Anthony Baker v. Child Support Div. & Dall. Cnty. Tex.

• Decision Date: 18 September 2018
• Docket Number: No. 3:18-cv-341-C-BN,3:18-cv-341-C-BN
• Parties: ANTHONY OF THE FAMILY BAKER, Plaintiff, v. CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION and DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

ANTHONY OF THE FAMILY BAKER, Plaintiff, v. CHILD SUPPORT DIVISION and DALLAS COUNTY TEXAS, Defendants.

No. 3:18-cv-341-C-BN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

September 18, 2018

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This civil rights action filed by a pro se plaintiff who paid the $400.00 statutory filing fee to initiate it has been referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference from Senior United States District Judge Sam R. Cummings. Defendant Dallas County moves to dismiss this action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff Anthony of the Family Baker ("Baker") filed a response in opposition. See Dkt. Nos. 19 & 20. And Dallas County filed a reply brief. See Dk. No. 21. The undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, because Baker has failed to allege a plausible claim against either defendant he identifies, the Court should grant Dallas County's motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismiss this action without prejudice to Baker's filing, if possible, and within a reasonable period of time to be set by the Court, an amended complaint that overcomes the deficiencies identified.

Applicable Background

Baker brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against "42 U.S.C. § 654(3) Child Support Division" ("CSD") and Dallas County, Texas, alleging that these defendants violated his constitutional rights and deprived him of property. See generally Dkt. No. 3; see, e.g., id. at 1 ("Property and income which Baker honestly acquires, he retains full control of, he did not use it to his neighbor's injury, he did not devote it to the CSD's or Dallas County's use, and he did not grant them the right to control that use so that whenever their needs require, they may take it upon payment of due compensation." (citation and emphases omitted)); id. at 9 (requesting as relief, that the Court "set right this undesirable and unfair situation, Baker's inherent and indefeasible rights privileges and immunities are restored, the current CSD IV-D Collections Case# DF16-14397 shall be terminated effective immediately, and he shall care for his seed in private, and no longer required to pay the CSD, and to be let alone from their intrusion into his private and professional life" and that he be given "a full refund of all monies collected, accompanied with the CSD's 66% federal profits therefrom, as well as penalties and interest"); see also Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 402-07 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that an individual may not enforce, under Section 1983, the various provisions of Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-669b - "We agree with the Sixth Circuit in Clark[ v. Portage County, Ohio, 281 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2002),] that 'the simple lack of effectiveness by a state in enforcing support obligations does not alone give rise to an individual right.' Id. at 605. Cuvillier may in some sense be a beneficiary of the Title IV-D provisions that she cites, but Congressdid not intend by those provisions to give her an individual right enforceable through a section 1983 suit. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), instructs this result." (footnotes omitted)).

In sum, Baker seeks to use this civil rights action to change - or escape from - the child-support obligations imposed on him by a state court and to obtain damages based on those previously imposed obligations.

Legal Standards

I. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims." Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). As such, the Court must dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Court will not assume it has jurisdiction. Rather, "the basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference." Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)).

"The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist" in any case originally filed in federal court.Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations omitted). And where, like here, a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the attack is presumptively "facial," and the Court need look only to the sufficiency of the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, or on the complaint as supplemented by undisputed facts, all of which are presumed to be true. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. May 1981).

A "factual" attack on jurisdiction, however, is based on affidavits, testimony, and other evidentiary material. See id. Under such an attack, the Court "is empowered to consider matters of fact which may be in dispute," Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161, and, to oppose the Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction," Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523; see also Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 412-13 (5th Cir. May 1981) ("Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court's jurisdiction - its very power to hear the case - there is substantial authority that the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims." (quoting Mortensen v. First. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977))).

"When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing anyattack on the merits." Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. "This requirement prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice. The court's dismissal of a plaintiff's case because the plaintiff lacks subject matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction." Id. (citations omitted).

II. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must "accept all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "A claim for relief is implausible on its face when 'the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels andconclusions, and, while a court must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true, it is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id. But, "to survive a motion to dismiss" under Twombly and Iqbal, the plaintiff need only "plead facts sufficient to show" that the claims asserted have "substantive plausibility" by stating "simply, concisely, and directly events" that the plaintiff contends entitle him or her to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 346, 347 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); accord N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) ("To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it must provide the plaintiff's grounds for entitlement to relief - including factual allegations that, when assumed to be true, raise a right to relief above the speculative level." (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)).

The United States Supreme Court "has made clear that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion turns on the sufficiency of the 'factual allegations' in the complaint." Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App'x 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 347), and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "do...