Anthis v. Windom
| Decision Date | 26 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | AC 42183 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Kristine S. ANTHIS v. Robert D. WINDOM |
Jack G. Steigelfest, Hartford, for the appellant (defendant).
Lawrence C. Sgrignari, Hamden, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Bright, Moll and Bear, Js.
The defendant, Robert D. Windom, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying various motions that he filed in the present action commenced by the plaintiff, Kristine S. Anthis, in favor of whom the court rendered judgment following a jury trial. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his (1) motion in limine, (2) motion for remittitur, and (3) motion to open, which, the defendant contends, effectively resulted in a double recovery by the plaintiff and a double payment by the defendant with respect to property damage expenses incurred by the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, which are undisputed, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On January 12, 2017, the plaintiff commenced the present action, sounding in negligence and recklessness, against the defendant, arising out of a July 12, 2015 incident during which the defendant, while attempting to back his motor vehicle toward the garage of his residence, lost control of his vehicle, which struck the front of the plaintiff's neighboring home.1 On March 23, 2017, the defendant filed an answer, in which he did not assert any special defenses.
On April 10, 2018, the plaintiff filed a trial management report, stating in relevant part that "[t]he plaintiff expects to file a motion in limine seeking to preclude the defendant from referencing and/or introducing evidence of any documentation which relates to [the] plaintiff's recovery of damages from her [homeowners] insurer." The plaintiff did not file any such motion thereafter.
The matter was tried to the jury in August, 2018. On August 21, 2018, prior to the start of evidence, the defendant filed a motion in limine, dated August 20, 2018, seeking an order "prohibiting the plaintiff from offering into evidence the cost of [her] home repairs," which the defendant contended were paid for by the plaintiff's homeowners insurer, or, in the alternative, permission to "cross-examine the plaintiff on the fact that her home repair expenses were paid for by her own [homeowners] insurance company." The same day, following argument, the trial court denied the motion in limine. At trial, evidence was admitted into the record reflecting that, in the aftermath of the July, 2015 incident, the plaintiff and her spouse had paid, among other things, $36,750 in home repair expenses and incurred $14,264.23 in temporary housing costs.2
On August 22, 2018, the jury returned its verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $55,738.54 in compensatory damages, consisting solely of economic damages,3 as to all counts. The jury also awarded the plaintiff punitive damages, the amount of which was later determined by the court, on the basis of the jury's finding that she had proven common-law recklessness.
On August 27, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for collateral source reduction and a motion for remittitur. In both motions, the defendant asserted that, in order to prevent a double recovery by the plaintiff, the court had to reduce the jury's verdict to account for insurance payments received by the plaintiff from her homeowners insurer. On August 30, 2018, the plaintiff filed objections to both motions. On September 17, 2018, the court held a hearing on those postverdict motions. The same day, the court denied the motion for collateral source reduction and sustained the plaintiff's objection thereto. On September 18, 2018, the court denied the motion for remittitur and sustained the plaintiff's objection thereto. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict in the amount of $75,723.05, consisting of $55,738.54 in compensatory damages, $19,205.25 in punitive damages, and $779.26 in taxed costs. On October 9, 2018, the defendant filed this appeal.
On November 7, 2018, the defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court open the judgment and reconsider its decision declining to reduce the jury's verdict. On November 15, 2018, the plaintiff filed an objection thereto. On December 21, 2018, after hearing argument on December 10, 2018, the court denied the motion to open. The defendant then amended this appeal to encompass that decision. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion in limine. We disagree.
We begin by setting forth the standard of review governing this claim. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McBurney v. Paquin , 302 Conn. 359, 377–78, 28 A.3d 272 (2011).
In his motion in limine, the defendant moved to preclude the plaintiff from offering evidence regarding her home repair costs, which he asserted had been paid for by her homeowners insurer. The defendant contended that "[t]he plaintiff should not be able to double dip, and unfairly suggest to the jury that all [of] her extensive repair costs were never paid," because, according to the defendant, this would create a risk that the jury might improperly inflate any noneconomic damages that it chose to award or be swayed to award punitive damages.
During argument on the motion in limine, the defendant's trial counsel asserted that it was inequitable for the plaintiff to "double dip" by seeking economic damages that included property damage costs paid for by her homeowners insurer. The defendant's trial counsel further argued that the plaintiff intended to offer into evidence personal checks reflecting payments made by her for the home repairs, which would falsely suggest to the jury that she had paid for them with her own funds without the contribution of insurance proceeds. In response, the plaintiff's counsel argued that the motion in limine was procedurally improper because (1) the defendant had failed to file a trial management report indicating that he intended to file any such motion, and (2) the defendant's trial counsel had represented in chambers that he would not be "inquiring on issues of insurance." The plaintiff's counsel further argued that the plaintiff would be prejudiced if evidence regarding her property damage expenses was precluded or, alternatively, the defendant was permitted to cross-examine her on the insurance payments remitted to her by her insurer. Additionally, the plaintiff's counsel argued that the plaintiff had not been made whole by the insurance payments and that her insurer was a collateral source, such that the insurance proceeds that it had remitted to her could not be deducted from the jury's economic damages award. Thereafter, the court asked the plaintiff's counsel whether it was his position "that to the extent the defendant is entitled to any sort of reduction for amounts received by [the plaintiff] that that reduction would be addressed appropriately in some sort of posttrial proceeding." The plaintiff's counsel responded that the defendant "would have, obviously, the opportunity to file posttrial motions and the court would then have to entertain those issues." The court thereafter denied the defendant's motion in limine.
On appeal, the defendant asserts that the court abused its discretion in declining to preclude evidence regarding the plaintiff's home repair costs because her homeowners insurer had paid those expenses and, thus, admitting evidence of those costs enabled the plaintiff to seek a double recovery for the same expenses in the form of economic damages.4 At the time of the court's denial of the motion in limine, however, although there was no dispute that the plaintiff's insurer had paid the plaintiff on an insurance claim submitted by her in relation to the July, 2015 incident, the total amount of the plaintiff's home repair expenses and the total amount and nature of the insurance proceeds received by the plaintiff were unknown. Indeed, during argument, the court observed that "the fact is that there may actually be a discrepancy between the amount [the plaintiff] paid out for [the] repairs and ... the amount [the plaintiff] was reimbursed by [her] insurer." The court later addressed the defendant's double recovery claim in adjudicating his motion for remittitur, with respect to which the parties created an evidentiary record. Under these circumstances, we find no error in the court's denial of the defendant's motion in limine.5
We next turn to the defendant's intertwined claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion for remittitur and his motion to open.6 These claims are unavailing.
We begin by setting forth the relevant standards...
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