W.2d 420 (1980).

We denied leave to appeal by order dated September 4, 1980; Ryan, J., would have granted leave. Upon reconsideration, we granted leave to appeal. 409 Mich. 903 (1981).

II

Plaintiffs argue here, as in the Court of Appeals, that Michigan has long recognized a duty on the part of a manufacturer to instruct on or give directions for the safe use of its product. Moreover, it is argued, such a duty exists separate and apart from any duty to warn about dangers associated with intended use or foreseeable misuse. In the instant case, plaintiffs contend that since a powered scaffold's only intended use occurs when the scaffold is suspended, Spider, as manufacturer, was negligent in failing to provide instructions for the safe rigging of its scaffold. 3

The Court of Appeals disagreed with plaintiffs' argument by distinguishing the cases cited in support of it. The Court noted that the decisions in Hill v. Husky Briquetting, Inc., 54 Mich.App. 17, 220 N.W.2d 137 (1974) (carbon monoxide suffocation), and in Gutowski v. M & R Plastics & Coating, Inc., 60 Mich.App. 499, 231 N.W.2d 456 (1975) (inhalation of a dangerous chemical), were ultimately grounded on the manufacturer's negligence in failing to warn, or failing to adequately warn, of the dangerous properties of its product.

Although we agree with the Court's characterization of these cases, we take pains to write in this case because we perceive no magic in the characterization. There is no bright line between instructions for safe use and warnings, and we decline to fashion one. Products may be accompanied by instructions or warnings or both or neither. Warnings, standing alone, may have no practical relevance without instructions. Instructions may well fade into warnings. A manufacturer's liability to a purchaser or a user of its product should be assessed with reference to whether its conduct, including the dissemination of information about the product, was reasonable under the circumstances. Liability may not be avoided or imposed by skillful manipulation of labels such as instructions or warnings. 4

III

"A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Prosser, Torts (4th ed), Sec. 53, p. 324. The terse legal conclusion that a duty is owed by one to another represents a judgment, as a matter of policy, that the latter's interests are entitled to legal protection against the former's conduct.

Prosser's "particular standard of conduct" is classically described as the conduct of a reasonably prudent person in light of the apparent risk. In Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977) (Fitzgerald and Coleman, JJ., dissenting), we quoted with approval from 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, Sec. 283, p. 12: " '[T]he standard of conduct to which [the actor] must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.' " 400 Mich. 443, 254 N.W.2d 759. This is the so-called standard of care against which a defendant's conduct is compared. Thus, the standard of care is "[w]hat the defendant must do, or must not do * * * to satisfy the duty". Prosser, supra, p. 324. 5

In a negligence action, the standard of care is reasonable or due care. Moning v. Alfono, supra. Thus, the standard of care required is always the care which a person of reasonable prudence would exercise under the circumstances as they existed. Even though the standard itself never varies, the amount of care and the type of conduct required may vary with the circumstances. Triestram v. Way, 286 Mich. 13, 281 N.W. 420 (1938) (North, J., and Wiest, C.J., dissenting) (sudden emergency). DePree v. Nutone, Inc., 422 F.2d 534 (CA 6, 1970) (warnings and instructions for use provided by vertical meat grinder manufacturer negligently misleading to mechanically unsophisticated homemaker). 6

In our view, the relationship between plaintiff Howard Antcliff's employer, Austin's Painters, Flint, Inc., and Spider is crucial to an understanding of both the circumstances which actually existed and our resolution of this case.

Austin's Painters has been in business, primarily as a partnership, since 1888. It is a well-known subcontractor in the construction trade in Michigan. It has been engaged as a subcontractor in major construction projects involving both indoor and exterior work, painting as well as sandblasting. In short, Austin's Painters is a professional in the construction trade and necessarily highly experienced in the use and rigging of scaffolding equipment.

In addition, there was testimony at trial by Paul Austin that scaffolding rigging techniques were customarily learned on the job, knowledge passing from the more experienced worker to the less experienced worker, that scaffold workers did their own rigging, and that choice of suspension technique was largely a matter of personal preference. Both Paul and Lee Austin and a former Austin's Painters employee, Robert H. Smith, testified that Austin's Painters hired experienced workers. Mr. Smith knew of plaintiff Howard Antcliff's prior experience before plaintiff was hired by Austin's Painters. And plaintiff was, in fact, a journeyman painter. 7

Spider is a Washington corporation owned by two brothers. It manufactures and sells powered scaffolds and accessories for use with the scaffolds. Its catalogue contains pictures and specifications of this equipment and illustrations of various structures from which its scaffolds may be suspended. The structures depicted include, among others, a building, structural steel, a bridge, a water tower and a smokestack.

The powered scaffold on which Howard Antcliff was working at the time of the accident was one of two such scaffolds purchased from Spider by Austin's Painters. In 1966, Austin's Painters purchased its first Spider powered scaffold to aid in the painting of the ceiling of Whiting Auditorium in Flint. This scaffold was delivered with a 23-page service and parts manual.

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