Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-1176-CIV-17C.,94-1176-CIV-17C.
• Citation: 941 F.Supp. 1567
• Parties: ANTHONY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., and Anthony Distributing Company, Inc., Plaintiff-counterdefendants, v. MILLER BREWING COMPANY, Defendant-counterclaimant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

941 F.Supp. 1567

ANTHONY DISTRIBUTORS, INC., and Anthony Distributing Company, Inc., Plaintiff-counterdefendants, v. MILLER BREWING COMPANY, Defendant-counterclaimant.

No. 94-1176-CIV-17C.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

October 2, 1996.

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Claude Hines Tison, Jr., Harold D. Oehler, Macfarlane, Ausley, Ferguson & McMullen, Tampa, FL, for Anthony Distributors, Inc. and Anthony Distributing Co., Inc.

A. Broaddus Livingston, Sylvia H. Walbolt, Matthew D. Allen, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., Tampa FL, Dwight J. Davis, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, Jill H. Bowman, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, Michael W. Youtt, L. Joseph Loveland, Donald L. Harvey, King & Spalding, Houston, TX, for Miller Brewing Co.

Ronald Keith Cacciatore, Ronald K. Cacciatore, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Doug Wood and Terry Burkardt.

William F. Jung, Black & Jung, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Thomas Blair, Mark Anderson, Thomas Rueckl, Rex Johnson, Donald Luchka and James Dunbar.

David Barnett Weinstein, Williams, Reed, Weinstein, Schifino & Mangione, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Kenneth Amato.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION, AND PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY ORDERS

KOVACHEVICH, Chief Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on three (3) motions and two (2) objections, their respective responses, and related documents (not all related documents are listed):

1. Defendant MILLER BREWING COMPANY's (hereinafter Miller) Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 190), Memorandum in Support (Docket No. 214), and Plaintiffs ANTHONY DISTRIBUTORS, INC.'s, and ANTHONY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC.'s (hereinafter and collectively Anthony) Response (Docket No. 238);

2. Anthony's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 200), Memorandum in Support (Docket No. 201), and Miller's Response (Docket No. 226);

3. Anthony's Motion for Clarification of June 19, 1996, Scheduling Order and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Docket No. 190), and Miller's Response (Docket No. 220);

4. Anthony's Objections to Magistrate Judge Jenkins' Discovery Orders Entered August 12, 1996 (Docket No. 221), and Miller's Response (Docket No. 240); and

5. Anthony's Objections to Magistrate Judge Jenkins' Discovery Orders Entered August 7, 1996 (Docket No. 218).

FACTS

To provide a factual background for this case, the Court reincorporates one of its prior Orders by specific reference. Anthony Distributors, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 882 F.Supp. 1024 (M.D.Fla.1995). The relevant facts are as follows:

On July 26, 1994, [Anthony] filed a ... complaint against [Miller] alleging ... breach of contract, and tort claims arising out of [Anthony's] status as exclusive directors of [Miller's] products in Pinellas and Hillsborough Counties [of Florida]....

Ill will between the parties began in 1991, when market fluctuations caused consumers in [Anthony's] distribution areas to become more price conscious. [Anthony's] historically satisfactory profit margin was affected as local consumers shifted to below-premium and budget beers. [Miller] did not reduce the retail price of these below-premium and budget beers to match competitors' prices, which resulted in a loss of [Anthony's] market share.

In 1992, [Miller] devised a plan to make it more competitive with its rival [Anheuser-Busch, Inc.] by increasing its distribution areas, which would result in having fewer distributors. [Miller] negotiated with [Anthony] in a failed attempt to buy back [Anthony's] distribution rights. [Miller] then implemented a [marketing] plan known as "Feet on the Street".... [Anthony] alleges that "Feet on the Street" was actually designed to interfere with [Anthony's] relationships with their customers, damage [Anthony's] reputation, and further impair [Anthony's] profit margin. To facilitate the claimed adversarial goal of "Feet on the Street," [Miller] allegedly committed criminal acts. [Anthony] claims that [Miller's] conduct ... was tortious, criminal, and a breach of contract.

Id. at 1028-29 (as altered).

MILLER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A complete discussion of the summary judgment standard can be found in Ali v. City of Clearwater, 915 F.Supp. 1231, 1237-38 (M.D.Fla.1996), which the Court incorporates by specific reference herein.

