Anthony v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 1965
• Docket Number: No. 41519,No. 2,41519,2
• Citation: Anthony v. State, 145 S.E.2d 657, 112 Ga.App. 444 (Ga. App. 1965)
• Parties: Hoke ANTHONY v. The STATE
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 657

145 S.E.2d 657

112 Ga.App. 444

Hoke ANTHONY v. The STATE.

No. 41519.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 2.

Sept. 20, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 11, 1965.

Guy Dunn, Oze R. Horton, Hapeville, for plaintiff in error.

Lewis R. Slaton, Sol. Gen., Carter Goode, J. Walter LeCraw, Jess H. Watson, William Hall, Jr., Atlanta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

PANNELL, Judge.

1. Section 2 of the Act approved February 19, 1951, repealing Code § 59-705 and substituting in lieu thereof a new section to be numbered § 59-705, in part, provides, 'In all criminal cases both the State and the defendant shall have the right to an individual examination of each juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge.' The denial by the judge of the right given by this statute is reversible error. Blount v. State, 214 Ga. 433, 105 S.E.2d 304; Ferguson v. State, 218 Ga. 173, 126 S.E.2d 798. However, where the accused is not denied the right by the trial judge, but only fails to exercise the right given and makes no objection when the individual jurors are put upon him for challenge, he cannot thereafter complain.

2. The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ferguson v. State of Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596, 81 S.Ct. 756, 770, 5 L.Ed.2d 783, holding that, 'in effectuating the provisions of § 38-415, Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, could not, in the context of § 38-416, deny appellant the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement', no longer has application in view of the changes made in Code § 38-415 permitting the defendant to be sworn and to testify in his own behalf, and the change made in Code § 38-416 eliminating the incompetency of a defendant to be a witness in his own behalf. Williams v. State, 220 Ga. 766, 141 S.E.2d 436. And in view of these changes, the ruling of the Supreme Court of this State 'following a long line of decisions beginning with Brown v. State, 58 Ga. 212(1), in Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231(7), 91 S.E.2d 764, that: 'The right to make a statement in his behalf is a personal right granted to the defendant by Code § 38-415, and extends no further than to permit him personally to make to the court and jury just such statement as he deems proper in his defense. His counsel has no right to ask him questions while he is making his statement. The trial judge, however, in his discretion, can permit his counsel to ask him questions or make suggestions to him relating to his statement, while he is making it or when he has concluded it,' is controlling in the application of amended Code § 38-415.' Williams v. State, 220 Ga. 766, 769, 141 S.E.2d 436, 438, supra. The ground of the motion for new trial complaining of the refusal of the trial judge to permit defendant's counsel to question him and refresh his recollection, is therefore without merit.

3. There being both direct and circumstantial evidence as to the defendant's guilt, it was not error to fail to charge, without request, 'the law as pertained to circumstantial evidence' (Ledford v. State, 215 Ga. 799, 806(10), 113 S.E.2d 628; Bobo v. State, 101 Ga.App. 48(2), 112 S.E.2d 679; Bailey v. State, 101 Ga.App. 81, 113 S.E.2d 172, even if we should concede that such an assignment of error presents any question for decision.

4. A charge to the jury that 'it is for the jury to determine whether the flight of the defendant, if such has been proven, was due to a sense of guilt or to another reason,' is not an intimation or expression of opinion by the court that flight has been proven, in violation of Code § 81-1104. Whether such a charge intimates or expresses an opinion that there is evidence of flight in the case is not a question presented for decision; and, if such question had been presented, it appears that there is evidence of flight in the case.

5. It was not error for the trial judge in instructing the jury to fail to define 'reasonable doubt' in the absence of a request therefor. Hammond v. State, 212 Ga. 186(8), 91 S.E.2d 615; Betsill v. State, 98 Ga.App. 695(6), 106 S.E.2d 323; Lingo v. State, 96 Ga.App. 379(1), 100 S.E.2d 116.

6. Where the State relies on direct and circumstantial evidence, the failure of the court to define 'direct evidence' and 'circumstantial evidence', in the absence of a request, is not error. Stanford v. State, ...