Antle v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 18 April 2000
• Citation: 15 S.W.3d 762
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) Richard and Lora Antle, Appellants, v. Gary Reynolds, Respondent. WD57271 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

15 S.W.3d 762 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

Richard and Lora Antle, Appellants, v. Gary Reynolds, Respondent.

WD57271

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

04/18/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Buchanan County, Hon. J. William Roberts

Counsel for Appellant: Blaine H. Elliott

Counsel for Respondent: John F. Burns

Opinion Summary: The Antles appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Reynolds on all their claims: claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, and in common law fraud. The parties had executed a sales agreement in which Reynolds provided the Antles with a "Guaranty of Title" and possession of the vehicle in exchange for the Antles' trade-in vehicle and the balance of the purchase price, but Reynolds never delivered the actual title to the vehicle. After having their claim for specific performance dismissed, the Antles brought this cause of action. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Reynolds based primarily on the belief that there can be no actual purchase of a vehicle in Missouri without the transfer of title, and therefore the Antles' Missouri Merchandising Practices Act was meritless.

Division holds: The proper interpretation of section 301.210, the statute which makes the sale of a vehicle without transfer of title "fraudulent and void", and the implementation of the public policy expressed therein is furthered by the allowance of claims under section 407.025, the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, and by the allowance of proper common law fraud claims against the dealer. This Court reverses the grant of summary judgment as to the common law action of fraudulent misrepresentation and as to the claim under section 407.025. As to the Truth in Lending Act claim, because this Court finds no authority justifying dismissal other than the erroneous notion that allowing the claim would defeat the public policy reflected in section 301.210, and because this Court is not persuaded such claims are barred by section 301.210, with or without a contemporaneous assignment of certificate of title, this Court reverses the summary judgment award as to all claims and remands the claims to the trial court for further proceedings.

James M. Smart, Jr., Judge

This case involves the recurring issue of what remedies are available to an individual purchasing a motor vehicle from a dealer without an assignment of certificate of title.

In early 1998, Richard and Lora Antle were shopping for a minivan to replace their 1997 Camaro as a family vehicle. In the process, they visited the used car lot owned by Gary Reynolds, doing business as Reynolds & Reynolds. The dealership showed the Antles a 1994 Dodge Caravan. After test driving the vehicle, the Antles negotiated for the purchase of the Caravan. The parties executed a retail installment contract and security agreement, which provided that the defendant dealership agreed to sell, and the Antles agreed to purchase, the Dodge Caravan, with the consideration to be the trade-in of the Antles' 1997 Camaro, subject to the existing loan and a payment of the sum of $13,050. The Antles contend that during these negotiations, the salesperson informed them that they would be required to buy an extended warranty in order to obtain financing for the Caravan. The dealership provided the Antles with a "Guaranty of Title." The Antles retained possession of the Caravan and paid the balance of the purchase price several days later by means of a bank draft.¹ The Antles delivered the Camaro to the dealership, and began making payments on the installment loan.

Some time thereafter, the Antles learned that the dealership had not paid off the loan balance on the Camaro. They also learned that the defendant had not paid for the extended warranty which the Antles understood they were purchasing. Despite their demands, the Antles also did not receive title to the Caravan.

Ultimately, plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of the contract. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, but instructed the Antles to return the Dodge Caravan to defendant, and instructed the defendant to return the Camaro to the Antles. Several weeks later, the defendant paid to plaintiffs the sum of $242.62 and paid the principal balance on the loan created by the Antles for the purchase of the Caravan.

The Antles claim that in spite of the actions taken to reverse the transaction, they remained out-of-pocket over $1500.00 in interest and finance charges. The Antles brought an action in the circuit court against Reynolds, pleading claims under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, sections 407.020 - .300, under the Federal Truth in Lending Act, and in common law fraud. Defendant Reynolds moved for summary judgment. After consideration of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant on all counts. The Antles appeal.

Standard of Review

On an appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court's review is "essentially de novo." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The issue of whether summary judgment was properly granted is an issue of law. Id. Because the trial court's judgment is based solely on the record submitted and the law, we do not defer to the trial court's judgment in our review. Id. We review the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. Id. We examine the record to determine whether there is a dispute as to any material fact, and, if not, whether the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dial v. Lathrop R-II School Dist., 871 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. banc 1994).

Analysis

The first count pleaded by the Antles was under the Merchandising Practice Act, sections 407.020 - .300. Section 407.020 describes the merchandising practices which are declared unlawful in violation of the Act. Included within the scope of the unlawful practices are the making of false statements and false promises and the use of "unfair" practices. Section 407.025.1 states as follows:

Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 407.020, may bring a private civil action in either the circuit court of the county in which the seller or lessor resides or in which the transaction complained of took place, to recover actual damages. The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may award to the prevailing party attorney's fees, based on the amount of time reasonably expended, and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant Reynolds on the claim under section 407.025 on the basis that section 301.210.4, RSMo 1994, bars the Antles from recovering damages under that section because the transaction in question did not constitute a valid or enforceable "purchase" under the law because no transfer of title occurred contemporaneous with the transaction. Section 301.210.4 states:

It shall be unlawful for any person to buy or sell in this state any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of this state, unless, at the time of the delivery thereof, there shall pass between the parties such certificates of ownership with an assignment thereof, as provided in this section, and the sale of any motor vehicle or trailer registered under the laws of this state, without the assignment of such certificate of ownership, shall be fraudulent and void.

The trial court, in denying the claim under the Merchandising Practice Act, found that the action was barred by the application of section 301.210.4, relying upon the case of Minton v. Hill, 944 S.W.2d 250 (Mo. App. 1997). The court also denied relief for similar reasons on the claim for common law fraud, citing Lebcowitz v. Simms, 300 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. App. 1957). Finding no authority directly on point as to the Truth in Lending Act claim, the court nevertheless believed the same principles required rejection of that claim as well. The appellants contend that the trial court erred in its rulings.

The appellants in this case claim that the trial court erred, and they challenge the precedent established by this court in Minton. Minton dealt in part with an issue presented in Point I here: whether section 301.210.4 forbids a private action for damages under the Missouri Merchandising Practice Act as to a vehicle transfer when there has been no transfer of title between the parties.

In Minton, the buyer had agreed to purchase a car from a used car dealer, Hill. The buyer paid most, but not all, of the purchase price and took possession of the vehicle. Minton, 944 S.W.2d at 252. The dealer retained the certificate of title. After the parties were unable to resolve a dispute about certain mechanical problems with the car, the dealer repossessed the car. Id. The buyer brought an action for conversion, but also contended, inter alia, that the dealer had violated section 407.025. Id. at 252-53. In Minton, we concluded that the law was clear that the buyer whose car was repossessed by the party holding title to the vehicle could not maintain an action for conversion against that party. Id. at 254. Noting the long list of authorities holding that under section 301.210, a purported buyer acquires no ownership or possessory rights in a motor vehicle without the relatively contemporaneous transfer of title, we ruled that Minton could not maintain her claim for conversion. Id. As to the claim under section 407.025, we held, after considering Jackson v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. App. 1984), that a transaction which did not include a valid title transfer pursuant to section...