Count II: Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship.

In this count, Anthony alleges that Miller intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with Anthony's business relationships with their customers. As the Court previously concluded, this allegation validly states a tort claim. 882 F.Supp. at 1030-31. Presently, at the summary judgment stage, the issue is whether Anthony has advanced sufficient record evidence of every element of this tort. The Court concludes that Anthony has not, as discussed below.

As recently stated by the Supreme Court of Florida, "[t]he elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are: (1) the existence of a business relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant; (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship by the defendant; and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the breach of the relationship." Ethan Allen, Inc., v. Georgetown Manor, Inc., 647 So.2d 812, 814 (Fla.1994) (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted). In the instant case, Miller primarily disputes elements three (3), interference, and four (4), damages.

To prove interference, Anthony must show that Miller's actions induced or caused a breach or termination of a business relationship or expectancy. Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). The interference must be both intentional and unjustified. Weight-Rite Golf Corp. v. United States Golf Association, 766 F.Supp. 1104, 1112 (M.D.Fla.1991), aff'd, 953 F.2d 651 (11th Cir.1992). Furthermore, damages to Anthony must "reasonably flow[]" from Miller' interference. Ethan Allen, 647 So.2d at 815.

As to interference, Anthony argues that their relationships need not be terminated to constitute interference. Anthony submits Exhibits K and OOO as record evidence of interference. (Docket No. 238, pp. 24-25). However, even if termination is required, Anthony argues that Exhibits NNN, G, and H support such a finding. (Docket No. 22-24).

Anthony's record evidence does not support their claim. First, based on a review of relevant case law, of which the parties provided little, this Court holds that either "breach" or "termination" of a business relationship or expectancy is necessary to establish "interference." Ocean State, 335 So.2d at 643; discussed supra; see also Ethan Allen, 647 So.2d at 814 (involving a furniture manufacturer that tortiously interfered with a dealer's relationship with its customers, in that the manufacturer's actions caused the dealer's customers "to cancel their orders and demand refunds"); Greenberg, M.D., v. Mount Sinai Medical Center, 629 So.2d 252, 254-55 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (involving a chief doctor alleged to have tortiously interfered with a subordinate doctors' patients, in that the chief influenced such patients to see him instead of subordinates); West v. Troelstrup, 367 So.2d 253, 254-55 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (involving an executive director alleged to have tortiously interfered with an employee's job, but affirming the claim's dismissal because the employee failed to allege that the executive director "influenced or induced anyone to terminate" the employee). To hold otherwise would unduly burden competition and free enterprise. See Heavener, Ogier Services, Inc. v. R.W. Florida Region, Inc., 418 So.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (describing, in the context of a claim for tortious interference, the delicate balance between: (1) safeguarding established and legitimate economic interests and (2) unduly burdening competition and free enterprise).

Neither Exhibits NNN (filed in camera), G, nor H contain sufficient record evidence of breach or termination. The charts, numbers, and opinions in Exhibit NNN fail to support Anthony's proposition that, after the "Feet on the Street" program disbanded, one of Anthony's customers demanded bribes from Anthony and terminated its relationship with Anthony based upon Anthony's refusal. (Docket No. 238, p. 23). Exhibit G, the deposition of Michael Lee Casselman, apparently an employee of Anthony's,¹ is full of inadmissible hearsay within hearsay, Fed. R.Evid. 805. That defect aside, the deponent clearly states that he does not know of "any customer ... lost as a result of the acts of the Feet on the Street personnel." (pp. 323-24). Finally, like the deponent in Exhibit G, the deponent in Exhibit H fails to assert any personal knowledge of a customer lost due to Miller's actions.

Even if breach or termination is not required to prove interference, Anthony still fails to present sufficient record evidence of interference. Exhibit K, the deposition of Gerald Suarez, another apparent employee of Anthony, fails to support a finding of interference. In fact, the deponent stated that he personally reduced the "ridiculous" amount of beer requested by Miller for displays "[u]sually every time...." (pp. 34, 37-38). Similarly, Exhibit OOO does not contain any evidence of interference. At best, it supports a finding that Miller did not approve of how Anthony handled their accounts. (E.g., p. 32). The Court notes...